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SACRIFICING LEGISLATIVE INTEGRITY AT THE 
ALTAR OF APPROPRIATIONS RIDERS: 
A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 
Sandra Beth Zellmer* 
The technique of appending substantive provisions to appro- 
priations bills has become a favorite tool of the legislative trade in 
recent years. Congress has employed appropriations riders to dic- 
tate the outcome of public policy issues ranging from abortion to 
oil development in pristine wilderness areas. Riders have been used 
with particularly destructive effect to circumvent long-standing en- 
vironmental policies, especially those involving the use of natural 
resources and public lands. In many cases, the policies affected 
were the result of decades of activity in Congress and in the courts, 
and retain broad public and legislative support. Appropriations rid- 
ers have also allowed these significant changes in policy to be 
made without public input or legislative accountability. The policy 
changes implemented through the appropriations process would 
likely not survive the scrutiny of natural resources committees and 
full floor debate. Appropriations riders have mandated dramatic 
changes in these carefully brokered policies, with highly disruptive 
effects on the long-term management and the sustainability of the 
public lands1 and natural resources. 
This Article explores several recent environmental riders and 
proposed riders, and their likely long-term effects. In particular, it 
focuses on the effects of the 1995 Rescissions Act2-specifically 
* U.S. Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources ~ivis ion;  L.L.M., 
George IVashington University, 1996; J.D., University of South Dakota, 1990; B.A., 
Morningside College, 1985. Paper submitted in partial satisfaction of the degree of Master 
of Laws. This Article represents only the views of the author. 
1. The term "public lands" includes lands managed by federal agencies with 
jurisdiction over natural resources: the Department of Agriculture National Forest Service 
and the Department of Interior Bureau of Land Management ("BLM), Fish and Wildlife 
Service, and National Park Service. 
2. Emergency SupplementaI Appropriations for Additional Disaster Assistance, for 
Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy that Occurred at 
Oklahoma City, and Rescissions Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-19, 109 Stat. 194 (1995) 
[hereinafter Rescissions Act]. 
Published in Harvard Environmental Law Review  Vol. 21 (1997), pp. 457-535.
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the Emergency Timber Salvage Rider3--on the management of natu- 
ral resources within federal forest lands in the Pacific Northwest. 
In an attempt to provide relief to communities dependent on log- 
ging of public lands, this rider undermined decades of land man- 
agement planning and overturned policies developed through ex- 
tended litigation and negotiations between industry, environmental- 
ists, state and local governments, and the executive branch of the 
federal government. The cumulative environmental effects of the 
rider are likely to ,persist long after the "emergency" indicated by 
the rider has passed. Yet, because of the abbreviated nature of the 
appropriations process, neither the public nor the legislators who 
voted on the timber rider were aware of its potentially far-reaching 
consequences. 
,This Article argues that the appropriations process is an ill- 
suited vehicle for formulating major changes in policy and estab- 
lishing national priorities. Indeed, the repeated abuse of the process 
to force executive action and, curtail judicial oversight has created 
a serious crisis. This Article examines several possible remedies, 
including the possibility of stricter judicial scrutiny of legislation 
passed by rider, as well as the enactment of line-item veto legisla- 
tion and legislation that would give congressional germaneness 
rules (limiting the subject matter of provisions that can be ap- 
pended to a bill) the force of law. Such legislation may be a step 
in the right direction; however, it may raise constitutional chal- 
lenges, and, in any event, none of these options would go far 
enough to prevent future legislative subterfuge. Moreover, as a 
practical matter, the fact that an interest is ,deemed a "right" does 
not necessarily preclude erosion of that right through appropria- 
tions riders.. 
This Article also considers proposals to recognize or create a 
constitutional right to sustainable public lands and natural resources, 
or a healthful environment, but determines that they are not the 
best solution. While such proposals merit further consideration, 
value-laden amendments find little support in our constitutional ' 
structure. 
Instead, this Article proposes the passage of a constitutional 
amendment that prohibits the use of appropriations measures to 
enact substantive exemptions or changes in the law. A process-ori- 
3. Id. at 240-47. 
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ented amendment would inhibit further legislative incursion on the 
constitutional checks and balances between political branches. As a 
result, important public policy decisions, such as environmental pri- 
orities, would be based on full and informed consideration of corn- 
peting interests and long-term effects. Such an amendment would be 
the most effective means of protecting the right to adequate repre- 
sentation and deliberative lawmaking, which are at the core of a 
democratic, republican government. It would also protect the-envi- 
ronment from the kinds of rider-based attacks that have become an 
all-too-frequent hallmark of the current legislative process. 
n. PRESENT PUBLIC LANDS POLICY AND LAWS ARE THE 
CULMINATION OF A CENTURY OF DELIBERATION AND RETAIN 
BROAD SUPPORT 
Today's natural resources laws build upon a century of experi- 
ence in managing federal lands and natural resources. The conflict 
between extractive, commodity-based uses and the need to preserve 
limited natural resources has presented a constant challenge to both 
legislative and executive decision makers throughout the twentieth 
century. Existing natural resources laws, "the pillars of federal envi- 
ronmental la~"~-the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),S 
the National Forest Management Act ("NF!MA"),6 the Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA"),7 and the Endangered Spe- 
cies Act ("ESA")8-represent Congress's considered efforts to re- 
solve these conflicts and balance competing interests. NFMA and 
FLPMA embody sustained yield and multiple use  principle^,^ while 
NEPA requires public participation and informed decisionmaking.1° 
The ESA establishes substantive protections for endangered and 
threatened species of wildlife." Together, these laws ensure con- 
-- - 
4. Victor Sher, Ancient Forests, Spotted Owls, and the Demise of Federal Environ- 
nlental Larv, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,469, 10,469 (1990). 
5. 42 U.S.C. $ 5  43214361 (1994). 
6. 16 U.S.C. $5 1600-1614 (1994). 
7. 43 U.S.C. $5 1701-1784 (1994). 
8. 16 U.S.C. $8 1531-1544 (1994). 
9. See id. $$ 528-31, 1600(3), 1604(e), (g)(3), 1611; 43 U.S.C. $5 1701(a)(7)-(8), 
1712(c)(l). 
10. See 42 U.S.C. $4332(2); see also Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 
490 U.S. 332, 350-51 (9th Cir. 1989). 
11. See 16 U.S.C. §$ 1536(a)(2), 1538(a)(1). 
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sideration of the interrelatedness of natural resources and their 
ecosystems, and strive to maintain them for future generations.12 
A. Long-Standing Natural ~esources Laws Strive to Strike a 
~ a l a n c e  between. Preservationist and Utilitarian Views 
Contemporary land use policies have their roots in forestry 
requirements .enacted near the end of the nineteenth century. In 
1891, Congress authorized the President to create forest reserves,13 
and millions of acres of forest lands were subsequently reserved 
from western public lands over the next two decades. l4 The Organic 
Administration Act of 189715 was the first management directive 
for the national forests, and Congress's first statement of the goal 
of maintaining a sustained yield from natural resources. It provided 
that forest reserves were to be established to secure favorable water 
flow conditions and to furnish a continuous ,timber supply.i6 Timber 
harvest was limited to "dead, matured, or large growth trees" marked 
and designated by a forester.17 
Planning became a centerpiece of federal forest management 
under Gifford Pinchot's guidance as Chief of the Division of 
Forestry, beginning as early as 1898,18 although formal 
forest planning was not legislatively required until the mid- 
12. See id. § 1604(b),(d)-(e); 43 U.S.C. $ 1712(c). 
13. See The Forest Reserve Act, ch. 561, $ 24,26 Stat. 1095, 1103 (1891) (codified 
in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., and 43 U.S.C.), repealed by Act 
of Oct. 21, 1976,. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2792. 
14. Presidents Harrison, Cleveland, and Theodore Roosevelt added over 50 forest 
reserves during their administrations. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON & H. MICHAEL ANDER- 
SON, LAND AND RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS 18 n.57 (1987); J. 
William Futrell, The History of Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FROM 
RESOURCES TO RECOVERY' 15 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 1993). Not surprisingly, 
these extensive withdrawals drew serious criticism from the western citizenry. See id, A 
special session of Congress was convened in 1897, resulting in the enactment of the 
Organic Administration Act of 1897 ("Organic Act"), ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34 (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. $8 473-482, 551 (1994)). Toward the end of the Roosevelt 
administration, Congress enacted a rider that barred further executive additions to forest 
reserves. See Futrell, supra, at 22. 
15. 16 U.S.C. $9 473482, 551. 
16. See id. $ 475. 
17. Id. Q 476, repealed by NFMA, id. $ 161 1. 
18. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 19-23; George Coggins, The 
Developing Larv of Land Use Planning on Federal Lands, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 307, 308, 
334 (1990) (detailing origins and current requirements of planning on both forest lands 
and other public lands). 
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1970s.19 Pinchot's long range plans required data collection, crea- 
tion of natural resource inventories, and assessment of management 
strategies,2O much as forest plans do today.*l In addition, these plans 
provided a strategy to guide individual land use decisions, and 
ensured that the sustained yield objectives would be met.22 
In the early twentieth century, two countervailing schools of 
thought began to develop with respect to management of public 
lands: utilitarianism, championed by Gifford Pinchot, and preser- 
vationism, associated with John Muir, founder of the Sierra Club.23 
Both sought to preserve forests for future generations, but the 
utilitarians promoted sustainable commodity production, while the 
preservationists focused on aesthetics and other non-commodity 
uses, typically associated with wilderness.24 This conflict, and the 
opposing resource management strategies it spawned, continues 
today.25 
Contemporary management mandates were established during 
the 1960s and 1970s, an era during which the preservationist view 
took hold.26 The first of these laws was the Multiple-Use, Sus- 
19. See Coggins, supra note 18, at 308. The passage of NEPA in 1969 "fore- 
shadow[ed] formal land planning mechanisms." Id. 
20. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 22-23. 
21. See FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. 33 1712, 1732 (1994); NFMA, 16 U.S.C. 3 1604. 
22. See Coggins, supra note 18, at 308,319-25,333-37(discussing past and present 
Bureau of Land Management ("BLM) and Forest Service management mandates). "Sus- 
tained yield" is defined as "the achievement and maintenance of a high-level annual or 
regular periodic output of the various renewable resources of the national forests without 
impairment of production of the land." 16 U.S.C. 531(b). See generally WILKINSON & 
ANDERSON, supra note 14, at Chapter N 
23. See Kenneth L. Rosenbaum, limber, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FROM RESOURCES 
TO RECOVERY 387 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 1993); Futrell, supra note 14, at 
20-21. 
24. See Rosenbaum, supra note 23, at 387, 390. The Wilderness Society and the 
National Wildlife Federation were both formed in 1935 to advance wilderness values and 
protect wildlife, respectively. See id. 
25. For example, the recent reservation of public lands in Utah raised vastly 
divergent viewpoints. Preservationists praised the creation of the Grand Staircase-Esca- 
lante National Monument as "visionary" and "a brave and true act," while county officials 
and industry representatives labelled i t  the "most arrogant gesture" ever seen. David 
Maraniss, Clinton Acts To Protect Utah land,  WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1996, at Al ,  AlO. 
26. Environmental issues were brought to the forefront by a number of widely read 
publications; perhaps the most critical example was RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 
(1962). For an important work in the natural resources area, see ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND 
COUNTY ALMANAC 236-39 (1966) ("A land . . . ethic reflects the existence of an ecological 
conscience, and this in turn reflects a conviction of individual responsibility for the health 
of the land:'). In addition, increased access to national and world events through the 
media, and the broadcast of photographs of earth from the moon, fostered a new ecological 
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tained-Yield Act of 1960 (MUSY),27 which was unanimously passed 
by Congress and added the concept of multiple use to the sustained 
yield objective of the Organic Act.28 
Critical natural resources laws, which prioritized preservation 
and protection over extraction and exploitation, were enacted as 
well: the Wilderness Act of 1964,29 the National Historic Preserva- 
tion Act in 1966,3O the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act in 1968,31 the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,32 and the Endangered 
Species Act of 1973.33 Numerous laws specific to Forest Service 
and BLM lands were also passed: the Forest and Rangeland Re- 
newable Resources Planning Act of 1974,34 the Federal Land Policy 
and Management Act of 1976,35 and the National Forest Manage- 
ment Act of 1976.36 Together, these statutes built upon lessons 
learned over nearly a century of public lands management, striving 
to strike a balance between divergent viewpoints and ushering in 
a new era of comprehensive, ecologically based planning open to 
citizen involvement ." 
B. Despite Recent Polarization, Preservation of the Nation's 
Resources Retains Broad Support 
The past two decades have witnessed two contrary trends: an 
intensified hostility to government control over natural resources, 
awareness: "[e]xtrate~estrial exploration . . . [has given] modern man a unique perspective 
on the earth and his natural environment . . . . [W]e have finally realized that no matter 
. . . how far afield our explorations take us, and no matter how great our vision, we must 
always return to earth." Edmund S. Muskie, Environmental Jurisdiction in the Coltgress 
and the Executive, 22 ME. L. REV. 171, 171 (1970). 
27. 16 U.S.C. $0 528-531 (1994). 
28. Id. $8 473479. 
29. Id. $3  1131-1136. 
30. Id. $8 470-470~-6. 
31. Id. $8 1271-1287. 
32. 42 U.S.C. $$ 4321-4370a (1994). 
33. 16 U.S.C. $5 1531-1544. 
34. 16 U.S.C. $5 1600-1687. 
35. 43 U.S.C. 85 1701-1782 (1994). BLM lands in Oregon and northern California 
are governed by a separate charter that stresses sustained yield management. See 43 U.S.C. 
$ 1181a. 
36. 16 U.S.C. $8 1600-1614. 
37. These statutes, coupled with the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946,5 U.S.C. 
$3 551-559, 701-706 (1994), provide a basis for citizen intervention and judicial review 
of agency action and strive to balance the perennial conflict between preservationists and 
utilitarians. See MUSY, 16 U.S.C. $ 475; NFMA, 16 U.S.C. $ 1604. 
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and a growing sense of urgency to protect the global environment. 
Private property rights proponents have gained momentum through 
the Wise Use and Sagebrush Rebellion movements, which advocate 
privatization of public lands and a dramatically diminished role for 
federal over~ igh t .~~  Meanwhile, events such as the 1992 Conference 
on the Environment and Development (the "Earth Summit") sig- 
nified an international awareness of the relationship between hu- 
mankind's future well-being and the protection of the global envi- 
r ~ n m e n t . ~ ~  The Summit "marked the emergence" of the "'central 
organizing principle' of the post-Cold War world-namely the task 
of protecting the earth's environment while fostering economjc 
progress,"40 and ushered in "a new generation of global treaties 
aimed at promoting sustainable economic progress and healing the 
relationship between civilization and the fragile ecological system 
of the earth."41 
Despite increased polarization between extremists at either 
end of the spectrum, public support for progress on environmental 
goals has in general remained steadfast.42 This support has encour- 
aged continued efforts to resolve differences through compromise 
and negotiated solutions. The premier example of a successful 
negotiated compromise is the Northwest Forest Plan, which made 
major strides toward resolving the decades-long controversy over 
the northern spotted 
38. See Thomas R. Huffman, Legislatures and the Environment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1313, 1326-27 (Joel H. Silbey ed., 1994). The Wise 
Use movement gained strength during the Reagan administration, with the appointment of 
James Watt as Secretary of the Interior. See Denis Hayes, Environmental Law and 
Milleilnial Politics, 25 ENVTL. L. REV. 953, 958 (1995) (Wise Use movement continues 
to present a "disciplined opposition [to the environmental movement] that displays a robust 
pride in being 'anti-environmental."'). For in-depth discussions of this movement, see 
Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspective of the 
Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL. L. 847 (1982); John D. Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush 
Rebellion: Law, Politics and Federal Lands, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 317 (1980). 
39. See AL GORE, JR., EARTH IN THE BALANCE at xiii-xiv , 180, 183-84 (Plume 
ed. 1992). 
40. Id. at xv. 
41. Id. at xii. 
42. See, e-g., Jessica Mathews, Prognosis for the Environment, WASH. POST, Jan. 
13, 1997, at A17 (noting that even environmentalists have been surprised by breadth and 
strength of public opposition to the Contract With America's anti-environmental provi- 
sions); James Gerstenzang, Environmentalists See Attacks by Foes Easing in Congress, Los 
ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 2, 1997, at A14 (noting that public pressure during the re-election 
campaign has made it unlikely that the anti-environmental initiatives of the 104th Congress 
will be repeated). 
43. The results of these negotiations are contained in U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE 
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This spirit of compromise came to an end with the "Republi- 
can Revolution" of 1994, as party leaders sought to implement a 
"Contract with America" founded in large part on private property 
rights.44 Republican leaders in the 104th Congress made strenuous 
efforts to dismantle decades of environmental law.45 When their 
proposals to change the law were unsuccessful in regular legislative 
riders were attached to appropriations bills.47 Among those 
enacted were the salvage timber ridefls and a moratorium on listing 
endangered, species.49 Numerous others were proposed, but were 
ultimately unsu~cessful,5~ 
ET AL., RECORD OF DECISION (ROD) FOR A~ENDMENTS TO FOREST SERVICE A N D  BUREAU 
OF LAND MANAGEMENT PLANNING DOCUMENTS WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE NORTHERN 
SPOTTED-OWL (1994) [hereinafter FOREST PLAN ROD], discussed in detail infra Part 1II.A. 
See 59 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 20, 1994) (providing notice that the ROD was signed by 
the Sec'y of the Interior and Dep. Sec'y of Agriculture); see also Seattle Audubon Soc'y 
v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (discussing innovative nature of the Forest 
Plan, which strove to resolve years of conflict in the Pacific Northwest, and finding that 
it satisfied environmental laws), affJd, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996). 
44. See Christopher Georges, Wider Property Owner Compensation May Prove a 
Costly Clause in the "Contract with America," WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1994, at A8; 
Marianne Lavelle, GOP Marches into New Deregulation Battle, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 19, 1994, 
at A16; Mary Beth Regan, The GOP's Guerilla War on Green La~vs, BUS. WK., Dec. 12, 
1994, at 102. 
45.' Secretary of Interior Bruce ~ a b b i t r  equated the GOP's Contract with America 
with an "invisible contract" with lobbyists, who have been allowed to "literally rewrit[e] 
our environmental and resource protection laws." Bruce Babbitt, Springtime for Polluters, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1995, at C2; see also Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Larv as 
a Mirror of the Future: Civic Values Confronting Market Force Dynamics in a Time of 
Counter-Revolution, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 733, 734, 761 (1996) ("Many would 
conclude that the Marketplace won the election and that environmental law was the 
preordained enemy of the Limbaughian majorities that took power. Significantly, industrial 
lobbyists straightforwardly took over the legislative process in the 104th Congress."). 
46. See, e.g., Babbit, supra note 45 (discussing failed efforts to pass legislation 
opening the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil and gas drilling and mining reform); 
Gerstenzang, supra note 42 (noting that efforts to enact revisions of the Endangered 
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. $0 1531-1544 (1994), and the Superfund law, 42 U.S.C $5 9601- 
9675 (1994), were unsuccessful in the 104th Congress); discussion infra Parts 111-V 
(describing attempts to enact these and other changes piecemeal through appropriations 
riders). 
47. See discussion infra Parts 1V.B-.C. 
48. See Rescissions Act, Pub. L. No. 104-19, 109 Stat. 194, 240-48. 
49. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions for the Depart- 
ment of Defense to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 
104-6, 109 Stat. 73, 86. The 104th Congress did not limit its riders to environmental 
issues; it forayed into'numerous other public policy areas as well, such as abortion, 
immigration, and medical "gag rules." See discussion infra Parts 1V.B-.C. 
50. For example, the proposed Appropriations for the Department of Interior and 
Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 1996, House Bill 1977, 104th Cong. 
(1995), contained numerous riders that would increase logging in the Tongass National 
Forest, restrict protections for the Mojave National Desert, and curtail or prohibit the 
Forest Service and BLM initiative to create a Columbia River Basin Ecosystem Manage- 
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m. THE 1995 ~ M B E R  RIDER ,DEMONSTRATES THE ADVERSE 
CONSEQUENCES OF APPROPRIATIONS RIDERS, AND THEIR 
DISTORTION OF THE PROCESS OF PUBLIC DEBATE AND INFORMED 
DECISIONMAKING 
The Rescissions Act of 1995 "making emergency supplemen- 
tal appropriations for additional disaster assistance, for . . . the 
tragedy that occurred at Oklahoma City" was signed into law by 
President Clinton on July 22, 1995.51 An early product of the first 
Republican Congress in 40 years, the Rescissions Act was consid- 
ered a "down payment" on deficit reduction5* and an indication of 
the new Congress's fiscal resolve.53 
Included in the Rescissions Act was a provision that had nothing 
to do with fiscal restraint, but nonetheless demonstrated another 
priority of the Republican majority. The so-called Emergency Salvage 
Timber Rider, inserted by Rep. Taylor and picked up by Senator 
Gorton in the appropriations committees, sought to overturn dec- 
ment Strategy. The bill was vetoed. See 141 CONG. REC. H15,057 (daily e'd., Dec. 18, 
1995). Similarly, the Balanced Budget Act of 1995, House BiIl2491, 104th Cong. (1995), 
which was also vetoed, see 141- CONG. REC. H14,136-37 (daily ed., Dec. 6, 1995), 
included a rider that would open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil and gas 
exploration and development. See also discussion infra Part IV.B.3. 
51. See Pub. L. 104-19, § 2001, 109 Stat. 194 (1995). In its original form, House 
Bill 1158, the Rescissions Act drew the first veto of the Clinton administration, in part 
because of the inclusion of this rider, as well as objectionable cuts to education. See 141 
CONG. REC. H5315, H5339-52 (daily ed., May 18, 1995). With respect to the timber rider, 
the Administration stated that the definition of "salvage" was too broad and opposed the 
provision that would overturn the existing land management framework under the North- 
west Forest Plan: 
The carefully crafted balance in the Forest Plan allows for a sustainable timber 
harvest as well as environmental protection. This Plan was key to the release 
of a court injunction on logging in the territory of the Northern Spotted Owl 
and represents a finely crafted compromise that took two years to achieve. The 
Administration believes that i t  can expedite Option 9 sales without setting 
aside the existing land management framework. 
Id. at 5341. The Act, including the timber rider, was ultimately passed in slightly revised 
form. See Pub. L. No. 104-19, 9 2001, 109 Stat. at 240-47 (1995). 
52. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. H6594 (daily ed. June 29, 1995) (Statement of Rep. 
Dreier). 
53. The Act removed $16.4 billion already appropriated for governmental opera- 
tions during the current fiscal year. See Dan Morgan & Tom Kenworthy, Pair of Liberals 
Block Bill on Spending Cuts, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, July I ,  1995 at A8. 
Traditionally Democratic priorities, such as low-income housing, summer jobs funding, 
and federal education programs were particularly targeted by the rescissions process. See, 
e.g., David Rogers, Conferees Agree on Spending Cut Bill, Setting Up Confrontation With 
Clinton, WALL ST. J.,  May 17, 1995, at A2. 
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ades of environmental policy and compromise relating to logging 
in sensitive old growth forests of the Pacific Northwest. In particu- 
lar, it attempted to bypass the comprehensive forest management 
principles of the Northwest Forest Plan-the recently completed 
and much-publicized outcome of negotiations between environmen- 
talists and industry, which was strongly supported by President Clin- 
ton. Under the guise of expediting "salvage" sales of timber, the 
rider mandated timber sales without regard to the Plan, prevented 
or reduced the potential for environmental analysis and mitigation, 
and narrowly circumscribed the possibility of judicial review.54 
The effects of the bill have been dramatic, causing the cutting 
of millions of board feet of additional timber in areas that had been 
declared off-limits, and using methods that but for the rider would 
have been prohibited by a variety of environmental statutes. Al- 
though many of the provisions of the rider have this will 
not undo the damage done by the rider either to the sensitive forest 
ecosystems or to the integrity of the political process. Long term 
damage has likely been done to sensitive habitat and resident wild- 
life by the harvesting allowed and in some cases mandated by the 
Act. At the same time, by enacting the timber rider through the 
appropriations process, Congressional leaders have denied their 
own members the opportunity to make an informed decision about 
whether these sales were wise policy or even an efficient use of 
the public's natural  resource^.^^ 
54. Section 2000 has been characterized as "order[ingJ the Forest Service and BLM 
to sell off some of the nation's healthiest and most ecologically valuable ancient forests 
at bargain basement prices." Michael Axline, Forest Health and the Politics of Expediency, 
26 ENVTL. L. 613, 614 (1996). 
55. Sections 2001(b) and (d) expired December 31, 1996, but contracts offered prior 
to that date continue to be governed by the rider. See 20010). Section 2001(k) expired 
on September 30, 1996, see § 2001(a)(2), but harvest of many awarded contracts contin- 
ues. 
56. "[Tlhe issue of whether ecologically important federal timber, which supports 
a variety of environmental values, should be used to support a jobs program for mills has 
never received the congressional attention that such an important and complex issue 
deserves." Axline, supra note 54, 54, at 625 (1996). See Muskie, supra note 26, at 172 
("me should exercise extreme caution concerning every decision which may affect the 
environment; we should insure that our public institutions have the capacity to evaluate 
environmental hazards and to reduce those hazards to an absolute minimum."). 
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A. The Northwest Forest Plan, Developed through Extensive 
Negotiation between Aflected Parties, Represents a 
Comprehensive Approach to Old Growth Forest Management 
Old growth part of a complex ecosystem in the Pacific 
Northwest, provide habitat to hundreds of wildlife and aquatic spe- 
cies, including at least eight threatened or endangered species.58 
They also fulfill important watershed functions by inhibiting ero- 
sion and flooding.59 Pacific Northwest old growth is rapidly disap- 
pearing-roughly ten percent of the original ancient forest domain 
is left in the region.60 This is virtually the only old growth left in 
the nation, and almost all of it is located on public landse61 
Management of public forest lands in the Pacific Northwest 
has been marked by controversy since the 1 9 7 0 ~ , ~ ~  symbolized by 
the highly visible and heated debate over the. northern spotted 
57. Old growth stands are forest stands, typically mature conifers such as Douglas 
fir, between 175 and 250 years old, with moderate to high canopy closure, dominated by 
large overstory trees and numerous large snags and accumulations of downed wood. See 
FOREST ECOSYSTEM ANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT TEAM: AN ECOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT IX-24 (1993) [hereinafter FEMAT REPORT]; FOREST PLAN ROD, 
supra note 43, at F-4. For a detailed discussion of Pacific Northwest old growth ecosys- 
tems, see ELLIOTT A. NORSE, ANCIENT FORESTS OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST (1990). 
58. See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, CRITICAL HABITAT FOR THE NORTHERN 
SPOTTED OWL 66-70 (1992); FEMAT REPORT, supra note 57, at 11-3-4, 30-40. 
59. They have been held to contribute "some of the highest quality waters flowing 
into the major rivers in the American West." Linda M. Bolduan, The Hatjeld Riders: 
Eliminating the Role of the Courts in Environmental Decision Making, 20 ENVTL. L. 329, 
342 (1990). See generally CHARLES E WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, 
WATER AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 156-67 (1992) (discussing ancient forests of the 
Pacific Northwest). 
60. There are about 2.5 million acres of old growth forests where 19 million acres 
once stood. See ~VILKINSON, supra note 59, at 157. Late successional reserves, which are 
forests in mature stages, see FEMAT REPORT, supra note 57, at IX-18, including old 
growth, comprise an additional 7.5 million acres of forest lands. See FOREST PLAN ROD, 
supra note 43, at 6. 
61. See WILKINSON, supra note 59, at 157. Science knows no way to create 
"man-made" old growth forests; nor can it markedly hasten the natural processes that form 
them. See id. at 165 (quoting SOCIETY OF AMERICAN FORESTERS, SCHEDULING THE 
HARVEST OF OLD GROWTH 17 (1984)); see also FEMAT REPORT, supra note 57, at 11-3 
(noting that ecologists now believe ecosystems in old forests in the Pacific Northwest may 
have developed under climatic conditions that cannot be duplicated). 
62. There are numerous articles that detail the history of the controversy and the 
litigation that it spawned. See, e.g., Bolduan, supra note 59; Steven L. Yaffee, Lessons 
About Leadership from the History of the Spotted Owl Controversy, 35 NAT. RESOURCES 
J. 381 (1995); Andrea L. Hungerford, Changing the Management of Public k n d s  Forests: 
The Role of the Spotted Owl Injunctions, 24 ENVTL. L. 1395 (1994); Victor M. Sher, 
Travels with Strix: The Spotted Owl's Journey through the Federal Courts, 14 PUB. LAND 
L. REV. 41 (1993). The history of the litigation over the spotted owl controversy is also 
set forth in Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1300 (W.D. Wash. 1994). 
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Spotted owl populations had been in decline, and forest 
health in question, since 1973, when an interagency committee 
recommended that the owl be listed under the ESA.'j4 Listing finally 
occurred in 1990.65 The dispute over the management of spotted 
owl habitat spawned more than a dozen lawsuits, resulting in at 
least three separate injunctions against the Bureau of Land Man- 
agement ("BLM") and the Forest Service under NFMA, FLPMA, 
ESA, and NEPA,'j6 which severely restricted federal timber sales.'j7 
In the midst of the spotted owl'controversy, section 318 of the 
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act for Fiscal Year 1990, also referred to as the HatfieldIAdams 
Rider, became law.68 Section 3 18 was intended to balance the desire 
for a predictable flow of public timber with the goal of preserving 
significant old growth forest stands for the northern spotted 0 ~ 1 . ~ 9  
Subsection 318(a) set an overall target level of timber from na- 
tional forests and BLM lands in Oregon and Washington for fiscal 
years 1989 and 1990.70 The statute set forth procedures for expe- 
dited review and prohibitions on injunctions and restraining or- 
63. The spotted owl, an indicator species, is viewed as "a surrogate for the other 
species that inhabit the forest:' and a monitor for the overall vitality of forest vegetation 
and watersheds. See Bolduan, supra note 59, at 342; 36 C.F.R. 5 219.19 (providing 
guidelines for seIection of indicator species and maintenance of their habitat). 
64. See Hungerford, supra note 62, at 1404; Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 
F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988). 
65. See 55 Fed. Reg. 26.114 (1990) (codified at' 50 C.F.R. 3 17 (1993)). 
66. For BLM litigation, see Lane County Audubon Soc'y v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290 
(9th Cir. 1992); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 795 F. Supp. 1489 (D. Or. 1992), aff'd 
sub nom. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993); Portland 
Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. 1456 (D. Or. 1989). aff'd in relevant part, 884 F.2d 
1233 (9th Cir. 1989); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 21,210,21,213 
(D. Or. 1988), rev'd and rem'd, 866 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1989). For Forest Service cases, 
see Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1473 (W.D. Wash. 1992), a f d  siib 
nom. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993); Seattle Audubon Soc'y 
v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081 (W.D. Wash. 1991), aff'd in part, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 
1991); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, No. C89-160-WD (W.D. Wash. Nov. 6, 1989), 
rev'd, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd and rem'd, 503 U.S. 429 (1992). The litigation 
is concisely summarized in Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1299- 
1302 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd sub nom. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley 80 F.3d 1401 
(9th Cir. 1996). 
67. See FOREST PLAN ROD, supra note 43, at 1. 
68. See Dept. of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. 
L. No. 101-121, $ 318, 103 Stat. 701, 745-50 (1989); 135 CONG. REC. S8762, 8795-97 
(daily ed., July 26, 1989). For a discussion of a series of riders that governed timber 
harvest in the Northwest, see Bolduan, supra note 59, at 329. 
69. See Gifford Pinchot Alliance v. Butruille, 742 F. Supp. 1077, 1079 @. Or. 
1990). 
70. $ 3.18(a)(l), 103 Stat. at 745. 
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ders,7' and required certain minimal environmental safeguards in 
lieu of existing These procedures applied exclusively to 
timber sales from the "thirteen national forests in Oregon and 
Washington and [BLM] Management districts in western Oregon 
known to contain northern spotted owls."73 
Despite Congress's attempt to reduce governmental interfer- 
ence and encourage timber production, some section 318 sales 
were delayed or suspended by litigation. Section 318 itself was 
challenged on constitutional grounds, with the Supreme Court ul- 
timately affirming the law in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soci- 
ety.74 A number of section 318 sales were enjoined while this issue 
moved through the courts.75 Other sales were challenged over their 
compliance with the specific terms of section 318, such as the 
requirement to minimize fragmentation of ecologically significant 
old Many such sales did not go forward because of con- 
cerns about impacts to listed species, particularly the marbled mur- 
re1et77 and spotted 
In April 1993, in response to judicial decisions .that halted 
logging in essentially all federal old growth forests within the 
range of the spotted owl, the Clinton Administration convened the 
Forest Conference in Portland, Oregon. As a result of the confer- 
ence, the interdisciplinary Forest Ecosystem Management Assess- 
ment Team ("FEMAT") was assembled to produce a scientific op- 
tions rep0rt.~9 The FEMAT report was then analyzed, along with 
p-~~ 
71. See 5 318(d),(f)(l),(g), 103 Stat. at 748-50. ~ - 
72. Although section 318 directed the agencies to sell ecologically significant old 
growth only as necessary and in a manner designed to minimize the effects of fragmen- 
tation within each sale, see 5 318(b)(1),(2), and provided that nothing was to affect 
interagency cooperation under the ESA and its regulations, see 5 318(e), it was a 
"piecemeal approach to forest resource use when a broad, long-term vision is needed." 
Bolduan, supra note 59, at 375. 
73. See 318(i), 103 Stat. at 750. 
74. 503 U.S. 429 (1992). 
75. See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 795 E Supp. 1489 (D. Or. 1992). 
76. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, No. C89-160-WD, (W.D. Wash. Nov. 
6, 1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 131 1 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd and rem'd, 503 U.S. 429 (1992). 
77. On September 28, 1992, the FWS listed the marbled murreIet, a seabird that is 
also dependent on old growth forest stands, as a threatened species. See 57 Fed. Reg. 
45,328 11992). 
78. See Lone Rock Timber Co. v. United States Dept. of Interior, 842 F. Supp. 433 
(D. Or. 1994). See generally Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. 
Wash. 1994), aff'd sub nom. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. MoseIey, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 
1996). I 
79. See FEMAT REPORT, supra note 57. 
470 Haward Environmental Law Review [Vol. 21 
its suggested alternatives for forest management, in the Supple- 
mental Environmental Impact Statement ("SEIS") for the North- 
west Forest Plans0 
The Record of Decision ("ROD") for Amendments to Forest 
Service and BLM Planning Documents Within the Range of the 
Northern Spotted Owl (the Northwest Forest Plan) was issued in 
April 1994,81 in "an attempt to anticipate and forestall future envi- 
ronmental problems, avoiding the severe economic dislocation and 
legal gridlock that occur when environmental problems are ig- 
n ~ r e d . " ~ ~  The agencies characterized the Northwest Forest Plan as 
an "unprecedented effort in public land management."83 The Plan 
represents a comprehensive ecosystem approach, analyzing the in- 
terrelatedness of all resources-timber, fish and wildlife, water 
quality-as well as economic well-being over a vast planning area. 
It is the first time that the BLM and the Forest Service, two of the 
largest federal land management agencies, have worked together to 
develop a common management approach for public lands through- 
out an entire ecosystem.84 It was also strongly supported by the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,s5 
The ROD consists of extensive standards, guidelines, and Iand 
allocations that comprise a comprehensive ecosystem management 
strategy, designed to end the decades-long spotted owl controversy by 
accommodating both the need for sustained timber yield and pro- 
tection of forest  resource^.^^ It establishes two primary categories 
of land allocation: reserves, including late-successional reservesa7 
80. See FOREST PLAN ROD, supra note 43, at 1. The draft SEIS was made available 
on July 28, 1993, see 58 Fed. Reg. 40,444-45 (1993), and generated over 100,000 public 
comments. See U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE ET AL., FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRON- 
MENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT app. 4 (1994) [hereinafter FINAL SEIS]; see also FOREST 
PLAN ROD, supra note 43, at 25-28, 65-73. The final SEIS was released in February 
1994. See 59 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (1994). It considered 10 alternatives in detail, selected from 
48 strategies analyzed in the FEMAT report. See Moseley, 80 E3d at 1404. 
81. See 59 Fed. Reg. 18,788. 
82. FOREST PLAN ROD, supra note 43, at 1-2. It is intended to "provide for a steady 
supply of timber sales and nontimber resources that can be sustained over the long-term 
without degrading the health of the forest or other environmental resources!' Id. at 3-4. 
83. Id. at 1; see also Lyons, 871 F. Supp. at 1303. 
84. See FOREST PLAN ROD, supra note 43, at 1. 
85. See FINAL SEIS, supra note 80, at app. G. 
86. See id. at 3-4; Moseley, 80 F.3d at 1404 (the alternative selected, Option 9, 
protects wildlife viability while allowing other multiple use activities). 
87. Late successional reserves are forests in mature stages, including old growth. 
See FEMAT REPORT, supra note 57, at IX-18. A mature stand is defined as one "for which 
the annual net rate of growth has peaked," and includes those generally between 100 and 
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and riparian reserves ,** where programmed harvest is severely re- 
stri~ted;~g and "matrix" and "adaptive management" areas, where 
harvest may proceed in accordance with the Plan's  requirement^.^^ 
Immediately after the ROD was issued, environmental groups 
and industry groups brought a series of actions challenging the 
legality of the Northwest Forest Plan. Environmentalists challenged, 
inter alia, the Plan's compliance with NEPA and with NFMA 
wildlife "viability" regulations, alleging that the ROD did not en- 
sure that a viable population of old growth forest dependent spe- 
cies, including the northern spotted owl, would be maintained.g1 
Industry groups alleged that the Plan was too restrictive, in viola- 
tion of NlFMA, FLPMA, NEPA, and other laws.92 
In December 1994, Judge Dwyer, of the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Washington, rejected all challenges, and declared 
the Plan to be lawful under NEPA, NFMA and their implementing 
reg~lations.9~ The Ninth Circuit affirmed, noting that the litigation 
had presented a "substantial controversy . . . surrounding a plan 
designed to bring some much needed coherence to the management 
of federal forests in the Pacific Nor th~es t . "~~  
180 years old. See id. at IX-20. Old growth, by comparison, is usually 175-250 years old, 
with larger diameter and greater structural complexity. See id. at IX-20, IX-24. 
88. A riparian area includes "the aquatic ecosystem and adjacent upland areas that 
directly affect it:' including floodplain, woodlands, and areas within approximately 100 
feet of the high-water mark of a stream or the shoreline of a standing water body. See 
FEMAT REPORT, supra note 57, at M-30. 
89. Certain salvage and thinning activities are allowed. See FOREST PLAN ROD, 
supra note 43, at 2. 
90. See id. at 2, 6-11. Programmed harvest may occur on approximately 22% of 
the 24 million acres of federal land in the planning area. See id. Harvest levels under the 
Plan are expected to be about one-fourth of pre-litigation 1980s levels. See Hungerford, 
supra note 62, at 1430 (citing Draft SEIS at S-16). 
91. See Supplemental Complaint at ¶¶ 1-3, Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. 
Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (Civil No. 92-479D), aff'd sub nom. Seattle Audubon 
Soc'y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996). 
92. See Northwest Forest Resources Council (NFRC) v. Dombeck, No. 94-1031-TPJ 
(D.D.C.) (complaint filed May 11, 1994); Northwest Forest Resources Council v. Thomas, 
No. 94-1032-TPJ 0.D.C.) (complaint filed May 11, 1994); Lyons, 871 F. Supp. at 1300. 
93. 871 F. Supp. at 1300. The three-year logging ban had been lifted earlier that 
year. See Hungerford, supra note 62, at 1431. 
94. Moseley, 80 F.3d at 1406. 
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B. The 1995 Timber Rider's Provisions Required or Encouraged 
Sales that May Proceed Regardless of Violations of the Forest 
Plan or Environmental Law 
I.  Subsection (k) of the Timber Rider Required the Release of 
Previously Cancelled or Enjoined Sales 
Subsection 2001(k) of the Rescissions Act directs the Secre- 
taries of the Interior and Agriculture to, inter alia: 
act to award, release, and permit to be completed in fiscal years 
1995 and 1996, with no change in originally advertised terms, 
volumes, and bid prices, all timber sale contracts offered or 
awarded before that date in any unit of the National Forest 
System or district of the Bureau of Land Management subject 
to section 318 of Public Law 101-121 (103 Stat. 745).95 
At the time the bill was signed into law, it was widely believed 
that subsection 2001(k) applied to a discrete set of remaining 
section 318 saIes.g6 However, immediately after the rider was en- 
acted, timber industry representatives sought to compel the release 
of all timber sales offered prior to the rider's enactment on all 
public lands within the geographic scope of section 3 1 8.97 
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon 
agreed with the timber industry's expansive interpretation, and or- 
dered the BLM to release all pending timber sales in western 
Oregon and the Forest Service to release all pending timber sales 
on any national forest within the states of Washington and Ore- 
g ~ n . ~ *  The, court's order was affirmed by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on April 24, 1996.99 These rulings 
required the release of sixty-two additional sales, totalling 230 mil- 
95. Pub. L. 104-19, § 2001(k)(l), 109 Stat. 194 (1995). 
96. See U.S. FOREST SERVICE, EFFECTS STATEMENT, Ex. D to United States' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Temporary Restraining Order, NFRC v. Glickman (NERC 
I), 82 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-6244-MRH). As discussed supra Part III.A.2, 
section 318 applied exclusiveiy to sales offered in fiscal years 1989 and 1990 in the 13 
national forests in Oregon and Washington and BLM districts in western Oregon known 
to contain northern spotted owls. See Pub. L. No. 101-121, 5 318(i), 103 Stat. 701, 750 
(1989). 
97. See NFRC v. Glickman, No. CV-95-06244-MRH (complaint filed Aug. 8, 1995). 
98. See NFRC v. Glickman, No. 95-6244 (D. Or. Sept. 13, 1995). 
99. See NFRC 1, 82 R3d 825 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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lion board feet (MMBF) over and above the remaining section 318 
sales volume.100 
The district court entered a second order in the case, which 
held, inter alia, that section 2001(k) required the release of all 
sales in Oregon and Washingtonlol if the bids were opened during 
the relevant time period.lo2 The Ninth Circuit also affirmed that 
decision.lo3 Thus, subsection (k) required the release of all sales 
that had been offered any time in the last five years anywhere on 
public lands in the states of Washington and Oregon-even if the 
sales had been withheld or enjoined for failure to comply with the 
Northwest Forest Plan or any environmental law or regulation.lo4 
2. The Rider Provided Agencies with Virtually Non-Reviewable 
Discretion to Execute Timber Sales 
By combining a broad grant of authority with explicit restric- 
tions on judicial review, the timber rider made it virtually impos- 
sible to successfully challenge salvage sale awards. Section 2001(b) 
provided that salvage sales shall be offeredato the maximum ex- 
tent feasible . . . above the programmed level" of harvest, notwith- 
standing any other law or previously entered judicial order.Io5 "Sal- 
vage timber sale" was defined very broadly: a sale "for which an 
important reason for entry includes the removal of . . . dead, dam- 
aged, or down trees."lo6 The statute provided expedited procedures 
for these salvage sales: the Secretary could rely on pre-existing 
100. See United States' Memorandum in Support of Emergency Motion for Stay 
Pending Appeal, at 5-6, 19-20 (filed Oct. 19, 1995) (No. 95-36038). Replacement timber 
was offered for some sales under a narrow exception provided in section 2001(k)(2), 
allowing harvesting to be done in less environmentally sensitive areas, see NFRC v. 
Glickman (NFRC 11), 97 E.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 1996); Tom Kenworthy, U.S., Timber 
Firrns Agree to Save Old-Growth Tracts, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1996, at A3. 
101. See NFRC v. Glickman, No. 95-6255-MJH, slip op. at 16 (D. Or. Jan. 10, 
1996). 
102. The court held that Pacific Northwest timber sales offered between October 
23, 1989, the date of section 318's enactment, and July 27, 1995, the date of enactment 
of the 1995 timber rider, must be released. See id. at 13. 
103. See NFRC 11, 97 F.3d at 1165-66. The Ninth Circuit subsequently denied the 
environmental groups' motion for clarification of this issue, rejecting their argument that 
sales that had been found to violate applicable laws (other than section 318 itself) at the 
time they were offered were void ab initio. See NEXC v. Glickman, No. 96-35132 (9th 
Cir. July 23, 1996). 
104. See id. 
105. See Pub. L. No. 104-19, 5 2001(b)(l), 109 Stat. 194, 241 (1995). 
106. 5 2001(a)(3). 
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documents, no matter how dated they were, or prepare a document 
that combined "an environmental assessment . . . [under NEPA] 
and a biological evaluation" under the ESA.lo7 
In addition, section 2001(f) severely restricted the scope and 
timing of judicial review of salvage sale decisions.lo8 The scope of 
review was limited to a determination of whether the decision was 
"arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with ap- 
plicable law (other than laws specijied in subsection (i))."lo9 This 
limitation essentially exempted sa1vage.sales from the requirements 
of all major federal environmental and natural resources laws."O 
Section 2001(f) further discouraged challenges by permitting suits 
to be brought only within 15 days of a sale's initial advertise- 
ment.lll 
Subsection (d) of the Act directed the Secretary to "expedi- 
tiously prepare, offer, and award timber sale contracts" on forests 
covered by the Northwest Forest Plan notwithstanding any other 
law or pre-enactment judicial order.lI2 Like section 2001 (b), sub- 
section (d) specifically prohibited judicial review based on environ- 
mental laws, including - NFMA, NEPA and the ESA.l13 The Ninth 
Circuit found that the requirement that sales proceed "notwith- 
standing any other law," and the limitation on judicial review, left 
it with essentially no law to apply to challenges based on environ- 
mental concerns. u4 
107. Q 2001(c)(l)(A) (citing NEPA, 42 U.S.C. Q 4332 (1995); ESA 3 7(a)(2), 16 
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1985)). 
108. See Q 2001(f)(4)-(5). 
109. Q 2001(f)(4) (emphasis added). 
110. It provides that, with respect to any activity related to a salvage timber sale: 
"The documents and procedures : . . shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements of the 
following applicable Federal laws (and regulations implementing such laws): . . . [NEPA, 
the ESA, NFMA], [and] . . . [all1 other applicable Federal environmental and natural 
resource laws." $ 2001(i). President Clinton has directed the agencies to comply with 
environmental laws "to the maximum extent allowed" and to conduct sales in an "envi- 
ronmentally sound manner," and the agencies have issued agreements and directives to 
minimize impacts to natural resources, in which they have evidenced their intention to 
continue to comply with environmental laws "to the extent practicable!' However, these 
guidance documents have not been construed as legally enforceable. See, e.g., Inland 
Empire v. Glickrnan, 911 F. Supp. 431, 437 (D. Mont. 1995), afd, 88 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 
1996). 
111. See Q 2001(f)(5). 
112. See Q 2001(d). 
113. See id. 
114. See Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 
1996) (rejecting allegations that sales would degrade aquatic resources, reduce viable 
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In fact, all courts that have reviewed challenges to section 
2001(b) and (d) sales have upheld the decision to proceed with the 
sale.u5 The clear implication is that agency conclusions regarding 
endangered species, watershed, sustained yield, and cost-benefit 
analyses clearly are off-limits to citizen  challenge^."^ Even com- 
pelling evidence that salvage sales will have adverse effects on 
endangered or threatened species will not be a basis for invalidat- 
ing a salvage 
In sum, although subsection (d), like subsection (b), is not as 
draconian as section 2001(k), in that it provides the Administration 
with discretion to proceed with Northwest Forest Plan sales, no 
analytical documents or protective procedures are required under 
section 2001(d), and virtually no judicial review is allowed if a 
challenge is presented on environmental grounds. While the agen- 
cies can take steps to prevent adverse environmental effects with 
respect to subsection (b) and (d) sales, the rider allows them to 
populations of resident and anadromous fish species, and violate Northwest Forest Plan 
standards and guidelines as unreviewable). 
115. A number of these opinions have upheld section 2001(b) sales. See, e.g., Idaho 
Sporting Congress v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1996); Southwest Center for 
Biological Diversity v. Glickman, 932 F-Supp. 1189 (D. Ariz., 1996); Ozark ChapterJSierra 
Club v. Thomas, 924 E Supp. 103 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Idaho Conservation League v. 
Thomas, 917 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Idaho, 1995), a r d ,  91 F.3d 1345 (9th Cir. 1996); Inland 
Empire Public Lands Council v. Glickrnan, 911 F. Supp. 431 @. Mont. 1995), aff'd, 88 
F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 1996); Kentucky Heartwood v. U.S. Forest Service, 906 F. Supp. 410 
(E.D. Ky. 1995); see also Armuchee Alliance v. King, 922 F. Supp. 1541 (N.D. Ga. 1996) 
(rejecting constitutional challenges based on separation of powers, vagueness, equal 
protection and due process). Other recent cases have upheld decisions to proceed with 
section 2001(d) sales regardless of alleged failure to comply with NEPA, WMA, and the 
Northwest Forest Plan. See, e.g., Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 
792 (9th Cir. 1996); Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 94-6245-TC (D. Or. 1995), 
aff'd, 93 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 1996). 
116. See Idaho Sporting Congress, 92 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1996); Idaho Conservation 
League, 91 E3d 1345; Inland Empire, 88 F.3d 697. 
117. See Idaho Conservation League, 91 F.3d 1345 (allowing salvage harvesting in 
highly eroded drainage, even though FWS and NMFS determined that sales were likely 
to adversely affect salmon and trout); cf. Inland Empire, 88 F.3d 697 (upholding district 
court's determination that sale could go forward under section 2001(b) even if adverse 
effects to endangered grizzly bear had been shown); Kentucky Heartwood, 906 E Supp. 
410 (rejecting challenge to sale that would allegedly affect the Indiana bat; court found 
that record supported Forest Service's position that sale would not harm the bat, but stated 
that there was little it could do even if adverse effects were proven). For a list of the most 
controversial salvage sales, see Elizabeth Manning, Forests Worth Fighting For, HIGH 
COUNTRY NEWS, Sept. 2, 1996, at 12. For a discussion of public protests over salvage 
logging under the rider, see Tony Davis, Last Line of Defense: Civil Disobedience and 
Protest Slow Down "Lawless Logging", HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Sept. 2, 1996, at 6, 10-11. 
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proceed with damaging sales in the Northwest Forest Plan area and 
otherl forests, without any public input or opportunity for review. 
C. The Abbreviated Appropriations Process Allowed the Rider 
to be Enacted without Suficient Legislative Consideration of its 
Scope and Consequences 
Despite the dramatic effects of the timber rider on forest man- 
agement policy, its passage was accompanied by severely limited 
debate. The rider was not submitted to the congressional cornmit- 
tees having jurisdiction over federal lands for hearings or for the 
preparation of  report^."^ Not only were no reports made available 
on the language of the bill at the time of its consideration; mem- 
bers of the House had to vote on the bill without seeing the final 
language t h e m s e l ~ e s . ~ ~  
As a result, many members were surprised to discover the 
actual impact of the rider. In addition, benefits of the rider touted 
by sponsors have proved to be overstated, and its potential for harm 
substantially greater than was acknowledged when the bill was 
voted on. The rider's passage clearly demonstrates the dangers of 
legislating on policy through the appropriations process. 
118. See Axline, supra note 54, at 631-32 (citing 141 CONG. REC, H6637 (daily 
ed., June 29, 1995)). 
119. See 141 CONG. REC. H6637 (daily ed. June 29, 1995). Many members 
criticized the techniques of the bill's sponsors during floor debate. See id. (statement of 
Rep. Obey) ('The timber issue is important to a lot of people in this House, including me, 
and just for the heck of it, I would like to know what the agreement is and see it in black 
and white before we debate it. It might be kind of quaint, but it might also be kind of 
useful."); id. at H6638 (statement of Rep. Defazio) ("[Wle are being asked to accept a pig 
in a poke. We are being told that the Democrat Administration has entered into a secret 
agreement not available in writing with the,Republican majority which we are going to 
be asked to vote on within 15 minutes here in the House of Representatives . . . . This is 
an outrage, this is an extraordinary outrage.");  id.^ at H6639 (statement of Rep. Furse) ("It 
is impossible for us to know whether this is going to be good for our watershed plans or 
bad for them, because we do not know the language.") (other citations and footnotes 
omitted). For a contradictory viewpoint, see Slade Gorton & Julie Hayes, Legislative 
History of the Ember and Salvage Amendments Enacted in the 104th Congress: A S~nall 
Wctory for limber Communities in the Pacific Northwest, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 641 (Envtl. 
Law Inst.) (1996) (noting that the language and some analysis of House Bill 1158, the 
rider's defeated predecessor, were available at the time of passage). 
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I .  The Scope and Impact of the Bill, Unexamined during 
Passage, Have Proved Far Greater than Sponsors Claimed 
In the absence of committee hearings or extended analysis, the 
rider's sponsors were largely able to shape the debate that took 
place in the House. The sponsors focused attention on the provi- 
sions that appeared most compelling, such as the one expediting 
salvage sales, section 200 1 (b).120 Senator Gorton created a sense of 
urgency by arguing that "the window of opportunity that the agen- 
cies have to conduct these forest health and salvaging operations 
gets smaller with each passing day . . . set[ting] the stage for 
another devastating wildfire season this Representative 
Taylor further stated that "[wle are not talking about green timber 
that needs also to be harvested. We are talking about dead and 
dying trees. We are talking about timber that has been burned."122 
In addition, the bill's sponsors minimized the breadth of the 
rider by explaining section 2 0 0 1 0  as a provision that simply 
allowed the administration to proceed with sales that had been 
previously authorized, but had been subject to lengthy de1a~s . l~~  
Yet, far from allowing the Clinton Administration to proceed with 
sales that it believed to be desirable, section 2001(k) forced the 
agencies to proceed with a number of sales that they had deter- 
mined to be in violation of the Northwest Forest Plan standards 
120. The legislative history deals extensively with the subject of forest health-fire, 
disease, and insect infestation-but barely mentions section 318 or. green tree sales. See 
141 CONG. REC. H5557 (daily ed. May 24, 1995) (Rep. Taylor's defense of the bill's 
predecessor); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-71, at 20-23 (1995); S. REP. NO. 104-17, at 
122-24 (1995); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-124 (1995). 
121. Letter from Senator Slade Gorton to Members of the Interior Subcommittee of 
the Senate Appropriations Committee (Mar. 20, 1995) (cited in Axline, supra note 54, at 
626 n.79). 
122. 141 CONG. REC. H3153 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1995); see also id. at H5558-59 
(daily ed. May 24, 1995) (Rep. Metcalf predicted that, without the rider, valuable natural 
resources will "rot" away: "Sadly, if these giants are not harvested within 2 years of being 
blown down, or fire or disease-damaged, they are of no value as timber . . . . This is part 
of the emergency situation we face in our forests."). 
123. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-124, at 137; 141 CONG. REc. S4875 (daily ed. Mar. 
30, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton); id. at S10,463-65 (daily ed. July 21, 1995) 
(statement of Sen. Gorton). Senator Gorton retracted this representation as soon as the 
rider was enacted and wrote a letter to the Clinton Administration stating that he expected 
the agencies to release all old sales in all forests and districts in Washington and Oregon. 
See NFRC v. Glickman (NFRC I), 82 F.3d 825, 835-36 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing July 27, 
1995 letter of Sens. Gorton, Murkowski, and four others). See generally Gorton & Hayes, 
supra note 119. 
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and guidelines, and that they believed would likely cause serious, 
irreparable harm.lZ4 
The difference in scope between that suggested when the 
bill was debated and that actually required by the law was 
substantial. The bill's sponsors told their colleagues that section 
2001(k) would release roughly 300 MMBF of section 3 18 ~ a 1 e s . l ~ ~  
It later became clear that members, including those familiar with 
logging practices in the Pacific Northwest, were confused about the 
amount of timber the rider would actually re1ea~e.I~~ In fact, it 
required the Forest Service to release approximately 116 MMBF 
more timber than anticipated, and the BLM to release nearly 115 
MMBF more than expected, from areas that were never governed 
by section 318.12' 
2. The Timber Rider May Substantially Diminish Agencies' 
Ability to Accomplish Multiple Use and Sustained Eeld 
Objectives 
Although the rider purported to be short-term legislation to 
remedy an "emergency" situation, its provisions, especially section 
2001(k), undermine years of planning and multiple use resource 
management in the northwest forests, with potentially long-term 
124. See U.S. Memorandum in Support of Emergency Motion for Stay Pending 
Appeal at 19-27 (filed Oct. 19, 1995) NFRC V. Glickman (NFRC I), 82 F.3d 825 (NO. 
95-36038) (9th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter U.S. Memorandum]. The sponsors told Congress 
that the rider would effectuate implementation of the Northwest Forest Plan, when in fact 
section 2001(k) "undermined that plan by requiring the cutting of old growth reserves 
which the Forest Plan was crafted to protect." Fzrrse Takes Lead in Repealirlg Tirttber 
Salvage Rider, Press Release (Dec. 7, 1995) (cited in Axline, supra note 54, at n.121) 
[hereinafter Furse Press Release]. 
125. See 141 CONG. REC. S10,464 (daily ed. July 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Gorton). 
126. See 142 CONG. REC. H6635, H6661 (daily ed. June 20, 1996) (Oregon Rep. 
Wes Cooley remarked that "750 million board feet" would be released under section 
2001(k). 
127. See U.S. Memorandum, supra note 124, at 5-6, 19-20. The total amount 
required to be released, including section 318 and non-318 sales, was well over 400 
MMBF. See id. at 5-6, 19-20. Senator Gorton, however, in a post-enactment article, 
estimated that 650 MMBF would be released-more than twice as much as he told his 
colleagues would be required. See Gorton & Hayes, supra note 119, at 644. Senator Gorton 
believes that this is a sustainable amount of harvest. See id. at 646. Gorton neglects the 
fact that timber stands are not fungible, and that much of the section 2001(k) harvest is 
taking place in the most sensitive areas in Pacific Northwest forests-areas that had been 
reserved from timber cutting under the Northwest Forest Plan, see U.S. Memorandum, 
supra note 124, at 19-20, although a small number of replacement sales have been 
accomplished under the rider. See Kenworthy, supra note 100. 
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effects.128 In the wake of the harvests and habitat disruptions per- 
mitted by the rider, resource management choices in the affected 
forests are likely to remain severely limited even after the conclu- 
sion of the emergency period.lZ9 In addition, by upsetting the Plan's 
careful balancing of interests, the rider discredited the political 
process and "reopened old wounds in communities which were 
beginning to heal [after] decades of 'timber wars.",'130 
Declarations submitted by the United States in a motion to 
stay implementation of the rider, after it was expansively inter- 
preted by Judge Hogan, indicated that a number of the sales re- 
quired to be released under section 2001(k) had been withdrawn 
long before the rider's enactment, because they did not comply 
with Northwest Forest Plan standards and guidelines.131 In addition, 
section 2001(k) resurrected sales that had been enjoined for viola- 
tions of NEPA and other environmental 1 a ~ s . l ~ ~  Many old sales had 
been withdrawn or enjoined because they would harm forest re- 
sources, such as watersheds,133 or endangered, threatened and at- 
risk species, such as the chinook salmon,134 northern spotted owl, 
128. See Furse Press Release, supra note 124; 142 CONG. REC. H6635, H6656 
(daily ed., June 20, 1996) (statement of Rep. Porter) (the rider "is superseding the carefully 
crafted environmental and natural resource laws that previously regulated logging in the 
Pacific Northwest"). 
129. See discussion, infra, at notes 139-143 and accompanying text. 
130. See 141 CONG. REC. S4870 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1995) (Sen. Murray predicted 
political turmoil in the Northwest); 142 CONG. REC. H6635, H6655 (daily ed. June 20, 
1996) (Rep. Furse stated that "[bly circumventing the normal avenues of public input," 
section 2001 "has reignited a war in the woods"); Tom Kenworthy, Protected Timber 
Opened to Logging, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1995, at A13 (the rider, and the interpretation 
given it by the courts, strikes a blow to the "comprehensive plan for managing forests in 
the Northwest . . . [which] put[ ] to rest years of public battle over old-growth timber in 
the region"); Tom Kenworthy, A Clear-Cut Solution for Loggers, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 
1996 at A1 (the rider "ignited a new logging war between timber companies and 
environmentalists throughout the West" by requiring the agencies to proceed with sales 
that were halted years ago to protect wildlife and fish, and "short-circuit[ing] the normally 
complex regulatory and legal structure that applies to timber sales on federal land"). 
131. See Declaration of William Bradley at q[qI 4-5, attached to U.S. Memorandum, 
supra note 124 [hereinafter Bradley Declaration]. 
132. See ONRC's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Stay Pending AppeaI at 8-9 
(filed Oct. 19, 1995), NRFC v. Glickman @FRC I), 82 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 
95-36038) (discussing the Tiptop and Tip sales in the Wenatchee forest, enjoined on NEPA 
and NF&M grounds in Leavenworth Audubon v. Ferraro, 881 F. Supp. 1482 (W.D. Wash. 
1995), and the Gatorson sale in the Colville National Forest, enjoined on NEPA grounds in 
Smith v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 93-178-JLG (E.D. Wash. Mar. 30, 1995)). See generally 
Declaration of Robert Williams, Associate Regional Forester for the Pacific Northwest 
Region, attached to U.S. Memorandum, supra note 124 [hereinafter Williams Declaration]. 
133. See Kenworthy, supra note 130, at AS. 
134. See IYilliarns Declaration, supra note 132, at q[qI 6-1 1; see also Declaration of 
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and shortnose sucker.135 Agency officials predicted that the release 
of many 2001(k) sales would result in severe long-term effects: 
[Tlhe harvest of most of these 62 sales would adversely impact 
northern spotted owls, marbled murrelets, shortnose suckers, 
and bull trout. In some cases, these impacts would be serious 
and may lead to direct mortality . . . . In most of these cases, 
adverse impacts to habitat would be long-term and would lead 
to depressed reproduction rates and reduced probabilities of 
recovery for these species.136 
The resulting damage is not likely to be undone quickly now 
that the rider has expired. Because section 2001(k) sales were 
awarded on originally offered terms, they did not comply with the 
Northwest Forest Plan's strategies for protecting fragile soils, old 
growth, watersheds, and ~ i1d l i f e . l~~  The extensive logging required 
by section 2001(k), some of which took place in late successional 
reserves, could well cause such declines in populations of at-risk 
species that the return of ~orthwest  Forest Plan standards and 
guidelines will do little g00d.l~~ Similarly, harvest in riparian areas 
could degrade aquatic habitat to the point that applying the Forest 
Plan's Aquatic Conservation Strategy to future activities will not 
necessarily reverse those effects.139 
Dr. Jacqueline Wyland, Chief, Environmental and Technical Services Division, National 
Marine Fisheries Service, at q[ 13, 38-39, 45-46, 49-50, 53-54, 58, and Attachment A, 
attached to U.S. Memorandum, supra note 124 [hereinafter Wyland Declaration] (listing 
BLM and Forest Service 2001(k) sales that will affect threatened or at-risk anadromous 
fish species, including Snake River chinook salmon, cutthroat trout, coho salmon, and 
steelhead trout). 
135. See Bradley Declaration, supra note 131, at ¶ 4; Declaration of Thomas J. 
Dwyer, q[¶ 9-12, 15-16, 19-21, 26, and App. I, attached to U.S. Memorandum, supra note 
124 [hereinafter Dwyer Declaration]. 
136. See Dwyer Declaration, supra note 135, at 9[ 26 (emphasis added); see also 
Second Declaration of Spear, at ¶ 22, attached to U.S. Memorandum in Opposition to 
TRO, supra note 96 (predicting that theForest Service's 2001(k) sales will cause long-term 
impacts to habitat and reduce the probability of recovery of northern spotted owls, 
murrelets, shortnose suckers, and bull trout). 
137. See Kenworthy, supra note 130, at A1 ("Everything we've learned about how 
not to log in the West has been thrown out the window. This is the old style, ugly dear-cuts 
the Forest Service said they'd never do again:") (quoting former congressman Jim Jontz 
@-Ind.), who now heads Western Ancient Forest Campaign). 
138. "It is now painfully clear that in short-circuiting the process and exempting 
timber sales from the environmental laws . . . irreparable harm to the fragile ecosystems 
was caused to our national forests." 142 CONG. REC. H6635, H6657 (daily ed., June 20, 
1996) (statement of Rep. Yates). 
139. The FEMAT report identified 314 at-risk anadromous salmonid stocks iden- 
tified within the range of the northern spotted ow1 and concluded that habitat protections 
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As a result of such lasting impacts, forest management deci- 
sions in the future are likely to be more restrictive than rqight 
otherwise have been the case. For example, because numerous 
section 2001 timber sales have been exempted from the require- 
ments of the Endangered Species Act, consultations on post-rider 
activities may well result in "jeopardy findings"140 under that act, 
in light of the cumulative effects of timber sales on the forest 
landscape.141 Such a finding could preclude future grazing, mining, 
or agriculture that otherwise would have been These 
long-term effects on the Pacific Northwest communitigs and forest 
resources could have been avoided, or at least mitigated, had the 
rider been considered in the "full sunshine of public re~iew,"l~~ 
instead of being sheltered by appropriations subterfuge. 
on federal lands are "increasingly important for ensuring the existence of high quality 
aquatic resources." FEMAT REPORT, supra note 57, at V-2. Accordingly, the Northwest 
Forest Plan incorporated an Aquatic Conservation Strategy to avoid further damage to 
riparian habitat. See FOREST PLAN ROD, supra note 43, at 9-10. Protective measures 
imposed on new sales in riparian areas-but not 2001(k) sales-include buffer zones 
around streams, helicopter retrieval of logs in areas with fragile soils and less disruptive 
road construction techniques. For other management measures that protect riparian areas 
in forests with anadromous fish-bearing streams, see Interim Strategy for Managing 
Anadromous Fish-Producing Watersheds ("PACFISH"), 60 Fed. Reg. 11,655 (1995) (amend- 
ing forest plans and BLM resource management plans for public lands in eastern Oregon 
and Washington, Idaho, and northern California). For interim management measures 
protective of National Forest System riparian areas with resident fish species, see Inland 
Native Fish Strategy, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,758 (1995). These- two interim strategies are to be 
replaced with long-term ecosystem plans with the adoption of the Columbia River Basin 
Ecosystem Management Strategy, see 59 Fed. Reg. 4680 (1994), which is to be completed 
in the summer of 1998. See 62 Fed. Reg. 2176 (1997). 
140. See 16 U.S.C. 5 1536(a)(2) (1994). 
141. See Wyland Declaration, supra note 134, a t¶¶  23, 35-36 (impacts of additional 
sales would degrade watersheds more than anticipated in consultations that had taken place 
on over one hundred grazing, mining, and harvest activities in the Wallowa-Whitman and 
Umatilla National Forests); Dwyer Declaration, supra note 135, at qI 20 (noting degrada- 
tion due to historic watershed impacts from activities including timber harvest, grazing, 
and agriculture in the sale area, and potential exacerbation due to further timber harvest). 
142. Activities taken pursuant to the rider's salvage logging provision, 3 2001(b), 
may also hinder the achievement of forest plan goals and objectives-complicating 
programmatic planning efforts and perhaps even foreclosing some future management 
activities. See WILDERNESS OC'Y, SALVAGE LOGGING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS: AN 
ECOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, AND LEGAL ASSESSMENT 9-10 (1996). 
143. Gorton & Hayes, supra note 119, at 647 (arguing that the rider was not enacted 
behind closed doors). 
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3. The Rider's BeneJits, as Claimed by Sponsors, Were Not 
Evaluated and Have Not Materialized 
Congress enumerated several reasons for enacting the timber 
rider, most notably improvement of forest health and recovery of 
the economic value of damaged timber before extensive deteriora- 
tion However, whether salvage harvesting actually does 
promote forest ,health by controlling future fire and insect infesta- 
tion is debatable.145 Whether measures as drastic as a blanket ex- 
emption from all environmental laws was necessary to address this 
concern is even more questionable, given the agencies' extensive 
discretion and authority under the National Forest Management Act 
and Federal Land Policy and Management Act to manage forest 
1a11ds.l~~ 
Further, at the time of the rider's enactment, the legislative 
bodies and the President were led to believe that it would generate 
funds to provide disaster relief for bombing victims and anti-ter- 
rorism measures.147 However, the two provisions with the greatest 
potential. to contribute to losses to the federal treasury were barely 
mentioned during committee and floor debate. First, the rider al- 
lowed salvage sales to proceed, even if they resulted in "below cost 
sales" for which the government's costs of preparation exceeded 
revenues.148 In addition, section 2001(k) required the award and 
release of old sales, which were offered more than five years ago 
144. See H.R. CONF. REP. 104-124, at 134 (1995). 
145. See Axline, supra note 54, at 626-28; see also Tom Kenworthy, Wildfires 
Rekindle Debate on What's Best for Forests, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1996, at Al,  A l l  (many 
forestry experts attribute the explosion of wildfires during the summer of 1996 to 
"well-intended but misguided fire suppression efforts and poor timber harvest practices"; 
according to NRDC spokesperson Sami Yassa, the increase in wildfires shows "how 
disingenuous [Congress's] concerns about fire really are": harvest practices have increased 
fire severity by removing the largest, most fire-resistant trees). 
146. See 16 U.S.C. $9 1600-14 (1994); 43 U.S.C. 9 1732 (1994). See generally 
WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 14, Ch. IV (discussing Forest Service's broad 
discretion under the National Forest Management Act and Multiple-Use, Sustained Yield 
Act to establish natural resources priorities and protect forest health and sustainability). 
147. See 141 CONG. REC. H5557, HS561-62 (daily ed. May 24, 1995) (statement 
of Rep. Riggs); Gorton & Hayes, supra note 119, at 647 (based on the sponsors' 
pre-enactment representations of the timber harvest required by the rider, the Congres- 
sional Budget Office reported that the rider would generate $84 million in revenue). 
148. See Pub. L. No. 104-19, 9 2001(c)(6), 109 Stat. 194, 241 (1995). "Below cost 
saIes" are not forbidden by the National Forest Management Act, although economic 
suitability is a factor to be considered. See 16 U.S.C. 3 6(k) (1994). Increased salvage 
logging frequently results in additional losses from below cost sale. See WILDERNESS 
SOC'Y, supra note 142, at 30. 
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when prices were generally lower, on "originally advertised terms, 
volumes, and bid prices."149 It is now estimated that, even with the 
sale of valuable old growth timber, the rider could cost taxpayers 
in excess of $330 million.150 
Moreover, although the rider purported to create jobs and pro- 
vide assistance to communities dependent on federal timber, any 
economic benefit attributable to the rider has accrued to only a few 
mills, and the brief increase in available federal timber will not 
halt the overall decline of the timber industry's economic irnpor- 
tance in the Pacific N o r t h w e ~ t . ~ ~ ~  In fact, the opposite may be 
true-the rider may accelerate the industry's demise by depleting 
available resources more quickly and obstructing the renewal of 
areas available for selective harvest in a manner ensuring sustain- 
able yields. 152 
149. Pub. L. NO. 104-19, § 2001(k)(l). 
150. See Axline, supra note 54, at 617 & n.27 (citing WILDERNESS OC'Y, ESTI- 
hlATED FISCAL COSTS OF CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR EMERGENCY SALVAGE TIMBER SALE 
PROGRAM 1 (1995)). The Congressional Research Service Estimated that the salvage 
program alone could cost the Treasury as much as $233.5 million. See WILDERNESS SOC'Y, 
supra note 142, at 32-33. Representative Lowey reported to her colleagues that the 
Congressional Research Service had estimated that the rider would cost $50 million in 
1996 alone. See 142 CONG. REC. H6635, H6661-62 (daily ed. June 20, 1996) (it is unclear 
whether this amount reflects the costs of all three provisions of the rider, including green 
tree sales awarded under section 2001(k), or whether it is limited to salvage sales under 
section 2001(b), which are typically less lucrative); see also id. at H6660-61 (Rep. MoreIla 
predicted that section 2001 sales in fragile and remote roadless areas are likely to be big 
money-losers, "[wlhile a potential boondoggle for large timber companies, PL 104-19 
poses a significant threat to local businesses."). 
151. See WILKINSON, supra note 59, at 166 ("The timber industry in the Northwest 
has been in transition for more than a decade, for reasons largely unrelated to the spotted 
owl or any other environmental factor"; job losses are attributable to liquidation of the old 
growth stands and slow rates of regeneration, worker productivity and exports of unproc- 
essed logs); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 1991) 
('Job losses in the wood products industry wilI continue regardless of whether the northern 
spotted owl is protected . . . ."); Axline, supra note 54, at 614 (the timber industry will 
continue to decline in spite of the brief economic boost provided by the rider). 
152. See WILDERNESS OC'Y, supra note 142, at 35-36. In addition, other enter- 
prises are likely to suffer as a result of the timber rider, "By threatening the health of the 
forests and the fisheries, the rider is in turn threatening the sports, commercial fishing, 
and the tourism industries, all of which are economically important to the Pacific 
Northwest." 142 CONG. REC. H6635, H6663 (daily ed. June 20, 1996) (statement of Rep. 
McDermott). 
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4; Repeal EfSorts Demonstrate the Frustration of Members of 
Congress with the Process Accorded the Rider 
Once the true effects of the bill became apparent, the rider was 
the subject of a remarkably sustained effort at repeal. Senator 
Murray proposed repeal based in part on the belief that members 
had been misled by the bill's sponsors.1s3 Representative Furse 
sponsored a bill to repeal the rider, which was co-sponsored by 
over 100 representatives, and circulated a memorandum to mem- 
bers of the House identifying misrepresentations that had resulted 
in the passage of the rider.lS4 In addition, Representative Furse 
offered language that would have modified the timber rider as an 
amendment to H.R. 3662, FY 1997 Appropriations for the Depart- 
ment of Interior and Related Agencies.ls5 
A number of members made statements on the House floor in 
support of repeal, expressing outrage at having been rnisled.156 
Others believed that repeal was appropriate because there had been 
153. See 142 CONG. REC. S2006 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1996). Senator Bradley 
introduced a similar measure, Senate Bill 1595, 104th Cong. (1996). See 142 CONG. RBC. 
at S160341605 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1996). 
154. See 141 CONG. REC. HI4238 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1995) (introducing the 
Restoration of Natural Resources Laws on the Public Lands Act of 1995, H.R. 2745, 104th 
Cong. (1995)); Furse Press Release, supra note 124. 
155. See 142 CONG. REC. H6635, H6654-64 (daily ed. June 20, 1996) (statements 
of Rep. Furse and others in support of the amendment). The Furse amendment was almost 
defeated on procedural grounds before it even came before the floor for consideration. The 
Rules Committee recommended that Rule XXI, prohibiting attachment of substantive 
legislation to appropriations bills, be enforced against the Furse amendment, H.R. RES. 
455, 104th Cong. (1996), although it recommended that the rule be waived with respect 
to other policy-based amendments. See 142 CONG. REC. H6518 (daily ed. June 19, 1996); 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-627 (1996). Of course, the salvage timber program was enacted only 
because Rule XXI had been waived with respect to ,that provision: "it seems only fair and 
reasonable to allow the House to consider terminating the program through the same means 
by which it was originally enacted." 142 CONG. REC. at I36521 (statement of Rep. 
Beilenson). The House agreed to consider the Furse amendment. See id. at H6625. 
156. "Although touted as an emergency measure to cut dead and dying timber, the 
rider has been used to clearcur healthy forests, including some hundreds of years old," 
142 CONG. REC. at H6635, H6655 (statement of Rep. Furse); id. at H6656 (statement of 
Rep. Boehlert) (this rider "was sold to this body under what can most generously be 
considered false pretenses"); id. at  H6660 (statement of Rep. Morella) ("The so-called 
forest health justification for suspending laws is a sham"); id. at H6661 (statement of Rep. 
Lowey) (the timber rider, one of many in a "shameful list" of the majority's attacks on 
environmental protections, "was misleadingly touted as being necessary to reduce forest 
fires . . . . [but] is now being used to clearcut healthy forests in the Pacific Northwest"); 
id. at H6662 (statement of Rep. Obey) (the rider "wound up allowing . . . a lot more than 
i t  was explained as doing . . . . [if the rider] in fact had been limited simply to straight 
salvage, as the House was told it was, we would not have had much of the controversy 
that has surrounded this ever since"). 
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no hearings on the timber rider at meaningful times in the deci- 
sionmaking process,lS7 and because of the lack of notice that the 
rider was going to be offered anew in the Oklahoma disaster relief 
package.x5s 
The Furse amendment was defeated, but by the narrowest of 
margins.159 Another measure of the unpopularity of the policy con- 
tained in the rider is the fact that efforts to extend the rider have 
so far been unavailing,160 as have attempts to enact a permanent 
form of the law.l6I 
157. See id. at H6635, H6656 (daily ed. June 20, 1996) (statement of Rep. Porter); 
id. at H6657 (statement of Rep. Yates); id. at H6659 (statement of Rep. McDermott); id. 
at H6660 (statement of Rep. Morella); id. at H6661 (statement of Rep. Blumenauer); see 
also 141 CONG. REc. H3231 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1995) (statement of Rep. DeFazio) ("The 
issue should never have been brought to the floor in this fashion."); id. at S4881 (daily 
ed. Mar. 30, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bradley) (attaching this rider to an appropriations 
bill "sets an incredibly dangerous precedent"). But see 142 CONG. REc. H6635, H6658 (in 
response to such criticism, Rep. Riggs noted and discussed the hearings that had taken 
place months earlier in connection with a previous version of the bill). 
158. See id. at H6635, H6656 (statement of Rep. Porter). 
159. See id. at D648-49 (daily ed., June 20, 1996). The recorded vote was 211 to 
209, see id., and at least one representative who was absent at the time of the vote later 
stated that he would have voted in favor of the Furse amendment because of concerns 
about the environmental and economic effects of the rider. See id. at E1160-61 (daily ed. 
June 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Ramstad). Others seemed to think the issue was moot, 
because section 2001(k), forcing sales of green timber in Washington and Oregon, would 
expire in September 1996. See id. at H6635, H6655 (statement of Rep. Dicks); id. at 
H6662 (statement of Rep. Taylor); id. at H6663 (statement of Rep. Kolbe). 
160. For example, the Hatfield timber rider, set forth in the proposed 1996 Interior 
appropriations bill, H.R. 1977, 104th Cong. (1996), was omitted from the Consolidated 
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). See 142 CONG. REC. S4161, S4169 (daily 
ed. Apr. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Murray); see also Final Deal Sealed; Key Riders 
Dropped, GREENWIRE, Apr. 25, 1996, p. 4 (discussing the Consolidated Rescissions and 
Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134). 
161. Senate Bill 391, 104th Cong. (1996), creating a permanent salvage policy, was 
sponsored by Senator Larry Craig and approved by the Senate Energy Committee on June 
19, 1996, but was not allowed to go to the floor until compromises were made with the 
then-ranking minority member, Senator Bill Bradley. See N a v  USDA Policy Bars Most 
Salvage Sales in Roadless Areas, PUB. LANDS NEWS, July 11, 1996, at 1-2. The Committee 
released its report on July 16, 1996. but negotiations were never completed. See Glickman 
to Face Senate Fire Over Ember Salvage Policy, PUB. LANDS NEWS, JuIy 25, 1996, at 8. 
The 105th Congress is considering a bill proposed by Senator Craig that would overhaul 
NFMA and FLPMA. Senator Craig Issues Draft of Public Lands Management Bill for 
Next Congress, 237 ENV'T REP. (BNA) at A8 @ec. 10, 1996). The bill addresses forest 
health issues, but "is not a repeat" of Craig's efforts to expand the salvage rider, according 
to Senate staff. See id. The bill, now entitled the Public Land Management Responsibility 
and Accountability Restoration Act, has not been formally introduced, but public hearings 
and workshops are currently being held. See 143 CONG. REC. S1409 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 
1997). 
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IV. OTHER RECENT RIDERS DEMONSTRATE HE DANGERS POSED 
BY THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 
The use of riders to provide special interest projects with 
exemptions from substantive legislation is nothing new, having 
been recognized as problematic by the early nineteenth century.162 
However, the abuse of the appropriations process has been taken 
to new and more extreme heights in recent decades,l'j3 and has been 
especially prevalent in the environmental area.164 
A. Exemptions Passed as Appropriations Riders Have 
Jeopardized Public Lands and Natural Resources 
Legislative short-cuts have been employed in numerous con- 
texts in past legislative sessions.165 In 1973, for example, the Trans- 
Alaska oil pipeline was exempted from NEPA requirements by use 
-- 
162. The practice of adding riders to appropriations bills has been "a perennial 
complaint." Walter Oleszek, The Congressional Budget Process, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 731,735 (Joel N. Silbey, ed., 1994). "By 1835 the delays 
caused by injecting legislation [extraneous policy riders] into [appropriations] bills had 
become serious and John Quincy Adarns . . . suggested that they be stripped of everything 
save appropriations." Id. (citing ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS 425-26 (1935)). 
163. See Jacques B. LeBoeuf, Limitations on the Use of Appropriations Riders by 
Congress to Effectuare~Policy Changes, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 460 (1992). 
Oleszek notes that, during the partisan disputes between the Reagan White House and the 
Democratic Congress of the 1980s, Congress resorted to massive "omnibus" bills that 
combined Congress's priorities with some of the President's priorities to discourage 
vetoes. See Oleszek, supra note 162, at 742. 
164. "The vehicle of choice for insulating federal agencies from environmental laws 
has been to insert obscure . . . [riders into] annual spending bills." Sher, supra note 4, at 
10,469. Indeed, the FY 1989 appropriation for the Department of Interior, Pub. L. No, 
100-446, 102 Stat. 1774 (1988), contained nearly 100 provisions that directly contravened 
pre-existing. environmental law, or restricted the expenditure of funds on otherwise 
authorized programs. See Charles Stewart 111, The Appropriations Comntitrees, in 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1015, 1021 (Joel H. Silbey ed., 1994). 
165. Among these were many earlier "timber riders" presaging the particularly 
damaging rider appended to the Rescissions Act. Faced with court injunctions limiting 
logging operations, Oregon Senator Mark Hatfield sponsored riders each year from 1986 
to 1990 to allow timber sales to go forward in spite of noncompliance with environmental 
laws. Those passed include the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 
99-88, 99 Stat. 293; Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 
for 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-446, 5 321, 102 Stat. 1774, 1827 (1988); Department of the 
Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 5 3318, 
103 Stat. 701, 745-50 (1989). The Department of the Interior and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act for 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-512, 104 Stat. 1915 (1990), was the first in 
five years to include no such rider, in large part because 20 senators and 79 representatives 
sent letters to the chairs of the appropriations committees protesting the enactment of 
1989's section 318 and its predecessor, section 314. See Victor Sher & Carol Huttti~lg, 
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of an appropriations rider.166 In 1980, Congress voted to exempt the 
Tennessee Valley Authority's Tellico Dam project from the Endan- 
gered Species by the same ~ehic1e. l~~ In 1988, construction 
of a multi-million-dollar observatory on Mount Graham in the 
Coronado National Forest was given the blessing of an approp-ia- 
tions rider that exempted the project from the requirements of both 
the Endangered Species Act and NEPA.169 Congress also employed 
an appropriations measure to exempt a proposed highwayCin Ha- 
waii from the Federal Highway Act,170 which prohibits the use of 
parklands unless no feasible alternative is available.171 
Eroding the Landscape, Eroding the Laws: Congressional Exemptions from ~ i d i c i a l  
Review of Environmental Laws, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 435, 487-88 (1991). 
166. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 3 203, 87 
Stat. 576, 584-85 (1973) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. 3 1652(d) (1988)), provided 
that the government need not consider an alternative plan for transporting oil from Alaska 
via an overland route, rather than via oil tanker at Valdez. If alternatives and effects of 
the pipeline had been analyzed under =PA, perhaps the Exxon Valdez oil spill would 
have been less likely. See Sher & Hunting, supra note 165, at 440-41. 
167. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. $§ 1531-1544. 
168. See Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-69, 93 Stat. 437, 449-50 (1979); H.R. 4388, 96th Cong. (1979); 125 CONG. REC. 
20,979 (1979). The Tellico Dam rider prompted this response from the Supreme Court: 
When voting on appropriations measures, legislators are entitled to operate 
under the assumption that the funds will be devoted to purposes which are 
lawful and not for any purpose forbidden. Without such an assurance, every 
appropriations measure would be pregnant with prospects of altering substan- 
tive legislation, repealing by implication any prior statute which might pro- 
hibit the expenditure. Not only wouId this lead to the absurd result of requiring 
Members to review exhaustively the background of every authorization before 
voting on an appropriation, but it would flout the very rules the Congress 
carefully adopted to avoid this need. 
Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190-91 (1978). 
169. A last minute rider to the Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-696, $$ 601-607, 102 Stat. 4571, 4597-99, allowed for construction of three 
telescopes before compIetion of formal environmental reviews. See John Lancaster, Endan- 
gered Squirrel Has Astronomers, Biologists at Odds, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1990, at AS. It 
declared that section 7 of the Endangered Species Act "shall be deemed authorized" for 
the authorization of the first three telescopes, see Pub. L. No. 100-696, 5 602, and NEPA 
"shall be deemed to have been satisfied," id. at 3 607. See also Mount Graham Red 
Squirrel v. Yeutter, 930 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring the District Court to hear 
evidence on the adequacy of the monitoring program set up to protect the endangered Mt. 
Graham red squirrel in compliance with the Act). 
170. See Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 
5 114, 100 Stat. 3341, 334149 (1986). 
171. See Department of Transportation Act 5 4(9, 49 U.S.C. 3 0 3 0  (1994) 
(allowing the Secretary of Transportation to approve projects that use public park lands 
only if there is no feasible alternative); see also Stop H-3 Association v. Dole, 870 K2d 
1419 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding appropriations legislation that exempted the project from 
otherwise applicable environmental requirements). 
Haward Environmental Law Review 
The 104th Congress was particularly prolific in passing sub- 
stantive riders, attaching more than fifty environmental riders to 
spending bills (although not all were enacted).172 Among those 
signed into law was an environmental exemption of yet another 
stage of the Mount Graham project,173 despite fears that the obser- 
vatory and telescope facilities may have an adverse effect on the 
endangered red squirrel,174 as well as on American Indian religious 
and cultural ,practices.175 
Perhaps most alanning of all, the 104th Congress was able to 
enact an across-the-board moratorium on the listing of species and 
designation of critical habitat under the Endangered Species Act as 
a rider to the appropriations bill for the Department of Defense.176 
The moratorium was specifically criticized on the floor of the 
House as beyond the jurisdiction of the Appropriations Commit- 
tee.177 For more than a year, the rider withheld protections for 
species that were severely threatened and warranted 1i~t ing. l~~ It 
poses a striking example of the perils of enacting substantive en- 
vironmental legislation through the appropriations process: a spe- 
cies entitled to protection under the Act could have been driven 
closer to extinction by a choice made while the Appropriations 
172. See Jim Nichols, Republicans Back Off Touted Reform of Environmental h t v s  
in Light of Polls Showing Support for Protection of Resources, CLEVELAND PLAIN 
DEALER, Oct. 22, 1995, at 1B; Jeny Gray, In House, Spending Bills Open Way to Make 
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1995, at A16 (proposed spending bills "would revoke or 
substantially restrict nearly 20 environmental laws that have become anathema to big 
business"). 
173. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 
104-134, $ 335, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). 
174. See Mount Graham Coalition v. Thomas, 89 F.3d 554, 555-56 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(describing history of Mount Graham project, and legislative reactions to controversy). 
175. See Elizabeth A. Brandt, The Fight for Dzil Nchaa Si An, Mt. Graham, 
CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Winter 1996, at 55-57. 
176. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions for the Depart- 
ment of Defense to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub. L, No, 
104-6, 109 Stat. 73, 86. The moratorium was to expire on October 1, 1995, but continuing 
resolutions kept it in place well into 1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-31, 109 Stat. 278 (1995); 
Pub. L. No. 104-56, 109 Stat. 548 (1995); Pub. L. No. 104-94, 110 Stat. 25 (1996); Pub. 
L. 104-99, 110 Stat 26 (1996); Pub. L. No. 104-122, 110 Stat. 876 (1996); Pub. L. No. 
104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996); see also Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 918 F. Supp. 318, 
320 (W.D. Wash. 1996). 
177. See 141 CONG. REC. H4344, H4345 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1995) (statement of Rep. 
Beilenson) ("We believe that the authorizing committee and not the Committee on 
Appropriations is the proper place to address this far-reaching and very critical issue."), 
178. See Environmental Defense Ctr. v. Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(lack of appropriated funds prevented Secretary from listing the California red-legged 
frog). 
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Committee considered the military budget. This type of decision 
should clearly be made by wildlife management experts, not mem- 
bers of Congress embroiled in the fiscal minutiae of the armed 
forces. 
B. Proposed Riders Would Have Had Far-Reaching Effects 
A number of additional riders were proposed in the 104th 
Congress that later failed to attain passage or were thwarted by the 
veto pen. If signed into law, they would have had severe conse- 
quences for natural resources and public lands. 
1. Riders in the 1996 Interior Appropriations Bill 
Numerous controversial riders were incorporated into the pro- 
posed appropriations bill for the Department of Interior and Re- 
lated Agencies for Fiscal Year 1996.179 Among them. were provi- 
sions that would restrict protective measures for the newly created 
Mojave National Preserve,ls0 increase logging in the Tongass Na- 
tional Forest,1g1 liberalize hardrock mining on public lands,lS2 and 
prohibit or severely curtail a multi-region Forest Service and BLM 
project for management of the Columbia River Basin Ecosystem.ls3 
These riders were criticized as both unsound policy and dis- 
honest politics. Representative George Miller, former chair of the 
House Natural Resources Committee, echoed the criticisms of many 
opponents of the riders when he labelled them "the most systematic 
and comprehensive assault on the environment and the environ- 
179. See H.R. 1977, 104th Cong. (1995). 
180. See California Desert Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat. 
4471, 4489-95 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §$ 410aaa-41 to 410aaa-59 (1994)). 
181. See infra text accompanying note 185. 
182. See James Gerstenzang, White House Threatens Veto of Environmental Meas- 
ure, Los ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 23, 1995, at A3. 
183. See 141 CONG. REC. H9688 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (Rep. Furse criticized 
the restriction on the Columbia River Basin Ecosystem Project and other measures to 
protect fisheries habitat on national forest Iands); id. at H9639, H9640 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 
1995) (statement of Rep. Beilenson) ("The legislation cripples a joint Forest Service-BLM 
ecosystem management project for the Columbia River Basin in the Northwest, a project 
intended to allow a sustainable flow of timber from that region. This provision threatens 
the protection of salmon and other critical species and guarantees continued court battles 
over logging in that region."). 
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mental laws" in the history of the nation.lS4 With respect to forest 
management, Representative Sidney Yates stated that 
The conference report to be ratified here today will dramatically 
increase logging on our already overtaxed forests . . . . What's 
more, . . . [it] prevents all environmental law from being en- 
forced in the Tongass . . . [and] prevents all citizens, environ- 
mentalists and private land owners alike, from exercising their 
rights to sue the Federal Govern~nent.~~~ 
The process employed to circumvent congressional rules was 
characterized by critics as, among other things, "a failure to uphold 
the deliberative process that underlies the American tradition of 
conservation."186 Ranking members of authorizing committees ex- 
pressed frustration,-that programs that they had recommended and 
that had been passed after full deliberation by both houses were 
being gutted by riders.lS7 They argued that supporters of the origi- 
nal substantive laws "were not afraid to have open and honest 
debate during the years it took to get thtese] measure[s) enacted. 
Opponents should allow for the same kind of exhaustive review if 
they believe they have the support to repeal it."lg8 
184. See David Helvarg, Defoliating Our Green Larvs: Congress Plans an American 
Clearcut, NATION, Dec. 4, 1995, at 699. Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt called the riders 
"an assault . . . on our natural resources and environment . . . . The barbecue is now under 
way on natural resources." Hugh Dellios, The $1 Desert-Mojave National Preserve is 
Protected on Paper But Imperiled in a Battle Over Funding, S.E EXAMINER, Oct. 1, 1995, 
at A8; see 141 CONG. REC. H9689 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Rep. Boehlert) 
("This bill represents nothing less than an assault on the environment. . . . We] squander 
precious resources, robbing them from future generations . . . . [This bill] is intolerable"). 
185. See 141 CONG. REC. H9685 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995). 
186. Id. at H9687-88; see id. at H9692 (statement of Rep. Miller) ("'What [the bill] 
purports to do in the name of budget cutting is obscene. Not only is this appropriations 
bill packed with authorizing legislation in a spending bill-in clear violation of House 
rules-but, it also shamelessly and against the public interest runs rampant in overturning 
sound environmental policy."). 
187. See 141 CONG. REC. H9639, H9642 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1995) (statement of 
Rep. Miller). 
As an architect of the 1990 Tongass Timber Reform Act, I take special offense 
at this assault on our largest national forest. These permanent changes in law 
are not within the proper jurisdiction of the appropriations committees . . . , 
The Senate language is an ill-advised attempt to turn back the clock and to 
manage these public lands to favor a heavily taxpayer subsidized special 
interest over all other competing users of the forest. 
See id. 
188. 141 CONG. REC. H6994 (daily ed. July 13, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fazio, 
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In all likelihood, the riders, had they been proposed as inde- 
pendent bills, would not have passed: 
[Tlhere is a simple reason these crucial policy decisions were 
tacked on to the Interior appropriations bill instead of being 
considered independently: these' policies were added as riders 
because on their own, they do not stand up to scrutiny. This is 
bad policy based on distorted science and values. ,The American 
people do not support it. Such change would not be sustained 
in the heat of open debate.lg9 
The Interior bill was also criticized for its' perceived slant towards 
private interests at the expense of the public: 
This legislation, which is based on pseudoscience, fails in terms 
of priorities, process, policy, and the pragmatic . . . . [It] con- 
structs a new set of priorities in which the rights of the 
American people to use and enjoy the public lands of our 
Nation finish dead last behind a .wide variety of special inter- 
ests, in essence the users who exploit public resources.1g0 
Although Congress passed the bill, the President vetoed it,lgl as he 
had earlier threatened.lg2 Efforts to override the veto failed.193 
regarding back-door efforts to dismantle the California Desert Act). Ironically, Sen. 
Wallop's efforts to change the area's status to a BLM-managed monument, subject to fewer 
restrictions, failed in committee and on the floor during consideration of the substantive 
bill that became the California Desert Protection Act, see 140 CONG. REC. Dl058 (daily 
ed. Sept. 29, 1993); id. at S4129 (Apr. 12, 1994). For further criticism of the California 
Desert rider, see Dellios, supra note 184, at AS. 
189. 141 CONG. REC. H9687 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Rep. Vento); 
see also Dellios, supra note 184, at A8 ("GOP lawmakers are trying to use the budget 
process to undo Democratic-backed laws and policies that the Republicans might not have 
the votes to reverse one by one." Secretary Babbitt remarked that congressional efforts to 
push forward with these environmental riders were "a cynical circumvention of the 
democratic process."). 
190. 141 CONG. REC. H9687 (statement of Rep. Vento); see also id. (Rep. Yates 
stated that this was the first time he had refused to sign a conference report on an 
appropriations bill: 'Why? . . . . It turns over the Nation's wealth for the exploitation by 
special interests:'). 
191. See id. at H15,057 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1995); Clinton Vetoes Interioc EPA 
Sper~ding Bills, GREENWIRE, Dec. 19, 1995, at 4. The appropriations bill for the Depart- 
ment of Commerce, HUD, and EPA was vetoed on the same day. See id.; Warren P. Strobel 
& David R. Sands, Spending Bill Vetoes Will Keep Workers Home, WASH. TJMES, Dec. 19, 
1995, at Al. 
192. See Gerstenzang, supra note 182; Janet Hook, House Rejects Funding Bills 
Over Abortion, Mine Issues, Los ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 30, 1995, at Al,  A27; Dellios, 
supra note 184, at AS. See generally Nichols, supra note 172, at 1B (discussing points of 
contention in Interior and EPA funding proposals). 
193. See 142 CONG. REC. HZ20 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1996). 
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2. The Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 
In the wake of the President's veto, appropriations for the 
Department of Interior, along with four other departmental appro- 
' priations that had been vetoed or had not passed both chambers,'94 
became part of the Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations 
Act of 1996. As initially introduced, the Interior provisions again 
generated controversy.195 
Many of the proposed bill's environmental provisions were 
revised before the Act was passed and enacted in April 1996, with 
the federal government facing yet another partial sh~t-down.l9~ In 
response to concerns raised by the Administration, several riders 
originally attached to the Interior bill were either significantly 
revised or omitted.lg7 For example, a provision that would have 
194. See id. at S4161, S4167 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hollings) 
(discussing the veto of the bill for the Commerce, Justice, and State Departments), 
195. See id. at N1808, H1867 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Yates) 
(''Elhis is the same bill that. . . the President wisely vetoed . . . . It mandates increased 
logging . . . [and] contains a moratorium on adding new plants and animals to the 
endangered species list"); id. at HI869 (statement of Rep. Miller) ('The bill is riddled 
with punitive provisions which have little or nothing to do with the budget and everything 
to do with antienvironmental policies."); see also id. at S2302, S2304 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 
1996) (statement of Sen. Boxer) (noting that she would vote against the bill because of 
riders that would "block new drinking water standards; prohibit the EPA from enforcing 
a rule on reformulated gasoline; . . . undermine wetland protection; prohibit the issuance 
of new energy efficiency standards; [and] limit the listing of new Superfund sites"; as well 
as riders that would prohibit abortion). 
196. See Pub. L. No. 104-134,110 Stat. 1321 (1996). When it became apparent that 
a bill was soon to pass that would likely be enacted, Senator Daschle remarked: 'This has 
been a very long, difficult struggle. Seven months, two Government shutdowns and 13 
continuing resolutions later, we resolved many of these extraordinarily difficult and 
contentious issues in a way that I feel has done a real service to the Senate:' 142 CONG. 
REC. S4161 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1996); see id. at S4169 (Sen. Murray stating that "It's 
unfortunate that it took two Government shut-downs, innumerable furloughs, and need- 
lessly bitter partisan disputes, before we reached the path of resolution: serious bipartisan 
negotiations. . . . p h e  Federal Budget should not be balanced through] quick and dirty 
gimmicks."). 
197. See 142 CONG. REC. S4156, S4158 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1996), For a discussion 
of the negotiations and enactment of the Omnibus Act, see Jackie Calmes & David Rogers, 
Historic Budget Battle Ends with a Whimper, WALL ST. J. ,  Apr. 26, 1996, at A14; Congress 
Ends Bitter Fight Over FY '96'BilI, GREENWIRE, Apr. 26, 1996, at 4. Throughout the 
negotiations, environmental riders proved to be the main problem with the omnibus bill 
according to White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta. See House OKs Short-Terttl CR; 
Omnibus Bill Talks Continue, CONG. DAILY, Apr. 24, 1996, available in 1996 W L  
10090671; see also 142 CONG. REC. S4169 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen, 
Murray) ("[TJhis cleaner bill represents a victory for all of us who care about the health 
of our environment and protection of natural resources."). 
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extended the salvage rider was dropped,198 and the  scope of the 
Columbia River Basin Ecosystem rider was substantially 1i1nited.l~~ 
Several riders regarding EPA authority were also dropped, 
including one stripping the EPA of its ability to overrule Corps of 
, Engineers decisions on wetlands.200 The final Act did, however, 
contain some restrictions on EPA programs such as additional list- 
ings under CERCLA,201 along with several significant non-environ- 
mental riders.202 
The Consolidated Act is an unusual piece of legislation be- 
cause it allowed the President to waive several of its riders if he 
determined that suspension was appropriate, based upon the public 
interest in sustainable environmental management or the protection 
of cultural, biological, or historic resources.203 Riders subject to 
waiver included provisions that would prohibit the listing of spe- 
cies under the Endangered Species Act,204 require the National Park 
Service to allow traditional multiple use practices historically con- 
doned by the BLM on the Mojave National Preserve,205 and allow 
certain timber sales to be offered in the Tongass National Forest 
- - - - - 
198. See 142 CONG. REC. S4182-83 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1996); see also Final Deal 
Sealed: Key Riders Dropped, GREENWIRE, Apr. 25, 1996, at 2. 
199. As enacted, this provision simply prohibits the extension of the Project to 
activities on non-federal lands. See Pub. L. No. 104-134, $ 314, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996); 
H.R. CONE REP, NO. 104-402, Amend. 152 (1995); see also 142 CONG. REC. S4161, S4169 
(daily ed. Apr. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Murray) ("Now, the Columbia Basin 
Ecosystem Project can go forward, providing resource managers with comprehensive, 
scientific information about how best to protect the land . . . and proactively address 
resource management before it [sic] we face a debilitating crisis."); id. at S4167 (statement 
of Sen. Craig) (expressing disappointment that provision did not pass as originally 
proposed). 
200. See 142 CONG. REC. at S4159 (daily ed: Apr. 25, 1996) (regarding the proposed 
Veterans Administration and Housing and Urban Development appropriations bill); id. at 
S2302, S2307-08 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (detailing Sen. Chafee's objections to the 
wetlands rider). 
201. The Act restricts the listing of additional facilities on the National Priorities 
List under CERCLA 105, 42 U.S.C. 9605 (1996), until legislation reauthorizing 
CERCLA is enacted, and limits the listing of toxicological profiles on the Toxic Substances 
and Disease Registry under CERCLA $ 104(i), 42 U.S.C. $ 9604(i). See Pub. L. No. 
104-134, $ 101, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996); Helvarg, supra note 184, at 699. 
202. For example, it prohibits funding for most abortions and registration of 
unmarried domestic partners in the District of Columbia. See Pub. L. No. 104-134, 
$§ 131-132, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996); 142 CONG. REC. H3842, H3866 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 
1996). 
203. See Pub. L. No. 104-134, $ 119(b), $ 325(c), 3 2901(c), 110 Stat. 1321, 
159-60 (1996). 
204. See 3 2901. 
205. See $ 119. 
494 Haward Environmental Law Review [Vol. 21 
"notwithstanding any other provision of law" and without oppor- 
tunity for judicial review.206 President Clinton suspended the opera- 
tion of all three provisions.207 Non-waivable provisions, on the 
other hand, imposem a moratorium on the processing of patent ap- 
plications under the general mining laws208 and delay irnplementa- 
tion of grazing reform regulations.209 
3. The Balanced Budget Act of 1995 
The Balanced Budget Reconciliation Act of 1995,210 as passed 
by both chambers, contained a particularly objectionable provision 
opening the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil and gas explo- 
ration and extraction.211 In fact, the version of the rider that was 
reported by the H~use~Committee on Budget exempted exploration 
and development in the Refuge from all environmental laws.212 
Ongoing debate over the classification and use of the Refuge has 
resulted in numerous unsuccessful proposals to open the Refuge's 
coastal plain to oil and gas drilling.213 At least two such bills have 
failed in the past ten years.214 Yet, the appropriations process al- 
206. See $ 325. 
207. See Marla Cone, Endangered Species List Ready to Grow, LOS ANGELES TIMES, 
May 10, 1996, at A3; Clinton Waives Three Riders; Some Riders Remain, GREENWIRE, 
Apr. 29, 1996, at 6. 
208. See Pub. L. No. 104-134,s 322. 
209. See id., 8 329. 
210. H.R. 2491, 104th Cong. (1995). 
211. See H.R. CONF. REP. 104-350, at 100 ($ 5333) (1995). 
212. See H.R. REP. No. 104-280, at 66 (vol. I 5 9002(h)) (1995). 
213. The ongoing debate over the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge has been char- 
acterized as 
at its best, a part of the debate between differing values and visions for the 
future integrity of life on Earth. At its worst, it is a raging political struggle 
between one vision that seeks to develop sustainable ways to live with and 
protect our wild natural heritage as a fundamental underpinning to life on 
Earth and another vision that seeks to allow the unlimited acquisition and use 
of natural resources to feed market driven systems that have no innate 
sustainability toward [sic] the natural world. 
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: Hearings on H.R. 2491 Before the Committee on Energy 
and Natural Resources, 104th Cong. 70 (1995) (statement of G. Jon Roush, President, The 
Wilderness Society) [hereinafter Statement of Roush]. 
214. See Nichols, supra note 172, at 1B; Richard J. Fink, The National Wildlife 
Refuges: Theory, Practice and Prospect, 18 HAW. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 33, nn.216-28 
(1994); 141 CONG. REC. S6736, S6738 (daily ed. May 16, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Wellstone); Allan Freedman, Supporters of Drilling See an Opening, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. 
REP. 2440, 2440 (Aug. 12, 1995) ('The debate has sizzled ever since . . . 1980"). 
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lowed the allies of two powerful congressmen from Alaska (chair- 
men of committees that had failed to pass the provisions) to avoid 
the spotlight and procedural safeguards of the normal legislative proc- 
ess,2I5 making the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge rider one of the 
104th Congress's most egregious example of legislative mischief. 
The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge was created thirty-five 
years ago in northeast Alaska "to protect its unique wildlife, wil- 
derness, and recreational  value^."^'^ The rider would undoubtedly 
jeopardize the integrity of the refuge, which is "a world treasure 
of ecologically pristine wilderness"217 containing a rich diversity of 
wildlife and its habitat.21s The area that would be opened to explo- 
ration and development is "the biological heart . . . of the ref- 
~ g e . " ~ ~ ~  It is also critical to the subsistence of the native Gwich'in 
peoples due to the presence of the Porcupine Caribou herd, an 
important subsistence resource.220 
Although the public overwhelmingly opposes drilling in the 
Arctic National Wildlife the appropriations process en- 
215. See Freedman, supra note 214, at.2440 (reporting that the strategy of chairmen 
Young and Murkowski (R-Alaska) to put the measure in the omnibus bill "would give 
them an edge in the Senate because the reconciliation bill, which reconciles tax and 
spending policies with deficit-reduction goals, cannot be filibustered. It also could blunt a 
threatened veto from President Clinton."). 
216. Statement of Roush, supra note 213, at 70. In 1980, Congress doubled the size 
of the protected area to over 19 million acres and designated 8 million acres as wilderness. 
See id. At that time, one and a half million acres of coastal plain, known as the 1002 area, 
were set aside for further study, protecting it until Congress passes an Act to either 
permanently protect it as wilderness or to develop whatever oil potential may exist in the 
area. See Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act ("ANILCA"), 16 U.S.C. 
$5 3142-3143 (1994). 
217. Statement of Roush, supra note 213, at 69. 
218. See id. Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt strongly opposed development in 
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge because exploration and development would perma- 
nently alter the area. See Freedman, supra note 214, at 2441. 
219. Statement of Roush, supra note 213, at 69. 
220. "What happens to the Arctic Refuge is not only an environmental issue. It is 
a human rights issue too, because the survival of the Gwich'in culture depends on the 
protection of the birthplace of the Porcupine Caribou Herd [sic]. I t  is [about] the basic 
tribal right we have to carry on our tradition[al] ways." Leasing of the 1002 Area of the 
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to the Oil Exploration and Development Industry: Hearing 
on H.R.249 Before the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong. 60 (1995) (statement 
of Sarah James, Netsi Gwich'in, Arctic Village, Alaska). See also Statement of Roush, 
supra note 213 at 69 ("The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge is internationally recognized 
for the extraordinary values that sustain unique wildlife populations and the subsistence 
like ways of the Gwich'in Athapaskan Indians."). Regarding the position of Alaska Native 
corporations, see Hearing on H.R.2491, supra, at 60 (statement of Oliver Leavitt, Vice- 
President, Arctic Slope Regional Corporation). 
221. See 142 CONG. REC. S5521, S5528 (daily ed. May 23,1996) (statement of Sen. 
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abled a small handful of legislators to pervert the system to pass 
this rider.222 It was characterized by its opponents as an irrespon- 
sible attempt to effectuate long-term prioritization of the nation's 
limited natural resources without public debate and full considera- 
tion by the appropriate arithorizing committees and members of 
While it falls to representative government to responsibly bal- 
ance out and resolve these conflicts through an open democratic 
process, we are far away from seeing that responsibility applied 
in how Congress is currently acting on the future of not only 
the Arctic Refuge, but all of our public lands . . . . The attempt 
to 'develop the Arctic Refuge [through the appropriations proc- 
ess] is a major symbol of that failure in public respon~ibility.~~~ 
Despite immense pressure to sign the Balanced Budget Act and 
avoid another government shut-down, the President vetoed it, based 
in large part on the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge provision,225 
In May 1996, the House Budget Committee once again pro- 
posed budgetary reconciliation legislation that would open the Arc- 
fic National Wildlife Refuge for exploration.226 The Senate's amend- 
Exon) (vast majority of Americans oppose development of the Refuge for oil and gas 
drilling). 
222. Even members of the appropriations committees objected: "In sum, the major- 
ity's text-which has not been the subject of any public hearings-seeks to avoid 
environmental lawsuits and public process by exempting the [Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge] leasing from environmental laws. It also exempts [the Refuge] from the basic laws 
governing oil and gas leasing . . . which apply even to less sensitive public lands elsewhere 
in the country." H.R. REP. NO. 104-280, at 990 (1995) (Minority, Additional and Dissent- 
ing Views to Title IX); see I41 CONG. REC. S16,014, S16,025 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1995) 
(statement of Sen. Bradley) ("This approach relies on political myopia . . . and fails to 
withstand the straight face test. Only by railroading . . . [the Refuge rider] through the 
Senate, under the very restrictive and controlled conditions of budget reconciliation, would 
. . . [it] ever have a chance of becoming law."). 
223. See 141 CONG. REC. S16,024 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Bradley) ('lf we go ahead with the development of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, 
we damage,probably irrevocably a unique, world-class ecosystem. We consume utterly n 
non-renewable resource. . . . I, frankly, reject any claim that our children will thank us 
for using up this oil and running oil rigs and oiI pipelines across the Arctic Plain. . . . Our 
children are not asking us to sell off their collective inheritance."). 
224. Statement of Roush, supra note 213, at 69. 
225. See 141 CONG. REC. H14,136-37 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (President's veto 
message to Congress) ('T want to protect this biologically rich wilderness permanently. I 
am also concerned that the Congress has chosen to use the reconciliation bill as a catch-all 
for various objectionable natural resource and environmental policies."). 
226. See Concurrent Resolution for the Budget for FY 1997, H. CON. RES. 178, 
104th Cong. (1996) (establishing budget targets for FY 1998-2002). 
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ments to the bill omitted the Arctic National Widllife Refuge provi- 
si0n,2~~ but pressure to develop the Refuge continues.228 
C. 1997 Appropriations Bills Contain Fewer Riders 
Congress once again failed to pass a general appropriations 
bill for the Department of Interior for fiscal year 1997. Interior 
appropriations had been under consideration as an independent 
bill229 up until just a few days before the end of the fiscal year,230 
when it became apparent that passage was unlikely and that a 
Continuing Resolution or omnibus package would be necessary.231 
The House then wrapped the Interior bill with four others that had 
been stalled, in part due to controversial riders, in the Omnibus 
Consolidated Appropriations 
227. See S. CON. RES. 57, 104th Cong. (1996); 142 CONG. REC. ~ 6 2 4 7 ,  H6268 
(daily ed. June 12, 1996); 142 CONG. REC. S6167-86 (daily ed. June 13, 1996); Congress 
Lays Plans for Another Reconciliation Bill (Arctic National Wildlife Refuge?), PUB: LANDS 
NEWS, June 27, 1996, at 6. 
228. See 142 CONG. REC. S10,583-84 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1996) (Sen. Murkowski 
suggested that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, and the instability of Middle Eastern 
oil sources, justify opening domestic oil fields, including the Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge). The conflict appears certain to be a significant one in the 105th Congress. Bills 
have recently been introduced in both the House and the Senate that would designate the 
Refuge as a wilderness area, see House Bill 900, 105th Cong. (1997) (proposed by Rep. 
Vento) and Senate Bill 531, 105th Cong. (1997) (proposed by Sen. Roth), but pro-devel- 
opment forces promise renewed legislation to allow leasing. See PUBLIC LANDS NEWS, 
April 17, 1997, at 8 (indicating that this could be proposed as a stand-alone bill or as a 
rider to an omnibus budget bill). 
229. H.R. 3662, 104th Cong. (1996). 
230. See 142 CONG. REC. D743 (daily ed. July 12, 1996). See also S. Rep. 104-319; 
142 CONG. REC. S7886 (daily ed. July 16, 1996); Panetta Issues Wish List as Spending 
Talks Start, CONG. DAILYIAM, Sept. 17, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11367542 [herein- 
after Panetta Issues Wish List]. 
231. See Senate Fails to Act on Money Bill, Raising Omnibus Specter, PUB. LANDS 
NEWS, Aug. 8, 1996, at 5; Eric Pianin, Butting Heads Over Spending-Again, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 16, 1996, at A9; Jessica Mathews, T,vo Tasks for Congress, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 
1996, at Al5; Panetta Issues Wish List, supra note 230. 
232. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). The Omnibus Act includes 
appropriations for Defense, Labor, Commerce-Justice-State, Foreign Operations, Interior, 
and Treasury-Postal-White House operations. It was passed on September 30, 1996, and 
signed into law just hours before N 1997 began. See Clinton Signs Spending Bill 
Follo,ving Passage in Senate, CONG. DAILY, Oct. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10091548 
[hereinafter Clinton Signs Spending Bill]. Riders generated turmoil over most, if not all, 
of these bills. For example, the Treasury Department bill was shelved in Congress because 
of irreconcilable differences over provisions prohibiting abortion coverage for federal 
workers and health care "gag rules." See Stephen Barr & Eric Pianin, Treasury Appropria- 
tions Bill is Put Aside in Divided Senate, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1996, at A20; Stephen 
Barr & Helen Dewar, Senate Continues Abortion Ban for Federal Workers Insurance, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1996, at A6. 
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Prior to consolidation, the House version of the Interior bill 
had included substantially fewer legislative riders than the FY96 
bill, a fact attributed both to eagerness to complete business and 
begin political campaigns,233 and to the negative public reaction to 
the previous year's environmental The House bill none- 
theless contained large funding shortfalls for national parks, endan- 
gered species programs, implementation of the Northwest Forest 
Plan, energy conservation, and American Indian programs.235 The 
Senate Appropriations Committee amended the bill to increase fund- 
ing,236 but added riders that would waive tribal sovereign immunity, 
allocate money directly to Indian tribes (bypassing the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs) and delay implementation of the Tongass Forest 
In addition to adding billions of dollars in additional domestic 
discretionary funding in response to the Administration's 
the final version of the Act dropped a number of riders that had 
been appended to the individual appropriations bills, including the 
two that governed tribal funding and sovereign It also 
added some new riders, including one waiving the requirements of 
the Endangered Species Act and NEPA for construction of border 
fencing to control illegal another creating the Opal 
- -- 
233. See Eric Pianin, Congress Finishes Major Legislation, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 
1996, at Al. 
234. See Nichols, supra note 172, at 1B. 
235. See 142 CONG. REC. H6518, 6522 (daily ed. June 19, 1996) (statement of Rep. 
Beilenson) ("[Tlhe Republican leadership's spending priorities . . . shortchange. . . programs 
that protect our Nation's resources for our children and our grandchildren. . . . Th[e] bill 
. . . denies future generations the legacy we believe we would all like to leave behind: 
abundant natural resources, a clean and well-protected environment, and a cultural richtless 
that all Americans can enjoy."). Secretary Babbitt recommended that the President veto 
the bill if it contained drastic funding shortfalls for Endangered Species Act programs and 
clean-up of abandoned mines. See House Spending Bill Due for Veto; Money is a Major 
Issue, PUB. LANDS NEWS, June 27, 1996, at 2; see also Senate InteriorAppropriations Bill 
Facing Veto Threat, CONG. DAILY/AM, Sept. 16, 1996, available in 1996 W L  11367534 
(predicting showdowns on grazing and other natural resources issues; Tongass rider 
attacked as an unconstitutional encroachment on executive authority). 
236. See S. REP. No. 104-319 (1996). 
237. See id. at $ 135-136 (Tongass rider), § 118 (tribal allocation), P 329 (tribal 
immunity). 
238. See Clinton Signs Spending Bill, supra note 232. 
239. The Act consists of over 2000 pages of legislation; some noted that it was 
doubtful whether a single member of Congress had read the entire bill, given its length 
and the short period of time in which it had been compiled. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,835 
(daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Inhofe). 
240. See H.R. CONF. REP. 104-863 at 567 (1996) (Div. C, Title I, 5 102(c)); 142 
CONG. REC. S11,711 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996) (statement of Sen. Simpson) (applauding 
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Creek Wilderness and Recreation Area,241 and yet another transfer- 
ring 5,000 acres of land to the Coquille Indian Tribe.242 
V. APPROPRIATIONS RIDERS THREATEN T H E  INTEGRITY O F  
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT BY PRECLUDING PUBLIC 
INVOLVEMENT AND INFORMED DEBATE ON CRITICAL POLICY 
ISSUES 
As the riders explored above make clear, policy-oriented pro- 
visions added during the appropriations process can have a dra- 
matic impact on the operation of targeted statutes. The inclusion 
of riders is not, of course, the only leverage appropriations com- 
mittees have over the agencies they oversee. Appropriations com- 
mittees' control over allocational decisions may give them almost 
as much influence over the implementation of federal programs as 
the legislative committees that authorized However, the 
"power of the purse," while substantial, does not extend to the 
outright reversal of agency 
inclusion of border control rider so that presence of endangered species, such as the 
California gnat catcher, would not delay fence construction). 
241. See H.R. CONE. REP. 104-863, at 538 @iv. B, Title I, 5 104); Brent Walth, 
Hatfield Gets Wish for Opal Creek, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Oct. 2, 1996, at A1 (Senator 
Hatfield, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, insisted on the inclusion of 
several riders affecting lands in Oregon in the final budget bill. Hatfield's-position "allowed 
him to slip the Opal Creek provisions into the final spending bill."). 
242. See H.R. CONE REP. 104-863, at 552 @iv. B, Title V, 3 501); Courtenay 
Thompson, Indian Tribes Face Hurdles on Land Shifts, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Oct. 2, 
1996, at Dl; see also Kathy Durbin, Opal Creek is Blowing in the (Political) Wind, HIGH 
COUNTRY NEWS, Sept. 16, 1996, at 2 (reporting that environmental groups withdrew 
support for the Opal Creek provision when Senator Hatfield tied it to the Coquille 
"giveaway"). 
243. See Stewart, supra note 164, at 1017. Appropriations committees have a degree 
of oversight "unmatched elsewhere in Congress." Id. at 1021. Just as agency programs do 
not become real until they are enforced, legislative measures lack substance until they are 
funded. See 3. William Futrell, The Administration of Environmental Law, in ENVIRON- 
MENTAL LAW FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY 71, 77 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 
1993) mereinafter Administration]. For example, the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. $8 7401- 
7671 (1994), was effectively crippled by a lack of appropriations from 1982 to 1990, and 
the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. $8 2601-2692 (1994), went unauthorized for 
nearly a decade. See id.; Sher, supra note 4. 
244. See LeBoeuf, supra note 163, at 475. It would appear that the Framers of our 
bicameral and tripartite system anticipated that appropriations allocations would provide 
a check on executive spending. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison). It is 
doubtful, however, that they intended for appropriations committees-separate and distinct 
from authorizing committees who are likely to be more conversant in their particular 
field-to wield such power over executive programs. See Oleszek, supra note 162, at 
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The use of policy-oriented riders, on the other hand, can ef- 
fectively force an agency to take action contrary to its authorizing 
mandate. Because of the absence of safeguards in the appropria- 
tions process, such dramatic policy changes can be achieved with 
little opportunity for consideration or debate. Riders can also be 
employed to force the President to capitulate to the legislature's 
demands when normal legislative routes would be stymied by the 
threat of veto.245 
This section examines the normal legislative processes for 
enacting legislation and finds that these processes provide proce- 
dural and substantive safeguards that are absent when riders are 
appended to appropriations bills. It concludes that the appropria- 
tions process is a poor vehicle for balancing competing interests 
and establishing national priorities.246 
A. Normal Legislative Processes Encourage Full and Informed 
Consideration of Substantive Policies and Priorities 
The normal process for the consideration of legislation in 
~ o n ~ r e s s ~ o m m i t t e e  research, drafts, review, and recommenda- 
tion, followed first by floor debate and passage in each chamber, 
then conference reports and bicameral adoption-provides many 
opportunities for public scrutiny and for consideration by members 
interested in the subject matter of the With respect to legis- 
lation that did not originate in their own committees, members are 
provided with their best (and sometimes only) opportunity to shape 
public policy through amendments and votes on the Floor 
debate, hearings, and committee consideration are the "components 
of the ~, legislative process that are most likely to reveal misrepre- 
737-38 (quoting Senator Hubert Humphrey, disputing the view that the constitutional 
requirement that appropriations be "made by law7' meant that they must be made by 
appropriations committees). 
245. See Stewart, supra note 164, at 1015. 
246. Parts 111 and N, supra, demonstrate that appropriations riders are especially 
ill-suited for managing valuable, but limited, natural resources held in trust for the benefit 
of the public and future generations, 
247. ,For a detailed discussion of the legislative process in Congress, see generally 
Stanley Bach, Legislating: Floor and Conference Procedures in Congress, in 2 ENCYCLO- 
. PEDIA OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 701-20 (Joel H. Silbey ed., 1994); WALTER J. 
OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS (4th ed. 1996). 
248. See Bach, supra note 247, at 708. 
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sentations, false assumptions, and problems with ambiguous lan- 
g ~ a g e . " ~ ~ ~  
Initially, most policy matters are delegated to committees with 
jurisdiction over the issues in~olved.~50 Environmental issues are 
divided into a myriad of committees with often overlapping juris- 
In the Senate, environmental and natural resources issues 
are governed by Committees on Energy and Natural Resources, 
Agriculture, Environment and Public Works, and, inevitably, Ap- 
propriations. In the House, relevant committees include Energy and 
Commerce, Agriculture, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Science, 
Space and Technology, and  appropriation^.^^^ 
The congressional process is strengthened by delegating the 
investigation and consideration of complex environmental issues to 
committees with expertise in a bill's specific subject matter.253 Fur- 
ther, the distribution of authority among congressional committees 
creates numerous points of access to decisionmakers, and, argu- 
ably, greater accountability and response to' feedback. The over- 
sight of interested committees and subcommittees ensures that no 
single chairperson-subject to the local interests of his constituents 
and pressures of lobbyists and contributors-has a "lock:' on envi- 
ronmental issues, and that various perspectives are heard, researched, 
249. Axline, supra note 54, at 638. See generally Sher & Hunting, supra note 165. 
250. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between committees and their 
chambers, and the distribution and exercise of power in the decisionmaking process in 
Congress. see STEVEN S. S ~ ~ I T H  AND CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING. COMMITTEES IN CON- GRE~YS (2d ed. 1990). 
251. See Futrell, supra note 243, at 75-77 (citing THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF 
LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979)). For example, 11 House and 9 .Senate committees, including 
nearly 100 separate subcommittees, oversee EPA. See Thomas L. Adams, Jr. & M. 
~lizabeth COX,-~he,~nvironmental Shell Game and the Need for Codification, 20 ENVTL. 
I., REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,367 (1990). 
252. See Futrell, supra note 243, at 75-77. Environmental issues have been the 
subject of specialization in the various House and Senate committees for decades. During 
the 1960s, in the Senate, the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Environment 
and Public Works Committee asserted jurisdiction over air and water pollution, including 
oil pollution in navigable waters. See Muskie, supra note 26, at 176-78. House committees 
that governed air and water pollution and solid waste legislation included the Public Works 
Committee and Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, while the Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries Committee retained jurisdiction over oil pollution. See id. at 177-78. 
Meanwhile, the Interior Committees were responsible for management of natural re- 
sources. See id. Executive agencies are similarly situated: environmental regulation comes 
under the jurisdiction of EPA, while natural resources issues are handled by .the Depart- 
ment of Agriculture (Forest Service) and the Department. of Interior (Bureau of Land 
Management, National Park Service, and Fish and Wildlife Service). See Futrell, supra 
note 243, at 79-80. 
253. See id. at 75-78. 
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and considered by legislators responsible for protecting the full 
range of public interests. The usual legislative process "improve[s] 
final legislative products and allow[s] dissenters to fine-tune lan- 
guage and challenge assumptions."254 
This process is not immune from criticism. A common com- 
plaint is that public policy decisionmaking is sometimes piecemeal 
and ~ncoordinated.~~~ One reason is the committee process itself, 
which can result in fragmented consideration of the issues. Dis- 
persed authority can also result in infighting, competition and lack 
of cooperation, and can impede comprehensive strategic leader- 
ship.256 
In addition, Congress's efforts have been described as static 
and unresponsive to the needs of the TO the chagrin of 
254. Axline, supra note 54, at 632. 
255. See Adams & Cox, supra note 251, at 10,367; Muskie, supra note 26, at 172 
(arguing that because "public' concern and scientific knowledge first focused legislative 
and administrative attention on the environmental crisis in piecemeal stages, the patterns 
of congressional and executive jurisdiction have reflected that approach"). 
256. Committee consideration is further "complicated by regional and party alli- 
ances within each committee." Futrell, supra note 243, a t  75. "As the importance of 
environmental protection becomes more obvious, its attractiveness as a political and 
legislative issue increases, and the muddy waters of committee jurisdiction in Congress 
become more muddy." Muskie, supra note 26, at 176. As a result, "jurisdictional disputes 
between committees could have a damaging effect on our efforts to solve the environ- 
mental crisis." Id. at 180; see also David W. Brady, Constitutional and Political Con- 
straints on Congressional Policy-Making: A Historical Perspective, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 873, 876-78 (Joel H. Silbey ed., 1994). 
257. One commentator accuses Congress of "seem[ing] to exhibit a persistent 
inability to legislate any major policy changes at all." Brady, supra note 256, at 873. It 
typically takes years for comprehensive environmental legislation to work its way through 
the authorizing committees .and floor amendment and debate. For example, efforts to 
reauthorize the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA, or Superfund), 42 U.S.C. $5 9601-75 (1994), for which funding authorizations 
expired in 1994, see Pub. L. No. 101-508 Q 6301, 104 Stat. 1388-319 (1990) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. $ 9611), have taken nearly three years, and the end to the debate 
is not yet in sight. For a sampling of the extensive deliberations that have taken place in 
authorizing committees and on the floor of both houses, see 140 CONG. REC. S1058-86 
(daily ed. Feb. 7, 1994) (introducing Senate Bill 1834, 103d Cong. (1994)); id. at S12,216 
(daily ed. Aug. 19, 1994) (referring Senate Bill 1834 to the Finance Committee); id. at 
Dl151 (Finance committee reporting favorably on Senate Bill 1834); id. at S13,560 (daily 
ed. Sept. 28, 1994) (statement of Sen. Gorton, discussing history of congressional efforts 
and urgent need for reform); 142 CONG. REC. H4438 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement 
of Rep. Gutknecht on urgency of reform); id. at H8029 (daily ed. July 18, 1996) 
(introducing House Bill 3849, 104th Cong. (1996)). Superfund's predecessor, the original 
CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), expired in September 1985. Efforts 
to reform the statute in 1985-86 consumed the attention of seven different congressional 
committees over almost two years; a stopgap measure was required to keep the program 
intact while numerous hearings, debates, and conference committee meetings were held. 
See ALLAN J. TOPEL AND REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE 13-14 
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those in the majority, the hallmark of Congress has been "continu- 
ity, stability, and incremental policy development, not rapid and 
sweeping change."2ss Indeed, the bicameral system established by 
the Founders and encapsulated in the C o n s t i t ~ t i o n ~ ~ ~  was a response 
to the concern that a hasty and potentially tyrannical majority in 
the House of Representatives would act "too quickly and chaoti- 
~ally"~~O if left to its own devices; ,the Senate, an indirectly elected 
upper house, would "use reason and judgment to temper the lower 
house's expected haste and extremism."261 
However imperfect, these safeguards operate to encourage con- 
sidered policymaking and public involvement. Although the dura- 
tion and number of debates on a particular bill are not proof of its 
ultimate quality or long-term viability, extended discussions in- 
volving a range of perspectives provide at least some assurance 
that troubling issues will be resolved in a manner that protects the 
public interest.262 
B. Public Involvement and Reasoned Decisionmaking Are 
Short-circuited in the Appropriations Process 
Aspirations for comprehensive review, embodied in the legisla- 
tive structure, are defeated when policy matters are decided through 
riders added to appropriations bills. Inadequate enforcement of 
existing rules, a willingness to waive rules, and the growing use 
of omnibus Continuing Resolutions in the appropriations process 
(1992). The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 was finally signed 
into law on October 17, 1986. See Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. $3 9601-9675). 
258. Brady, supra note 256, at 873-74; see id. at 878 (discussing why major policy 
changes rarely occur in Congress), id. at 879-82 (describing "electoral realignments," 
which occur when popular voter revolution has a significant impact on the governing 
process, as the exception to the general premise, and suggesting that three realignments 
had occurred in American history prior to 1993 in response to slavery, industrialization, 
and the Great Depression and New Deal). Perhaps historians and constitutional scholars 
in future years will include the 1994 election and Republican "Contract with America" as 
a fourth realignment). 
259. See U.S. CONST. art. I, $5 1-3. 
260. Brady, supra note 256, at 873-74. 
261. Id. at 873. 
262. Justice Louis Brandeis put it most aptly: "Publicity is justly commended as a 
remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; 
electric light the most efficient policeman." Lours BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 
89 (1995), cited with approval in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976), and Bruce 
Babbitt, Springtime for Polluters, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1995, at C2. 
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allow substantive riders to flourish, undermining the goal of delib- 
erative government. This is particularly damaging when the appro- 
priations process is used to dictate complex substantive issues, like 
environmental policy, that would greatly benefit from the give and 
take of the normal legislative process.263 Even environmental leg- 
islation that is fairly discrete receives far greater consideration in 
committees and on the than does an appropriations rider,265 
1.  Existing Rules Fail to Limit Abuse of Substantive Riders 
Congressional procedures play 'a critical role in ensuring that 
issues are given informed c~ns idera t ion .~~~ "The legislative proce- 
dures of the House and Senate are not merely the neutral mechan- 
ics of the lawmaking process; they can have important and some- 
times decisive policy  consequence^."^^^ Yet nothing in the Constitu- 
tion expressly ensures that public policy matters are given full 
consideration by Congress. Congress is left largely free to govern 
itself;268 each house may adopt its own procedural rules, and decide 
263. See Bolduan, supra note 59, at 370-72. 
264. See discussion supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
265. For example, the 1995 timber salvage rider was considered over a total of four 
months. It was first disclosed in the committee report for House Bill 1159, 104th Codg. 
(1995) (a forerunner to the Rescissions Act, Pub. L. No. 104-19, 209 Stat. 194 (1995)) on 
March 8, 1995. See H. REP. 104-71 (1995), It was introduced on the House floor on March 
14, see 141 CONG. REC. H3148-56 (daily ed., 1995), debated sporadically over the next 
two days, and passed by the full House on March 16. See id. at H3159. The rider received 
similar treatment in the Senate. See 141 CONG. REC. S4761 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1995); id. 
at S5378-80 (daily-ed. Apr. 6, 1995); see also id. at H5317-18 (daily ed. May 18, 1995); 
id at S7371-81 (daiIy ed. May 24,1995) (discussing conference report). House Bill 1158, 
104th Cong. (1995)-the version emerging from the conference committee-was vetoed 
after passage. It was reintroduced in modified form as House Bill 1944, 104th Cong. 
(1995), which passed the full House on June 29, see 141 CONG. REC. H6643-44 (daily 
ed.. June 29, 1995), was considered on the Senate floor on July 20-21, and passed the 
Senate on July 21, 1995. See id. at Sl0,462-67 (daily ed. July 21, 1995). 
266. See Bach, supra note 247, at 702 ("[Alssemblies that approve,policies without 
the benefit of adequate and informed debate are properly derided as rubber-stamp bodies 
that merely ratify decisions made elsewhere."). 
267. Id. at 718. The most important issue about a bill may actually be settled with 
the disposition of "an ostensibly procedural question" even before debate on the merits of 
the bill itself commences. Id. at 715. As a result, proposals to reform House and Senate 
procedural rules "can provoke floor debates as heated and vituperative as those over the 
most contentious issues of national or international policy . . . . Changes in the procedures 
. . . can redistribute the balance of power within the House or Senate in fundamental and 
lasting ways . . . [and] affect a wide array of policy choices not only for the present but 
for the unforeseeable future . . . ." Id. at 718. 
268. In comparison, the vast majority of state constitutions contain fairly detailed 
procedural limitations on the legislative process. See Robert E Williams, State Constitti. 
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how it will interpret and enforce them.269 Each may also amend or 
repeal its rules, or waive or suspend them on any given bill.270 AS 
a result, "members remain in almost total control of how they 
conduct their business,"271 ignoring, if they choose, mechanisms 
that provide for public input and informed deliberation. 
Almost from the date of their incepti0n,2~~ appropriations com- 
mittees have been criticized for overstepping their bounds and 
adding extraneous policy riders to their bills, which "undercut the 
prerogatives of other standing committees."273 Indeed, current House 
and Senate rules provide that appropriations bills cannot contain 
new policy directives or modify existing substantive law.274 This is 
tional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 
48 U. PITT. L. REV. 797, 798-99 (1987). Many state constitutions prohibit the legislature 
from attaching substantive riders to general appropriations bills. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. 
art. IV, 9 71; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, 20; FLA. CONST. art. HI, $ 12; ILL. CONST. 
art. IV, 8(d); LA. CONST. art. In, $ 16(c); OKLA. CONST. art. V, $ 56. Others strictly 
prohibit the inclusion of multiple subjects in bills. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IV, 3 9; 
N.D. CONST. art. TV, 5 33. Courts have invalidated substantive appropriations riders under 
such single subject provisions. See Cal. Labor Fed'n AFL-CIO v. Occupational Safety and 
Health Standards Bd., 5 Cal. App. 4th 985 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). 
269. See U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of 
its Proceedings."). The standing rules adopted by the Senate remain in force from year to 
year until the Senate affirmatively decides to revise them, but the House adopts its rules 
anew at the beginning of each Congress. See Bach, supra note 247, at 701. , 
270. See Bach, supra note 247, at 702. 
271. Id. at 701. For the few examples of general legislative requirements, see U.S. 
CONST. art. I, 5 4, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XX, 3 2 (Congress* shall 
assemble at least once a year); id. at 7, cl. 1 (revenue bills must originate in the House 
of Representatives). 
272. The House established an Appropriations and Banking Committee in 1865, and 
the Senate created its Appropriations Committee in 1867. See Oleszek, supra note 162, at 
733. 
273. Id. at 733. Past congresses attempted to use riders to deprive slaves of the right 
to vote (by prohibiting the use of federal troops to protect them at the polls) and to rid 
the federal government of "subversive" employees suspected of Communist affiliations. 
See LeBoeuf, supra note 163, at 471-72 (riders that would have affected voting rights 
were vetoed by President Hayes, and the Supreme Court, in United States v. Lovett, 328 
U.S. 303 (1946), struck down the rider that targeted federal empIoyees as a bill of attainder 
prohibited by U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 9, cl. 3). The practice of "rider-tacking" has been 
employed even more frequently in recent years, in many important public policy areas. 
See discussion supra Parts IV.A-.B. 
274. See Standing Rules of the U.S. Senate, Rule 16(4), in COMMITTEE ON RULES 
AND ADMINISTRATION, SENATE MANUAL 624 (1995); Rules of the House of Repre- 
sentatives, Rule XX1(2), in CHARLES W. JOHNSON, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, 
AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 624 (1995). See generally C. CANNON, 
PROCEDURE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES $ 1834 (1936). The provision barring 
substantive riders was reaffirmed by the House in the 104th Congress, and a provision was 
added that prohibits the attachment of non-emergency matters in an appropriations bill 
containing an emergency designation under the Budget Act. See Rules of the House of 
Representatives, Rule XXI(Zj(e), supra; H.R. Res. 6, 104th Cong. $ 215(b) (1995) (en- 
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a long-standing prohibition; it was initially adopted in the House 
in the late 1830s, and the Senate quickly followed 
The distinction between substantive law and appropriations is 
intended to enable appropriations committees to concentrate on 
financial issues and, perhaps more importantly, "to prevent them 
from trespassing on substantive Thus, the appropria- 
tions process is not to be used as a "vehicle . . . for legislative 
provisions that might not survive the scrutiny of the authorizing 
committees ."277 
However, while the House enforces its rules more strictly than 
does the the House Committee on Rules may and often 
does waive or suspend rules with respect to appropriations bills.279 
When congressional rules are waived, riders may be attached to 
acted); 141 CONG. REc. W23, H29 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995). Although riders may be 
appended to bills, the report clearly states "it is not the intent of this rule to make in order 
any amendments not otherwise in order under the rules. Thus, any amendments to rescind 
or reduce direct spending must be germane to the bill as reported or be given special 
protection by way of a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and adopted by the 
House." 141 CONG. REC. H37. 
275. See Oleszek, supra note 162, at 735. The House also has a rule requiring that 
amendments be germane to the topic of the bilI they propose to affect; however, the Senate 
has no germaneness rule of general application. See Bach, supra note 247, at 707. 
Moreover, although the Senate does prohibit policy-based amendments to House-passed 
appropriations bills, its broad interpretive standards enable members to defend many issues 
as germane. See Oleszek, supra note 162, at 735-36. 
276. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 361 (1979). See generally SMITH & 
DEERING, supra note 250, at 235-36. 
277. See S ~ ~ I T H  & DEERING, supra note 50, at 183; Neal E. Devins, Regulation of 
Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 458, 458-59 (the 
"incomplete" appropriations process should not be used to prevent authorizing committees 
from applying their expertise). 
278. See Bach, supra note 247, at 711. 
279. This happened with particular frequency in the 104th Congress. See, e.g., 142 
CONG. REC. D629 (daily ed. June 18, 1996) (House Comm. on Rules waives points of 
order against legislative provisions in House Bill 3662, 104th Cong. (1996), the general 
appropriations bill for the Department of Interior and related agencies for N 1997); 141 
CONG. REC. H4344, 4345 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1995) (House approves Rules Comm. 
resolution waiving all points of order against House Bill 889, 104th Cong. (19951, a 
defense measure that included a moratorium on Endangered Species Act listings). The 
House Committee on Rules approved the timber rider by waiving both House Rule XXI, 
which prohibits unauthorized legislative provisions in appropriations bills, and House Rule 
XVI, the germaneness rule. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-78 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. D347 
(daily ed. Mar. 14, 1995). Waivers are easily obtained when the appropriations chair or 
the chair of the authorizing committee desires inclusion of a rider: "the Rules Committee 
is a generally dependable ally of the majority-party leadership." Bach, supra note 247, at 
705; see also Stewart, supra note 164, at 1015 (noting that appropriations committees have 
been centers of power since inception); Axline, supra note 54, at 639 (discussing Senators 
Gorton and Hatfield's influence over the adoption of the salvage rider). Moreover, the 
House allows "limitation" riders, which restrict or limit the use of funds for any part of 
a program addressed in the bill. See Oleszek, supra note 162, at 736. Limitation riders 
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appropriations bills and move through the process with minimal 
public review and input, and without due consideration of the bills7 
implications by the authorizing committees with jurisdiction over 
the rider's subject matter.280 
Moreover, the hasty process by which riders are appended to 
large appropriations bills provides little opportunity for non-mem- 
bers of the appropriations committees to read the rider's provi- 
sions, much less consider, question, or debate, the wisdom of its 
requirements and prohibitions.281 
2. Continuing Resolutions Are Particularly Susceptible to Policy 
Amendments 
The pitfalls of making sweeping policy decisions through the 
appropriations process are exacerbated when Congress fails to en- 
act one or more of the thirteen regular appropriations bills by the 
start of the new fiscal year, and a continuing resolution is required 
to provide last minute stopgap funding and maintain government 
operations.282 There are no congressional rules to hinder the inclu- 
sion of policy matters in a continuing resolution.283 As a result, 
continuing resolutions may encourage appropriators "to pursue leg- 
inevitably make policy. See id. (citing abortion as a classic example); see also-Devins, 
supra note 277, at 456-57. 
280. See Allan Freedman, For Sale: Government Assets To Reduce Budget Dejcit, 
57 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2889,2890 (1995) (quoting Rep. George Millyr, ranking minority 
member of the House Natural Resources Committee, expressing disgust at efforts to tack 
a rider allowing oil and gas drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge onto the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1995). 
281. See Devins, supra note 277, at 458 ("Exacerbating this problem [of using the 
appropriations process to accomplish substantive ends], appropriations are often acted on 
quickly, providing little opportunity for thoughtful deliberation of the issues raised by such 
measures."); see also 141 CONG. REC. H6637 (daily ed. June 29, 1995) (statement of Rep. 
Obey) (sarcastically noting that it might be "kind of useful" to be allowed time to read 
the 1995 salvage timber rider before debating it); id. at H6638 (statement of Rep. Defazio) 
("we are going to be asked to vote on [compromise language in the salvage timber rider] 
within 15 minutes . . . . This is an . . . extraordinary outrage."). 
282. See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, Blame Checks and Balances, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 
1995, at A23 (describing politica1 jockeying to obtain substantive concessions in budget 
crises and fiscal "train wrecks" of the 104th Congress in late 1995); Eric Pianin & John 
F. Hams, Clinton Signs Measures to Halt Shutdown, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1996, at A1 
(reporting that congressional resolutions had been signed that would bring an end to the 
three-week government shutdown but leave federal workers virtually ham-strung because 
operating funds were not provided for many agencies; congressional resolutions are a 
"'goofy' and patchwork approach to restoring government services"). 
283. See SMITH & DEERING, supra note 250, at 210. 
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islative matters without the consent and cooperation of the affected 
authorizing committee."284 
The danger is particularly great because of the circumstances 
surrounding the passage of continuing resolutions.285 Especially 
when Congress chooses to fund all or a number of the thirteen 
annual appropriations bills through a single omnibus resolution, the 
sheer size of the document is likely to ensure that only a handful 
of appropriations committee members understand the details con- 
tained within them.286 In addition, because of their urgency, con- 
tinuing resolutions are often virtually v e t o - p r o ~ f . ~ ~ ~  Thus neither 
fellow members of Congress, or the President, are likely to serve 
as a check on continuing resolution riders. 
Recent events clearly illustrate the risks of the appropriations 
process as it currently operates.288 During the budgetary "train wreck" 
in 1995 and early 1996,289 Senator Robert Byrd concluded that the 
284. Id. at 21 1. 
285. See Stewart, supra note 164, at 1029. 'Xppropriations bills often pass at the 
eleventh hour as the federal government's spending authority runs out, and tremendous 
pressures, unrelated to a rider's substance, push toward passage." Sher & Hunting, supra 
note 165, at 479. For this reason, Senator McCain recently introduced the Government 
Shutdown Prevention Act, S. 228, 105th Cong. (1997), which would set Fiscal Year 1998 
spending at 98% of FY 1997 levels if appropriations bills are not completed on time. See 
143 CONG. REc. S3017, 3018 (daily ed., Apr. 10, 1997). 
286. See Stewart, supra note 164, at 1029. Stewart notes that the omnibus continu- 
ing resolution for FY 1987 weighed 30 pounds. See id. 
287. See, e.g.; Statement by  President on Signing H.R. 1643 Contin~ting Resolrition, 
U.S. NEWSWIRE, Washington, D.C., Jan. 6, 1996, available in 1996 W L  5618883 [herein- 
after Statement by  President] (noting the adverse effects of three-week government 
shut-down, President Clinton signed two continuing resolutions, although they contained 
a provision that "single[d] out poor women by prohibiting the use of District [of Columbia] 
funds for providing abortion services" and failed to fund significant activities, such as EPA 
enforcement of environmental laws); see also Michael Rappaport, The President's Veto 
and the Constitution, 87 Nw. U .  L. REV. 735, 784 n.198 (1993) (describing President 
Hayes' "heroic resistance to tacking" by vetoing appropriations bills that contained riders); 
J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe and 
Kurland, 84 Nw. U.L. REV. 437,476 (1990) (arguing that legislative bundling of unrelated 
measures vitiates the veto power). 
288. See discussion supra Parts 1II.B-.C., 1V.A-.B.; see also NFRC v. Glickman 
(NERC II), 97 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 1996); SAS v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (substantive legislation through appropriations bills is inappropriate), rev'd, 1 I2  
S. Ct. 1407 (1992). 
289. During the 104th Congress, the government shut down twice, for a week in 
November and again for 21 days in December and January. According to the General 
Accounting Office, prior to 1995 there had been nine occasions since 1981 when funding 
gaps of one to three days occurred, usually over a weekend. See Statement by Sen. Robert 
C. Byrd on Government Shutdown, GOVERN~IENT PRESS RELEASES, Nov. 15, 1995, available 
in 1995 W L  12677684 [hereinafter Statement by Sen. ByrdJ. "Not one of these occasions 
approached the cost or the severity, not to mention the gross irresponsibility, of our present 
situation." Id. The 1995-96 shutdowns were estimated to have cost the government, and 
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cause of the failure to complete congressional action on eight 
remaining appropriations bills was "the fact that virtually all of 
them contain at least one controversial legislative rider-issues 
such as public housing reform, EPA regulatory issues, mining law 
reform, California desert protection, National Endowment for the 
Arts, prison reform, abortion and rewriting the 1994 Crime Bill.77290 
Senator Byrd surmised that "the grand strategy of the Republican 
majority in Congress is to threaten to shut down the government 
and to force a default on our debt in order to coerce the President 
. . . .  
"291 
In January, as the second shutdown reached the end of its third 
week and as appropriations for several departments and agencies 
still had not neared completion,~Congress began to pass "mini" 
continuing resolutions, funding pet projects one by one, as con- 
stituents felt the pinch of suspended government contracts and 
closed national p a r k ~ . ~ g ~  Finally, in April-seven months after the 
start of the fiscal year-a consolidated spending bill was enacted 
to fund programs that were still without general appropriations 
bills.293 
C. Riders Subvert the Integrity of a Republican, 
Representational Legislature 
Although standard legislative procedures sometimes fail to 
achieve informed decisionmaking reflective of the public interest, 
that ideal is utterly unattainable when procedural safeguards are 
ignored or unavailable.294 To include provisions that change or obviate 
the taxpayers, about $1 billion. See Dan Morgan & Stephen Barr, When Shutdo~vn Hit 
Home Ports, GOP Cutters Trimmed their Sails, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1996, at Al.  
290. Sratement by Sen. Byrd, supra note 289; see Morgan & Barr, supra note 289, 
at A1 ("Conservatives have loaded appropriations bills with legislative provisions on 
abortion, labor law and environmental regulations that are unacceptable to President 
Clinton or Senate Democrats, so the measures are stalled."). 
291. Statement by Sen. Byrd, supra note 289. 
292. See Morgan & Ban; supra note 289, at Al; statement of President, supra note 
287; Pianin & Harris, supra note 282, at A l .  
293. See Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 S,tat. 1321 (1996); discussion supra P& IV.B.2. 
294. Professor Rappaport states that the "modem tactic of legislating by massive 
Continuing Resolutions . . . makes a travesty of the ideal of a deliberative Congress." 
Rappaport, supra note 287, at 743 n.21. Presumably, he would agree, then, that the practice 
of tacking substantive policy items to omnibus appropriations bills, which may provide 
even less opportunity for debate, would also make a travesty of a democratic legislature. 
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public policy and law in an appropriations bill or continuing reso- 
lution seriously undermines the integrity of the process and cir- 
cumvents the public will as expressed in those pre-existing sub- 
stantive laws. Riders erode the very foundation of the democratic 
model of bicameral, tripartite government by limiting responsive 
representation that can only result from fully informed debate and 
decisi~nmaking:~~~ 
Eiders do not provide the public with] . . . an adequate oppor- 
tunity to examine the policy path.that is being advanced, much 
less members of Congress. This is not in keeping with the 
American tradition of representative government: the American 
people have a right to know that significant policy changes are 
being made and they have a right to know the direction of the 
new policy path.296 
In effect, the inclusion of riders in the appropriations process 
provides a mechanism for Congress to avoid confronting funda- 
mental conflicts in public values. Elected officials need not take 
controversial positions when they vote on lengthy appropriations 
bills that include virtually undetectable riders. The resuIt is that 
hard choices are not made, and accountability falls by the way- 
side.297 When riders dictate policy in the environmental area, the 
results "highlight the disparity between the far-reaching statement 
of protection asserted in NEPA and other environmental laws and 
the political realities that encouraged Congress to eviscerate the 
statutes' substantive impact."298 
295. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 46-47, 89-90 (Harv. Univ. 
Press 1980) (arguing that under the basic democratic theory of government, the fundamen- 
tal role of Congress is to represent the consensus of the citizens, while the role of the 
Constitution is to ensure adequate process so that the voices of the people may be heard). 
296. 141 CONG. REC. H9687-88 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Rep. Vento 
on the proposed Interior appropriations bill for EY 1996). 
297. See Pamela L. Zielske, Recent Case, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 741,742-43, 756 
(1996) (noting that Pennsylvania constitution includes a prohibition on substantive riders 
and other "pernicious customs" of the legislature in an effort to avoid procedural abuses 
and promote governmental honesty and accountability); see also Williams, supra note 268, 
at 798 (noting that, in response to perceived legislative abuses, virtually all state consti- 
tutions contain procedural limitations that strive to require open and deliberative processes 
so that the merits of legislative proposals may be addressed "in an orderly and rational 
manner"). For further discussion of approaches to the rider problem at the state level, see 
infra note 314, 314. 
298. Sher & Hunting, supra note 165, at 476. This is the very reason that implied 
repeals or waivers of pre-existing substantive laws are "especially disfavored when the 
claimed repeal relies on an appropriations act." NFRC v. Glickman (NFRC II), 97 F.3d 
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Not only does the use of appropriations riders curtail full 
debate and public involvement, riders typically foreclose judicial 
challenge to agency actions as well.299 Appropriations riders that 
limit opportunities for judicial review are doubly suspect. Such 
riders are especially likely to compromise non-economic resources 
by encouraging agencies to "violate statutory requirements with 
impunity,"300 thereby fostering-even encouraging-shortsighted- 
ness. 
The use of riders to exempt specified activities from environ- 
mental requirements and to limit judicial review eviscerates a "fun- 
damental premise of federal environmental poli~y"~~~-that the laws 
apply uniformly to agencies across the country, and require rational 
decisionmaking that considers the action's broader implications on 
the public welfare, guided by substantive standards, informed by 
public participation, and enforceable by the judiciary.302 Such riders 
"undermin[e] the integrity of the laws and our judicial system,"303 
creating a compelling case for a forceful and effective remedy. 
VI. THE MANIPULATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
THROUGH SUBSTANTIVE RIDERS NECESSITATES A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE 
Commentators have suggested a variety of remedies to the 
problem of Congressional appropriations riders. A president, espe- 
1161, 1166 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U. 153, 190 (1978)). 
Further, the legislative history of such enactments may provide no reliable interpretive 
guidance, because such bills are not subjected to committee review and full floor debate. 
See Devins, supra note 277, at 481-82 (noting that, because riders rarely contain clear 
policy statements, they often result in interpretive difficulties). But see United States v. 
Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 556-57 (1940) (relying heavily on legislative debates to interpret 
rider that prohibited previously authorized bonuses for Army re-enlistees). 
299. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
300. Bolduan, supra note 59, at 364. Accordingly, "when economic concerns and 
environmental law conflict, the law should be reviewed, not circumvented." 135 CONG. 
REC. S12,983 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Biden). 
301. See Sher, supra note 4, at 10,470. 
302. See id.; 135 CONG. REC. S12,983 (statement of Sen. Biden) (this "disturbing 
trend . . . continues a wrong-headed and potentially devastating practice of using legisla- 
tion approved with no public review to undermine environmental laws that were developed 
through a lengthy public process"). 
303. Sher, supra note 4, at 10,469. "t'T]he right to hold government action account- 
able before an independent judiciary" is part of "'the- very essence of civil liberty."' Id. 
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803)); see Sher & Hunting, supra note 
34, at 48 1-82. 
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cially one armed with textual veto authority?O4 might be able to 
correct or veto abusive bills.305 The courts might, by imposing a 
stricter standard of review on agency action permitted or mandated 
by a provision in an appropriations rider, reassert the primacy of 
legislation resulting from a truly deliberative process.306 The House 
and Senate might be persuaded to apply existing rules concerning 
riders more or to enact super-legislation308 that would . 
protect the appropriations process by enforcing germaneness rules. 
Finally, the creation or recognition of a constitutional right to a 
sustainable environment could prevent encroachment by legislative 
riders .309 
After considering each of these alternatives, this Article sug- 
gests that yet another option would best foster integrity and respon- 
siveness in our republican form of government, as well as protect 
natural resources and the environment: a process-oriented consti- 
tutional amendment precluding the enactment of substantive law 
through the appropriations process.310 
304. See injka note 314 and accompanying text. 
305. See Rappaport, supra note 287, at 784 (arguing that to deter rider-tacking, the 
President should make a public pledge to veto appropriations bills that include substantive 
provisions). 
306. Bolduan, Sher, and Hunting propose stricter standards than regular Adminis- 
trative Procedure Act "arbitrary and capricious" review. See Bolduan, supra note 59, at 
373-80; Sher & Hunting, supra note 165, at 479-82. See generally JOSEPH L. SAX, 
DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1971). 
307. See Axline, supra note 54, at 613, 638-39. Professor Axline does not suggest 
how to accomplish this objective, which is unfortunate considering the serious impediment 
presented by the House and Senate's long-standing authority to govern their own internal 
procedures with virtually no influence, let alone oversight, by the other two branches of 
government or the public. See Bach, supra note 247, at 701-02. Indeed, although the 
Constitution says very little about the nuts and bolts of the business of legislating, it 
specifically provides h a t  "[elach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings." U.S, 
CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
308. "Super-legislation" is used here to describe a statutory rule that could only be 
waived by a super-majority vote in the Senate or House. 
309. See Sher & Hunting, supra note 165, at 482-85 (arguing that a constitutional 
right would "insulate environmental values from legislative erosion" and justify heightened 
scrutiny of congressional conduct on environmental issues); Rodger Schlickeisen, Protect- 
ing Biodiversity for Future Generations: An Argument for a Constitrrtional Amendment, 8 
TUL. ENVTL. L.3. 181 (1994) (arguing that an amendment is necessary to protect rights of 
current and future generations to benefits of natural resources and to prevent legislation 
or agency action that would harm ecological systems). 
310. This option is presented here in response to the need to curtail hasty public 
policy legislation involving environmental issues, particularly riders, such as the 1995 
timber rider, which diminish the separation of powers between political branches. How- 
ever, an amendment need not be limited to environmental matters; instead, it should apply 
to all legislation that makes substantive policy. 
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A. Other Proposed Solutions Would Not Suficiently Restrict the 
Use of Appropriations Riders - 
1. The Line Item Veto Act, Even if it Were Constitutional, Would 
Not Prohibit Substantive Riders 
The recently enacted Line Item Veto Act allows the President 
to excise "(1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; 
[or] (2) any item of new direct spending" from a bill or joint 
resolution.311 The Act is a bbreduction only" veto,312 which grants 
the Executive limited authority to reduce specific dollar amounts. 
Even members of Congress agree that the Act "will be helpful in 
imposing budget discipline . . . [and] in preventing unsupportable 
spending projects from being added to spending bills without pub- 
lic notice, debate, or hearings . . . . "3 13 
Although the line-item veto provides a much needed mecha- 
nism to subject pork-barrel projects to the veto pen without jeop- 
ardizing an entire budget or appropriations bill, its narrow grant of 
authority does not address the problem of substantive legislative 
riders.314 Further, line-item veto powers, even narrowly' tailored 
reduction-only veto provisions, may well violate Articles I and 111 
by improperly delegating legislative powers to the Executive, thereby 
upsetting the balance of p0wers.~15 In fact, a federal district court 
311. See Pub. L. No. 104130, 3 2(a), 5 1021(a), 110 Stat. 1200 (1996) (codified at 
2 U.S.C.A. § 691(a) (1997)). 
312. See Antony R. Petrilla, Note, The Role of the Line-Item Veto in the Federal 
Balance of Power, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469, 480-81 (1994). 
313. 142 CONG. REC. S4250, S4251 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. 
Dorgan) ("Congress has a bad habit of spending money on projects that we have not 
reviewed in committee hearings or permitted in authorization bills . . . . The bill will help 
the President control spending abuses, especially unauthorized projects in appropriations 
bills."). 
314. Over 40 states allow some form of line-item veto. See Richard Briffault, The 
Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1171, 1175 (1993). Some of the state 
provisions that do not explicitly limit the veto authority to dollar amounts or spending 
items have been interpreted to allow textual redlining, see Petrilla, supra note 312, at n.42, 
and accompanying text, but most state courts have refused to give such expansive 
interpretation. See Diane-Michele Krasnow, The Imbalance of Power and the Presidential 
Veto: A Case for the Item Veto, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 583, 597 n.271 (1991) (citing 
cases). 
315. See Martin S. Flaherty,   he ~ o s t  Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1838 
(1996) (an expansive line-item veto authority "dramatically fails the test of balance"); 
Briffault, supra note 314, at 1174 ("',By putting asunder what the legislature has put 
together [through negotiation and compromise] the item veto results in laws the legislature 
never passed" thereby challenging the view that legislation is the domain of the legisla- 
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has recently found the Act unconstitutional on such 
Thus, any legislative attempt to expand the Line Item Veto Act to 
allow the President to make changes (or deletions) in the substance 
of bills would be constitutionally suspect.317 
Even if courts were to allow the line-item veto to be expanded 
in this way, this approach would not solve other problems created 
by substantive riders. An executive veto, which of course occurs at 
the end of the legislative process, is no substitute for proper inves- 
tigation and consideration by the authorizing committee and floor 
debate by members of both political parties, nor does it replace 
opportunities for public scrutiny and input that are possible during 
normal legislative consideration.318 Finally, like other legislation, 
the line-item veto could easily be rescinded in future congressional 
2. Stricter Judicial Scrutiny Would Not Be Immune from 
Legislative Erosion 
A number of commentators have suggested that stricter judi- 
cial review of agency actions derived from substantive riders could 
ture.). In National Treasury Union v. United States, a federal labor organization alleged 
violations of the Article I, $ 7 Presentment Clause, which gives the Executive the authority 
to veto bills, Article 111 checks and balances, and Article I, Q 5, which gives each house 
authority to establish its own procedural rules. See 929 F. Supp. 484, 486 (D.D.C. 1996). 
The claims were dismissed for lack of standing. See id. at 490. 
316. See Byrd v. Raines, 97-0001-TPJ, 1997 WL 169409 (D.D.C. Apr. 10, 1997). 
In Byrd v. Rains, the court held that the presentment clause of the Article I prevents 
Congress from ceding basic legislative authority, such as cancellation or repeal of a 
statutory provision, to the President. See id. at *lo. The court found the Act's cancellation 
provision analagous to the legislative veto issue in INS v. Ciradha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
stating that "Ulust as Congress could not delegate to one of its chambers the power to 
veto select provisions of law, it may not assign that authority to the President!' Id. at *lO 
(citing Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954). The Clinton administration has stated its intent to appeal 
the decision to the Supreme Court. See Peter Baker, Clinton Plans Quick Line-Item Veto 
Appeal, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1997, at A6. 
317. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Line-Ztern Veto ~mendment,  80 CORNELL . RDV, 
1498, 1501 (1995); Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for tile Unitary 
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 100 n.170 (1994). Thus, there have been many advocates 
of establishing a line-item veto by constitutional amendment. See, e.g., Sidak, supra, at 
1503-04; Calabresi, supra, at 72 n.119. 
318. See Haherty, supra note 315, at 1838 (arguing that the line-item veto impedes 
joint accountability by peimitting enactment without approval of different branches 
representing different manifestations of the public will). 
319. See Sidak, supra note 317, at 1500 (indicating that future congresses could 
"repeal, suspend or otherwise circumscribe line-item veto authority conferred . . . by 
statute"). 
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lessen the Congress's ability to use this means of legislating policy. 
In fact, the Court has long recognized that heightened scrutiny may 
extend to substantive legislation that lacks the opportunity for pub- 
lic input and full congressional investigation and debate. In U.S. v. 
Carolene Products CO.,~*O the case often credited as the origin of 
the strict scrutiny test of constitutional review,3*l the Supreme Court 
found that the challenged law322 did not violate the Fifth Arnend- 
ment because Congress had a rational basis for its enactment, as 
demonstrated by review of reports of committee hearings in which 
Congress considered extensive investigations and expert testimony. 
At the same time, the Couqt acknowledged that legislation 
affecting commercial transactions could be found unconstitutional 
if it is "of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it 
rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experi- 
ence of the legislators."323 Arguably, if heightened scrutiny were 
applied to environmental riders such as section 2001, and the self- 
serving statements of the bills' sponsors were properly discounted, 
such riders could be found to exceed Congress's authority under 
the Property Clause324 or Commerce Clause.325 In fact, the courts 
have consistently embraced this concept to a limited degree, hold- 
ing that appropriations riders, as a "disfavored" mechanism for 
legislating, will be interpreted to amend or waive the underlying 
authorizing statute only if such an interpretation is clearly in- 
tended.326 
However, while the need for judicial oversight is compelling, 
strict review would not be immune from legislative erosion. The 
United States and its agencies have long enjoyed sovereign immu- 
nity from laws~i ts ,3~~ although Congress chose to waive this imrnu- 
nity in a limited fashion through the enactment of the Administra- 
320. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
321. See id. at 152 n.4. 
322. The Filled Milk Act, ch. 262, 42 Stat. 1486 (1923) (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
$$ 61-63 (1994)). 
323. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152. 
324. U.S. CONST. art. IV, $ 3, cl. 2. 
325. U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 8, cl. 3. 
326. See, e-g., Seattle Audobon Society v. Robertson, 503 U.S. 429,440 ("[Rlepeals 
by implication are especially disfavored in the appropriations context, {although] Congress 
nonetheless may amend substantive law in an appropriations statute, as long as it does so 
clearly.") (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978)). 
327. See Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Adminis- 
trative Action: Some Conclusions from the Public Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867 
(1 970). 
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tive Procedure Even after the passage of the APA, citizen 
enforcement was not assumed, leading Congress to create citizen 
suit provisions in most major environmental statutes.329 
Finally, these rights to sue, given by statute, may just as easily 
be taken away by statute. They may even, as the timber rider cases 
make all too clear, be limited or eliminated by rider language that 
directs projects to be found compliant, or directs action to be taken 
in the agency's "sole discretion." 
3. Super-Legislation Requiring Germaneness, While Perhaps a 
Step in the Right Direction, May, Be Constitutionally Infirm, as 
Well as Subject to Repeal 
As previously noted, there is no independent mechanism to 
enforce the rules of Congress; members are left to comply volun- 
tari l~.~~O The unfortunate result of this lack of outside enforcement 
is that waivers and exemptions, particularly on environmental is- 
sues, easily become the rule, not the exception. To prevent this, an 
approach that ensures (or at least allows) external enforcement and 
ensure compliance is necessary. One approach would involve the 
passage of "super-legislation," which could only be revoked by 
more than a ~imple~major i ty .~~~ Such super-legislation could encap- 
sulate House and Senate rules barring substantive legislation through 
the abbreviated budget process. If a member were to challenge an 
appropriations provision on germaneness grounds, a supermajority 
would be required to override the objection and pass the rider.332 
328. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994); Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234,239-40 n.11 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982); Beller u. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 796 (9th Cir. 1980). Prior to that waiver, 
it was very difficult, if not impossible, to subject executive agencies' decisions to judicial 
review. In fact, it was not until the Supreme Court handed down Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), that informal agency action was subjected to 
rigorous judicial review. 
329. See, e.g.,, Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. 5 1365 (1994); Endangered 
Species Act 5 ll(g), 16 U.S.C. 8 1540(g) (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Re- 
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act $ 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1994). 
330. See Bach, supra note 247, at 701-02; U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 5. 
331. The Senate's rule for terminating filibusters illustrates the difficulty of captur- 
ing more than a simple majority vote in Congress. The Senate may not vote on a measure 
if any senator seeks recognition to speak pn it. In this way, the minority has power to 
indefinitely stall legislation, unIess at least three-fifths of the senators agree to limit debate 
by invoking cloture-a significant obstacle to forcing a vote on any particular bill. See 
Bach, supra note 247, at 703 ("[Tlhe danger of filibuster is almost omnipresent:'). 
Notably, senators may not filibuster appropriations bills. See id. 
332. Similarly, members of the 104th Congress proposed to protect the economic 
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In fact, the Constitution jealously guards the right of majority 
rule, requiring supermajorities for only five kinds of measures: 
presidential impeachment, expulsion of House or Senate members, 
ratification of treaties, overriding a veto, and amending the Consti- 
t ~ t i o n . ~ ~ ~  The Framers believed that, although super-legislation might 
inhibit hasty and ill-conceived measures, the resulting power in the 
hands of the minority generally outweighed the benefits. "[Tlhe 
fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It 
would no longer be the majority that would rule . . . . [A]n inter- 
ested minority might take advantage of [supermajority require- 
ments] to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general 
weal, or, in particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable indul- 
g e n c e ~ . " ~ ~ ~  
To give a minority a negative upon the majority (which is 
always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a 
decision) . . . has an effect the reverse of what is expected . . . 
[ilts real operation is . . . to substitute the pleasure, caprice, or 
artifices of an insignificant, turbulent or corrupt junto to the 
regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority. 
If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a majority, 
respecting the best mode of conducting it, the majority, in order 
that something may be done, must then conform to the views 
of the minority . . . . Hence tedious delays; continual negotia- 
tions and intrigue; contemptible compromises of the public 
good.335 
interests of constituents by requiring a supermajority to pass tax increases. See 142 CONG. 
REC. H3256 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1996). Interestingly, proponents believed that economic 
issues justified a mechanism to "temper simple majoritarianism," id. at H3259 (statement 
of Rep. Solomon) (arguing that tax increases are "at least as significant as ratification of 
a treaty"), so that Congress would either cut spending or look to economic stimulants to 
raise revenues instead of the peoples' pocketbooks. See id. (citing columnist George Will). 
333. Opponents to the tax proposal, discussed in note 332 supra, argued that "the 
Founding Fathers were willing to accept the fact that Congresses in the future might use 
poor judgment at times and pass harmful laws by a majority vote-but they believed so 
deeply in the principle of majority rule, that they placed that principIe above whatever 
personal concerns they had that the majority at times would act in a manner contrary to 
their own feelings." Id. at H3260. 
334. THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (cited in 142 
CONG. REC. H3256, H3260 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1996)). 
335. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton); see 142 CONG. REC. H3260 
(statement of Rep. Beilenson) (arguing that the Framers' reluctance to include superma- 
jority provisions in the Constitution "was largely due to the ineffectiveness of the Articles 
of Confederation which . . . . required a supermajority for both taxing and spending, and 
the fact that it was so difficult to pay off  evolutionary War] debts . . . and to pay for 
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Arguably, requiring supermajorities to enact waivers of exist- 
ing law through appropriations riders does not present the same 
concerns. Such legislation would simply make it more difficult to 
pass such waivers. The status quo, which, while imperfect, does 
provide environmental and procedural safeguards, would likely be 
preserved; the "pertinacious minority" would be discouraged from 
making "contemptible compromises" of the public interest. 
Although such legislation may be a workable solution, or at 
least a step in the right direction, it does not rest easily within the 
existing constitutional framework, and would seem to directly con- 
tradict Article I, Section 5 of the Con~t i tu t ion.~~~ Indeed, legislation 
that imposes procedural requirements on the internal workings of 
Congress may be subject to constitutional challenge.337 Moreover, 
like the line-item veto, a legislatively enacted provision of this kind 
could too easily be repealed by later legislation. 
B. A Constitutional Amendment Is Warranted 
I .  The Erosion of Legislative Safeguards JustiJies Amendment 
Constitutional amendments ihould not be proposed lightly. 
Indeed, the process of amending the Cons t i t~ t i on~~~  is "SO cumber- 
some that it can serve as a safety valve only under the most 
extreme conditions."339 Amendment is justified, however, when the 
political process is systemically malfunctioning, as it has been in 
recent years with the advent of sweeping changes in substantive 
law through appropriations riders. 
the regular national expenditures thereafter . . . . For that reason, the Philadelphia Con- 
vention chose to reject proposals to impose supennajorities in legislative fields of even 
special sensitivity and concern, reserving them for the five specific and special areas"). 
336. "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings." U.S. CONST. art. I, 
5 5, cl. 2; see also Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Note, Is a Presidential Item Veto Constitritional?, 
96 YALE L.J. 838, 855 (1987) (arguing that a "house's power to exercise its ancillary 
functions cannot be abridged by a statute"). 
337. See, e-g., Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 929 F. Supp, 484 
(D.D.C. 1996) (challenging constitutionality of line-item veto). 
338. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
339. B N C ~  A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Corrstitiitio~i, 93 
YALE L.J. 1013, 1057 (1984) (referring to the difficulty of using constitutional amend- 
ments to reverse Supreme Court decisions); see also Kathleen M .  Sullivan, Constit~rtional 
Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself of Amendment Fever, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 
691, 694 (1996) (arguing that the Constitution should be amended "only reluctantly and 
as a last resort"). 
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One might argue that the examples of failed rider attempts 
discussed above provide evidence that our current constitutional 
regime is functioning properly.340 After all, the riders incorporated 
into the 1996 Interior Appropriations the 1996 Consolidated 
Rescissions and Appropriations and the Balanced Budget 
Act of 1995343 either failed in Congress or were vetoed. However, 
the persistence demonstrated by the President and minority party 
during the highly unusual standoff on the 1996 budget is unlikely 
to recur under more typical  circumstance^.^* On balance, the in- 
creasing manipulation of the appropriations process to shift the 
balance of powers and all but preclude the President's veto power, 
to short-cut full consideration by lawmakers, and to sidestep public 
participation in legislative decisionmaking has created a crisis that 
may require constitutional action. Legislative proposals and other 
non-constitutional proposals to limit the abuse of the appropria- 
tions process simply do not go far enough to safeguard the public 
interest and are too easily subverted by powerful appropriations 
committees or future congresses. 
The Federalist Papers provide ample evidence that the Framers 
of the constitution believed that under certain conditions, a change 
in preexisting constitutional principles may be warranted.345 In- 
deed, amendments are in order when the Framers' objectives "have 
been attenuated by political developments."346 An amendment to 
340. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
341. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1. 
342. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2. 
343. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3. 
344. See discussion supra Part N.A. For example, the public perception that the 
Republican Congress was to blame for the budgetary "train wreck" gave the Clinton 
administration an unusual freedom to exercise the veto power. This perception itself 
resulted from the unique, and in retrospect ill-advised, efforts of the Republicans to turn 
a narrow mandate into a "revoIution." 
345. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 261 (James Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961); 
Ackerman, supra note 339, at 1021-22; Sidak, supra note 317, at 1504-05. "[Llaws and 
institutions go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind . . . . With the change 
of circumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times." 142 CONG. 
REC. H3256 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1996) (statement of Rep. Mcinnis, quoting Thomas 
Jefferson). "Amendments therefore will be necessary, and it will be better to provide for 
them, in an easy, regular and Constitutional way than to trust chance and violence." Id, 
(quoting Constitutional Convention statement of Colonel Mason). 
346. 142 CONG. REC. at H3256, H3259 (statement of Rep. Solomon, quoting George 
Will); see Sullivan, supra note 339, at 703 (arguing that although there is a strong 
presumption against amending the Constitution, amendment may be justified "when 
changes consistent with its broad purposes are unlikely to be implemented by ordinary 
legislative means"). 
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renew the integrity of congressional deliberation and legislative 
accountability would not be a radical innovation; instead it should 
be viewed as an attempt to revitalize the original values of the 
Cons t i t~ t ion .~~~ 
Heightened constitutional protection for citizen participation 
in the legislative process and for congressional accountability is 
justified under this theory for several reasons. First, although it has 
become common practice in modern times, "tacking policy items 
onto budgetary legislation would have been viewed with extreme 
distaste" by the Framers.348 Excessive rider-tacking has seriously 
eroded the integrity of the tripartite, republican democracy estab- 
lished by the Framers, who envisioned the legislature not only as 
a representational body, but also as a deliberative body-not only 
reflective of trends in public opinion but also mindful of the long- 
term public good.349 
The use of riders to direct environmental policy highlights the 
need for amendment because powerful forces working against en- 
vironmental stewardship cannot be checked without constitutional 
347. See 142 CONG. REC. H3256, H3258-59 (statement of Rep. Solomon in support 
of an amendment to require a supermajority to enact tax increases). Machiavelli predicted 
that "all human Constitutions are subject to Corruption and must perish, unless they are 
timely renewed by reducing them to their first Principles." GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION 
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, 34 (1969) (cited in Krasnow, supra note 314, at 
583). 
348. Marcus, supra note 282, at A23 (citing Professor Michael McConnell, Univer- 
sity of Chicago, and Professor Dougas Kmiec, University of Notre Dame); see also 
LeBoeuf, supra note 163, at 460 ("[Tlhe Framers could not possibly have envisioned the 
position appropriations riders occupy today."); Krasnow, supra note 314, at 607 (arguing 
that the Framers, though aware of the rider-tacking procedure, did not foresee the extent 
to which i t  has now evolved); Sidak & Smith, supra note 287, at 471 (arguing that although 
some bill-bundling was probably anticipated, in all likelihood the Framers "did not 
conternplate legislative bundling on the scale that Congress indulges in today"; the first 
appropriations bill contained only four items of expenditures and no substantive riders); 
Thomas Schroeder, Note, Original Understanding and Veto Power: Are the Fratners Safe 
While Congress is in Session?, 7 J.L. & POL. 757 (1991). Professor Rappaport, however, 
argues that the Framers were familiar with the practice of rider-tacking but thought that 
the Executive and the Senate held sufficient powers to prevent most instances of abuse. 
See Rappaport, supra note 287, at 740, 764-66; see also Wolfson, supra note 336, at 
840-44 (arguing that, based on British and colonial experience, the Framers realized that 
the Executive could only veto appropriations bills, even those with non-germane riders, 
with great difficulty); Marcus, supra note 282, at A23 (noting that, at least as of the first 
day of the past year's lengthy and unprecedented government shutdowns, Professor 
Laurence Tribe believed that rider-spawned gridlock was simply a sign of checks and 
balances at work; forcing the President's hand by including irrelevant matters in bills 
"would not have struck [the Framers] as a flaw in the constitutional design"). 
349. See Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., The Framer's Understanding of Constitfllional 
Deliberations in Congress, 21 GA. L. REV. 217, 235 (1986); discussion supra Part ILC. 
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protection. The short-term monetary and political gain that attends 
the exploitation of natural resources is compelling.350 But such 
instant gratification comes at the expense of the long-term health 
of the ecosy~tem,3~~ which, like future generations who will be 
most affected by depletion of public resources, cannot speak for 
itself, nor can it wield influence through political favors.352 
2. Riders that Upset Constitutional Checks and Balances 
Underscore the Need for an Amendment 
The Appropriations Clause353 reflects the Framers' ideal that 
the "arbitrariness of government action" be restrained by a require- 
ment that public spending be subjected to the rule of The 
Clause also reflects the desire to avoid concentrations o'f political 
power by dividing functions between governmental entities.355 Ap- 
propriations riders often fly in the face of the Executive's consti- 
tutional responsibilities to veto objectionable laws and to enforce 
laws that are enacted.356 Further, iiders that direct executive action 
-- 
350. See GORE, supra note 39, at 275 (discussing "competing imperatives" that 
create incentives to maximize short-term profit and ignore long-term needs, np_w-Vice 
President Gore noted that our society is marked by a dysfunctional way of thinking-a 
"ravenous, insatiable consumption, its dogma,-and the mechanisms by which ever more 
resources are obtained."); Plater, supra note 45, at 734 ("'Environmental law, reflecting a 
paradigm shift in how we perceive the world, has emerged over the past three decades as one 
of the primary realms in which society attempts to insert short and long-term public civic 
values into practical economic affairs. This role inevitably makes environmental law a 
political battlefield."); see also Schlickeisen, supra note 309, at 197-201, 209 (arguing 
that an environmental right is necessary to ensure posterity of future generations because 
statutory law will not provide adequate protections in the face of overwhelming incentives to 
maximize short-term gain); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the 
Right to Environment, 28 STAN. J .  INT'L L. 103, 117-20 (1991) (arguing that international 
safeguards should be imposed on domestic decisionmaking, given the high short-term costs 
resulting from environmental protection and the resulting political disfavor). 
351. See Axline, supra note 54, at 637 ("The sponsors of the salvage logging rider 
are willing to sacrifice entire species if necessary to preserve, even for a short tinie, a 
limited number of jobs at mills that are subsidized by federal timber."). 
352. See GORE, supra note 39, at 275. The use of riders to affect environmental 
affairs dissolves intergenerational equity, providing an especially compelling justification 
for constitutional amendment. See Sidak, supra note 317, at 1499, 1505. 
353. U.S. CONST. art. I, 3 9. 
354. See J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
1162, 1167. Requiring a showing of legal authority to draw funds "ensures that the public 
will have notice of spending decisions." Id. 
355. See LeBoeuf, supra note 163, at 458-59 ("Perhaps more perfectly than any 
other provision in the Constitution, the Appropriations Clause embodies the notion of 
separation of powers."). 
356. See LeBoeuf, supra note 163, at 472-73; U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 7, art. 11. 
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contrary to final judgments entered by the courts suffer an addi- 
tional defect that justifies constitutional amendment: they upset the 
checks and balances provided by Article III.357 Appropriations rid- 
ers frequently venture into these forbidden territories.358 
The United States Constitution is distinguished from other, 
less durable democratic frameworks because it separates govern- 
mental power into three branches,359 and provides for judicial re- 
view to uphold the integrity of this structure against the pressures 
of normal NO one branch of the federal government is 
to exercise the functions of another branch;361 Congress "cannot be 
judge, jury and executioner under our Con~titution."~~~ 
The separation of powers principle "operates as a complex 
machine which encourages each official to question the extent to 
which other constitutional officials are successfully representing 
the People's true political The three branches of gov- 
ernment are designed to "check each other's defects, and thereby 
yield a whole more 'representative' than any of its constituent 
parts."364 Legislation that blurs the distinction between the branches, 
as riders often do, is particularly offensive because it undermines 
those safeguards.365 
357. See LeBoeuf, supra note 163, at 464-65,475. 
358. See id. at 474. 
359. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-In. T h e  genius of the Constitution is we have three 
branches of the Federal Government [legislative, executive, and judicial]" 141 CONG. REC. 
S13,814, S13,828 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bumpers). See INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,951 (1983). 
360. "Given the danger that normal government will be captured by partisans of 
narrow special interests," the Framers "consolidate[d] the Revolutionary achievements of 
the American people through the institution of judicial review." Ackerman, supra note 339, 
at 1029-30 (discussing THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
361. See Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201-02 
(1928); THE FEDERALIST, NO. 48 (James Madison) ("ENIone of [the branches] ought to 
possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others, in the administration 
of their respective powers."). 
362. 141 CONG. REC. S13,828 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1995) (statement of Sen, 
Bumpers, questioning constitutionality of congressional efforts to undermine the decisions 
of Department of Agriculture Undersecretary James Lyons by zeroing out Lyons' salary 
in N 1996 appropriations bill). 
363. Ackerman, supra note 339, at 1028; see id. at 1067. 
364. Id. at 1028 n.35. 
365. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 442-43 & n.5 
(1977) (noting that, while the three brances are not expected to operate in complete 
isolation from one another, "'where the whole power of one department is exercised by 
the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental 
principles of a free constituion [ 1 are subverted,"' (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 
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a. Inte$erence with the Judiciary 
Laws that retroactively command the courts to open final judg- 
ments, or that direct the outcome of pending litigation, offend the 
separation of powers doctrine by invading the judicial function.366 
In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., the Supreme Court invalidated 
legislation that directed that "dismissed causes of action . . . shall 
be reinstated."367 If implemented, the effect of the legislation would 
have been to breathe new life into cases dismissed with prejudice 
under the law in effect at the time of the dismissal. The Court 
found the law unconstitutional, because once a court issues a final 
judgment in a case, "a judicial decision becomes the last word of 
the judicial department with regard to a particular case or contro- 
versy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that 
the law applicable to that very case was something other than what 
the courts said it 
The 1995 timber rider directed a result that is equally trou- 
bling-it retroactively revived executive actions that were finally 
and conclusively found to have violated the law.369 Further, it de- 
feated judicial mandates requiring that the objectionable action be 
325-26 (James Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961)); thus, the separation of powers inquiry turns 
on the extent to which the exercise of power by one branch prevents another from 
"accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions"); cf: THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 
(Alexander pamilton) (discussing the need to maintain distinct separation of powers 
between the federal and state governments to facilitate mass mobilization when necessary 
for the common good, such as the mobilization that resulted in the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution itself); THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison) 
(making the same point). 
366. See Plaut v..Spendthrift Fann, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1451 (1995); Alaska Wilderness 
Recreation & Tourism Ass'n v. Morrison, 67 E3d 723 (9th Cir 1995); see also Bill Miller, 
Congress Votes to Let Morgan, Daughter Return: Rep. Wolf's Intervention Clears Way for 
D.C. Surgeon Who Fled U.S. Over Custody Case, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1996, at Al ,  A15 
(arguing that this rider, which directed results contrary to a judicial order, was "a direct 
assault on the independence of the judiciary" and an unprecedented and "frightening 
example of congressional excess") (citing Representative Sensenbrenner and Professor 
Jonathon Turley, George Washington University National Law Center). 
367. Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1451 (striking as unconstitutional a limitations provision 
of the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78aa-1 (1994)). 
368. Id. at 1457; see Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 411, 413 (1792) (revision of Article 
111 judgments is "radically inconsistent" with independence of the judicial power vested 
in the courts); THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 at 545 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cooke ed., 1961) 
("A legislature, without exceeding its province, cannot reverse a determination once made, 
in a particular case; though it may prescribe a new ruIe for future cases."). 
369. See Pub. L. No. 104-19, $ 2001(b),(d),(k), 109 Stat. 194 (1996); Plaut, 115 S. 
Ct .  1451; U.S. v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871). 
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permanently enjoined,S70 and prevented the Executive from imple- 
menting final court orders, as required by Article II.371 
Other environmental riders have blurred the lines between po- 
litical branches, .but, unlike the 1995 timber rider, have not bla- 
tantly dismantled final judgments without providing new standards 
or circumstances. The courts have been reluctant to invalidate such 
riders on separation of powers grounds.372 In fact, the Supreme 
Court rejected an Article III challenge to the HatfieldfAdams rider373 
in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon That rider was drafted 
in response to litigation pending at that time, including two cases , 
specifically mentioned in the statute.375 The Ninth Circuit held that 
it directed the outcome of pending litigation, and therefore violated 
Article The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that, even 
though the rider was obviously intended to resolve the two named 
cases, it "compelled changes" in the law by specifying new envi- 
ronmental requirements applicable to the underlying lawsuits, but 
did not direct specific findings or results under old law.377 
Unlike the HatfieldIAdams rider at issue in Robertson, the 
1995 timber rider affected not only pending cases, but final judg- 
ments and permanent injunctions as well, overstepping the author- 
370. See Lane County Audubon Soc'y v. Jamison, 958 F-2d 290 (9th Cir. 1992); see 
also Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 E Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd slrb 
nom. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996). 
371. See Devins, supra note 277, at 475-76; see also discussion infra Part VI.B.2.b. 
372. Couits are required to "adopt a constitutional reading when such an interpre- 
tation is  reasonable," but interpretations given to riders are sometimes more strained than 
reasonable. See Mount Graham Coalition v. Thomas, 89 E3d 554, 557-58 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(citing George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933)); id. at 558 
(Noonan, J., concurring); see also Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Gtickman (NFRC 
II), 97 F.3d 1161 (1996). Perhaps courts are reluctant to strike appropriations legislation 
on constitutional grounds because of the short duration of these bills, see, e.g., Pub. L. 
No. 104-19, 5 2001(a)(2) (defining the "emergency period" as ending September 30, 1997) 
and 8 20010') (providing that the authority provided by subsections (b) and (d) shall expire 
on December 31, 1996), consistent with the premise that' constitution?l issues should not 
be reached if a case can be resolved on other grounds. However, constitutional violations, 
even those that last for only a moment, should not be condoned. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 
U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (even momentary violations of first amendment freedoms constitute 
"irreparable injury"). 
373. See Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-121,-8 318, 103 Stat. 701, 745-50 (1989). 
374. 503 U.S. 429 (1992). 
375. See id. at 431. 
376. ~ e k  Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 E2d 131 1, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 
1990). 
377. See 503 U.S. 429, 437-39 (1992);, Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 
21 E3d 895 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that Congress did not exceed its legislative authority 
because it replaced laws underlying pending litigation with new requirements). 
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ity that has been granted to the judicial branch.378 Further, unlike 
the HatfieldIAdams rider, the 1995 rider provided no new environ- 
mental safeguards in lieu of existing laws.379 Thus, it upsets the 
separation of powers because it does not simply prescribe rules 
governing future conduct but, instead directs specific results by 
reference to past actions taken by executive agencies, without chang- 
ing the underlying laws.380 
378. Article III gives the judiciary the "'province and duty . . . to say what the law 
is' in particular cases and controversies." Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1451, 
1453 (1995) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)). It 
therefore gives federal courts "the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them" 
by rendering dispositive judgments reviewable only by superior courts in the judicial 
heirarchy. Id. However, some courts have implied that a distinction could be made, for the 
purposes of Article 111 analysis, based on whether the final judgment involved money 
damages or injunctive relief, infemng that laws that affect injunctions may be less 
objectionable. In Mount Graham Coalition v. Thomas, 89 F.3d 554, 557 (9th Cir. 1996), 
the court refused to interpret a rider governing the Mount Graham telescope project as, 
"undoing past judgments:' and instead found that it could be read to merely alter the 
prospective effect of past injunctions. It is true that, unlike awards for damages, "altered 
circumstances sometimes make alterations in an injunction inevitable," id. at 559 (Noonan, 
J., concurring); it is also true that Congress itself may effectuate changed circumstances, 
see id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421 (1855) (in 
which Congress directed that a bridge, previously enjoined as a nuisance and obstruction 
to navigation, was a necessary route for the mails)). However, when Congress deprives an 
injunction of its effect by directing a result contrary to a court's final order without 
changing the underlying circumstances or creating new legal rights, that congressional 
mandate is as offensive to separation of powers principles as is interference with a 
monetary judgment. Nothing in Supreme Court precedent indicates otherwise. See Plaut, 
115 S. Ct. at 1455-56 (citing cases, and noting that President Lincoln refused to interfere 
with the infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (in which the Court held 
that an African man who had been born a slave was not a citizen and therefore could not 
bring suit in federal court to establish his freedom or remedy an assault by his former 
owner), due to separation of powers concerns, believing that "the evil effect following it, 
being limited to that particular case . . . can better be borne than could the evils7' of 
interference by other political branches); Alaska Wilderness Recreation Ass'n v. Momson, 
67 F.3d 723, 733 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to vacate order enjoining timber harvest for 
NEPA violations in spite of sufficiency language in salvage timber rider, Pub. L. 104-19, 
5 503 (1995). Thus, the established principle that courts retain equitable powers to modify 
their own injunctive orders to ensure that such orders are not "turned through changing 
circumstances into an instruments of wrong," System Fed'n v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 
647-651 (1961), does not necessarily extend to legislation having retroactive application. 
C$ Brown v. Califano, 627 F.2d 1221, 1234 @.C. Cir. 1980) (indicating that a rider's 
antibusing restriction would be unconstitutional under equal protection principles if i t  
deprived injunctive remedy of its effectiveness). 
379. See Robertson, 503 U.S. at 437-39. Further, while the Court in Systems 
Federation, 364 U.S. at 651, found judicial modifications to be warranted because changes 
in the law had brought the previous order's terms into direct conflict with statutory 
objectives, such was not the case with the timber rider. Previously entered injunctions 
affected by the rider were not rendered inequitable or contrary to objectives set forth in 
extant environmental law. 
380. See Plaut, 115 S .  Ct. at 1456-57; Robertson, 503 U.S. at 437-38; see also 
Alaska Wilderness Recreation and Tourism Ass'n v. Morrison, 67 E3d 723, 733 (1995) 
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b. Integerence with the Executive Function 
In addition, appropriations riders frequently evade checks and 
balances by undermining the executive powers granted by Articles 
I and II of the Constitution. The 1995 timber rider, like other riders 
that require executive action notwithstanding other existing laws, 
blatantly offends Article I1 of the Constitution: the President "shall 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed."381 The timber rider 
trespassed into the prerogatives of the executive branch by forcing 
sales that do not comply with the Northwest Forest Plan-a Plan 
that was strongly supported by the President and had been given 
judicial blessing as satisfying existing environmental l a ~ s ~ ~ ~ - t o  be 
released.383 In doing so, the rider significantly eroded the division 
between the executive and legislative branches, raising both con- 
stitutional and prudential concerns.384 To allow Congress to direct 
the implementation of pre-existing substantive laws through appro- 
priations riders contravenes Article II, and would "subvert the en- 
tire notion of separation of powers. The concept of the rule of law 
requires those who enact legislation to refrain from executing it. 
Only then is the risk of a tyrannical legislature averted."385 
(holding that a rider that provided that an EIS was deemed sufficient did not override the 
judicial decision that, in fact, the EIS did not satisfy NEPA; rider did not purport to change 
the underlying law, nor did it offer any new statutory standards). However, in Norrl~~vest 
Forest Resource Council v. Glickman (NFRC II), 97 E3d 1161 (1996), the court summarily 
rejected the argument that section 2001 (k)(l) violates separation of powers, citing Robert- 
son, without further analysis. 
381. U.S. CONST. art. II, 8 3. 
382. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994), 
a f d  sub nom. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 80 E3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996). 
383. See Bradley Declaration, supra note 131, at 2-3 (discussing action on BLM 
sales required to be released under section 2001(k)); Williams Declaration, supra note 132, 
at 3 (discussing Forest Service sales that had been enjoined and suspended). The Northwest 
Forest Plan itself was crafted in response to a number of previous injunctions; it reserved 
sensitive areas from harvest to avoid running afoul of those court orders, and to comply 
with the ESA, NFMA, and other environmental laws. See discussion srrpra Part 1II.A. 
Many of the sales that must be released under section 2001(k) are located within the Plan's 
reserves. See Williams Declaration, supra, at 3-4 and Table I. 
384. "[Olnce Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation 
ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its enactment only indirectly-by 
passing new legislation." Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1986) (citing INS v, 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983)). In Bowsher, the Court found a provision of the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, Pub. L. 99-177,99 Stat. 1038 (1985), which gave Congress 
the power to remove the Comptroller General, an officer charged with Executive duties, 
to be unconstitutional. See 478 U.S. at 733-34. 
385. LeBoeuf, supra note 163, at 473; see Archie Parnell, Congressional Interfer- 
ence in Agency Enforcement: The IRS Experience, 89 YALE L.J. 1360, 1379 (1980); cf. 
Devins, supra note 277, at 458-59. While noting that "riders that prohibit the Executive 
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Appropriations riders, by posing the specter of government 
shutdown, also undermine the President's authority to veto objec- 
tionable legislation, in contravention of Article I.386 The Present- 
ment Clause, a mechanism to protect against "ill-conceived legis- 
l a t i ~ n , " ~ ~ ~  was included to ensure that the President, the representative 
of national interests, has a voice in the legislative process, which 
would otherwise reflect only the more parochial interests of mem- 
bers of Congress.388 
However, the modern-day budget process has skewed the balance 
by shifting a significant amount of control from the President to 
Congress.389 The use of omnibus appropriations bills with non-ger- 
mane riders has "made a mockery of the President's ability to exercise 
the veto power"390 and "corrupted the delicate structure of shared 
powers."391 This fundamental shift has created a constitutional crisis.392 
In the absence of judicial invalidation of the timber rider and 
similar riders, constitutional amendment is warranted so that Con- 
gress is not again tempted to "ride" over the functions of the other 
two branches. The crisis created by the expansive use of appropria- 
tions riders to contravene separation of powers principles justifies 
a reaction of constitutional dimension.393 
from launching regulatory initiatives-without altering the underlying authorizations stat- 
ute-unduly limit the Executive's policymaking responsibilities," Devins urges not an end 
to the practice, but merely that Congress be "more sensitive to the implications of 
appropriations-based oversight." Id. at 500. 
386. See U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 7, cl. 2; Sidak & Smith, supra note 287, at 475-76 
(arguing that rider-tacking vitiates the presentment clause). 
387. Krasnow, supra note 314, at 613; see Sidak & Smith, supra note 287, at 446 
(indicating that the veto power was expected to "prevent the enactment of harmful laws"). 
388. See Petrilla, supra note 312, at 471. The Framers intended to "protect the 
President from legislative usurpation by empowering him with an institutional weapon to 
wield in the legislative process." Krasnow, supra note ]6h f*, at 595. 
389. Krasnow, supra note 314, at 586, 601; Petrilla, supra note 312, at 471. 
390. Krasnow, supra note 314, at 584. Not only does the attachment of riders onto 
appropriations bills have a chilling effect by placing a high political price tag on the use 
of the veto, vetoes of budgetary legislation are far more likely to be overridden than other 
vetoes. See Petrilla, supra note 312, at 477, 479 (noting that the Congress has ovemden 
budgetary vetoes approximately 35% of the time, while overriding regular (non-budgetary) 
legislation only about 7% of the time). 
391. See Krasnow, supra note 314, at 613. 
392. See id. at 601, 607 (arguing that the congressional encroachment on the veto 
power is a crisis); Sidak & Smith, supra note 287, at 476 (arguing that art. I, $ 7, cI. 3 
(the residual presentment clause, extending the executive veto to congressional orders and 
resolutions) evinces the Framers' desire to prevent Congress from devising creative ways 
to avoid the presentment requirement; and arguing that bill-bundling does not seem any 
less offensive than labeling a bill a resolution). 
393. Interbranch struggles such as those experienced in recent years over the fate 
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C. A Constitutional Amendment Should Be Process-Oriented 
I .  A Substantive Environmental Right Does Not Fit Well within 
the Existing Constitutional Framework, Nor Would it Be Immune 
to Erosion by Rider 
In spite of the lofty policy statement included in the nation's 
preeminent environmental law, NEPA-"each person should enjoy 
a healthful en~ironment"~~~-there is no enforceable right to envi- 
ronment or sustainable natural resources. In response, a number of 
commentators have argued for the creation, by amendment or ju- 
dicial implication,-of a constitutional right of this kind.395 However, 
the creation of a new substantive right through constitutional amend- 
ment finds little support in existing federal or international law. In 
addition, proposals to discover or create an environmental right 
might not dissuade Congress from utilizing the appropriations process 
to effectuate changes in the law.396 
of the environment "signaI the existence of a profound constitutional debate:' Ackerman, 
supra note 339, at 1069, and further justify radical transformation. A constitutional 
amendment that effectuates resolution of the "sustained period of extraordinary institu- 
tional conflict," id. at 1053, inflicted on the nation and its public lands is a legitimate 
reaction. See id. at 1022-23, 1029 (arguing that public mobilization to effectuate funda- 
mental change occurs "during rare periods of heightened political consciousness" that 
results in a "collective effort to renew and redefine the public good"); see also Plaut v, 
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1453-54 (1995) (noting that pre-revolutionary 
assemblies' interference with court judgments was one of the concerns that led to 
Philadelphia Convention to decide to develop a constitution). 
394. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1994). 
395. See, e.g., Sher & Hunting, supra note 165; Schlickeisen, supra note 309, For 
example, a right to environment might be implied as an essential value of a modern 
society: fully informed decisionmaking based upon free choice; recognition of the intrinsic 
value of each individual member of society; and patrimonial duties toward future genera- 
tions not to limit their freedom of choice and self-destination. See Joseph L. Sax, The 
Search for Environmental Rights; 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 93, 96 (1990). Environ- 
mental interest groups have,also argued that the right to a healthy environment is an 
individual right protected by the equal protection clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 
Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419, 1421-23, 1438 (9th Cir. 1989). Although the court 
acknowledged that the importance of a healthy environment has been found to create 
legally cognizable interests, see id. at 1430 n.21 (citing U.S. v. Students Challenging 
ReguIatory Procedures ("SCRAP"), 412 U.S. 669 (1973)), it did not find it necessary to 
resolve the issue. See Stop H-3 Ass'n, 870 F.2d at 1430-32. 
396. For example, freedom of reproductive choice, which is not an explicit right but 
has been found in the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights, see Roe v. Wade, 110 U.S. 113 
(1973), has come under attack repeatedly in proposed legislative riders. See, e.g., 142 
CONG. REC. H1942, HI946 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1996) (discussing abortion rider contained 
in earlier version of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 
1996, enacted as Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996)). 
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Proposals to tack on new constitutional provisions that reflect 
the current social values of the time are inherently problematic. 
Arguably, "preserving fundamental values is not an appropriate 
constitutional task."397 The Constitution is "intended to regulate the 
general political interests of the nation,"398 rather than to detail 
particular rights. We should, then, resist "the temptation to clutter 
up [the Constitution] with . . . amendments relating to substantive 
matters.77399 
It is most telling that the few attempts the Framers made to 
elevate substantive values of the time by designating them for special 
protection in the Constitution "have been ill-fated, normally result- 
ing in repeal, either officially or by interpretive pretense."400 For 
example, slavery, which was protected in the original document,401 
was outlawed, after much bloodshed, by the Thirteenth Amend- 
ment.402 Another notable amendment that attempted to encapsulate 
a "fundamental" value was the eighteenth-temperance-which was 
repealed fourteen years later by the Twenty-First 
Similarly, the 1994 Republican Revolution brought a wave of 
"amendment fervor,y7404 but recent efforts to amend the constitution 
397. ELY, supra note 295, at 88. 
398. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 579 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cook ed., 1961). 
399. Lon Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Centuly, 6 J .  LEG. EDUC. 457, 
463-64 (1954); see also Sullivan, supra note 339, at 696 (arguing that "[a]mendments 
politicize a constitution to the extent that they embed in it a controversial substantive 
choice"). 
400. ELY, supra note 295, at 88. Even the First Amendment's guarantee to free 
speech and association is directed toward ensuring that politicaI processes work. See id. 
at 93-94. With respect to the religion clauses of the First Amendment, Ely argues that the 
establishment clause serves, at least in part, a separation of powers function, not incon- 
sistent with the other procedural protections of the Constitution. See id. at 94. The free 
exercise clause serves an equal protection-like function that safeguards minority religions 
and requires decisionmakers to take the interests of all those their decisions affect into 
account; therefore, its inclusion in the Bill of Rights is also "entirely appropriate to a 
constitution." Id. at 100. Other substantive provisions, e-g., rights to bear arms and to enter 
into contracts, are, arguably, historic anomalies that have been effectively repealed by 
judicial construction. See id. at 100-01. 
401. See U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 9, c1. 1. 
402. See id. at amend. XIII. 
403. See id. at amends. XVIII, XXI; ~ul l i ian ,  supra note 339, at 696 (noting that 
"the only modem amendment to enact a social policy . . . . prohibition] is also the only 
modem amendment to have been repeaIed"). 
404. Michael Doyle, Growing Drive to Amend the Constitution: Congress Turns 
Increasingly to this 'Last Step,' SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 15, 1996, at A3; see Sullivan, 
supra note 339, at 691, 693 (noting that the 104th Congress has considered more 
amendment proposals than at any other time in recent memory: "the current proliferation 
of proposed constitutional amendments is striking"). Senator Bumpers recently com- 
plained, "Sometimes there are so many changes proposed around here on the Constitution 
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to encapsulate moral values, including environmental rights,405 have 
failed. Some of the weightiest social issues of our time have been 
the subject of proposed amendments, but none has attained passage 
by two-thirds of Congress, as required by Article V, much less 
ratification by the states:406 equal rights based on gender;407 bal- 
anced budget;408 flag desecration;409 aborti~n;~lo and school prayer.411 
Political expediency has frequently been the motivation behind 
these amendment proposals-many are popular, but largely uncon- 
sidered, reactions to issues that happen to be in vogue at the 
you would think it was just a rough draft, and that we were charged with the responsibility 
of finishing it." 141 CONG. REC. S13,814, S13,828 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1995). 
405. Rep. Moms Udall proposed at least one environmental amendment, and several 
others have also been proposed, but none has received serious consideration. See Folir 
Plans to Add a Nature Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, EARTH ISLAND J., at 11 (1990). 
Most recently, a coalition of 37 state legislators announced that they would propose a 
constitutional amendment to guarantee the right to a clean and healthy environment to all 
present and future generations. See Conservationists Hail Call for Environmental Anterrd- 
ment to U.S. Constitution, U.S. Newswire, Sept. 25, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12123062, 
406. Article V requires ratification by the legislatures of three fourths of the states. 
See U.S. CONST. art. V. An alternative procedure calls for a convention for proposing 
amendments on applications of the legislatures of two-thuds of the states, see id., but this 
provision has never been used. See H.R. REP. 104-3 (1995) (Judiciary Committee report 
recommending passage of the Balanced Budget Amendment). 
407. Senator Kennedy has consistently proposed that the Judiciary Committee report 
an Equal Rights Amendment. See S.J. Res. 40, 103d Cong. (1993), S. REP. 104-343, at 79 
(1996); S.J. Res. 3, 102d Cong. (1991), S. REP. 103-30, at 78 (1993); S.J. Res. 1, lOlst 
Cong. (1989), S. REP. 102-17, at 69 (1991). 
408. The Balanced Budget Amendment has been a special favorite of the Republican 
majority in the 104th and 105th Congresses, and is one of the seven constitutional 
amendment proposals of the party platform. See Jonathan Alter, The Passiorz Gap, 
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 19, 1996, at 49 (reporting that others include the imposition of 
congressional term limits, protection for school prayer and victims' rights, and prohibitions 
on flag burning, abortion, and citizenship for iIlegal aliens). Although recommended to the 
House and Senate by their respective judiciary committees, it has not achieved passage. 
See H.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. (1995), H.R. REP. 104-3 (1995); S.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. 
(1995), S. REP. 104-5 (1995); Eric Pianin & Helen Dewar, Budget Arrlend~nent Barely 
Loses in Senate, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1997, at Al. Similarly, in the 103d Congress, a 
balanced budget amendment, S.J. Res. 41 (1993), was reported favorably by the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, but overwhelmingly defeated on the floor. See S. REP. 104-343 at 
79. 
409. An amendment to prohibit desecration of the American flag has been proposed 
several times in both houses, and the House Judiciary Committee recommended its passage 
in the 104th Congress. See H.J. Res. 79, 104th Cong. (1995), H. REP. 104-151 (1995). 
Three committee members dissented, objecting to the elevation of the flag "over other 
cherished symbols" by embedding the proposal into the Constitution. See id. at 15. 
410. See S.J. Res. 37, 103d Cong., S. REP. 103-30, at 78 (1993); S.J. Res. 3, lOlst 
Cong. (1989), S. REP. 102-17, at 69 (1991). 
411. An amendment allowing school prayer has been proposed numerous times in 
recent years, but has not been recommended for passage. See S.J. Res. 9, 103d Cong. 
(1993), S. REP. 104-343, at 79 (1996); S.J. Res. 15, 103d Cong. (1993), S. REP. 103-30, 
at 78 (1993); S.J. Res. 144, 10lst Cong. (1989), S. REP. 17, 102d Cong. at 69 (1991). 
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moment. For example, a proposal to amend the Constitution to 
require a supermajority to pass tax increases, which came up for 
consideration on the House floor on April 15, 1996, was labelled 
by some as "showboating pure and simple," "a legislative fiasco,"412 
and a "public-relations stunt."413 Similarly, one of the most recent 
proposals, the Victims' Rights Amendment, was politically attrac- 
tive during the 1996 election year, and drew considerable support 
from both parties.414 The proposal seemed to have sunk into post- 
election obscurity but "Victim's Rights Week" (April 13-19, 1997) 
has generated renewed interest.415 
On the other hand, enduring post-Bill of Rights amendments 
all protect procedural rights. Several deal with the franchise,416 to 
protect and open political processes to all citizens on an equal 
basis.417 Others also provide representational, safeguards, through 
electoral q~alifications,4~* compensation of members,419 popular elec- 
tion pro~ess ,4~~ presidential succe~sion,4~~ and presidential term lim- 
its.422 Thus, the United States Constitution is distinguished as pro- 
412. 142 CONG. REC. H3256, H3258 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1996) (statement of Rep. 
Moakley) (the Constitution is "no place for political theater"). 
413. Id. at H3260 (statement of Rep. Beilenson). Ironically, although internal House 
rules were changed during the 104th Congress to require a three-fifths vote for tax 
increases, the rule was waived every time the issue came up. See id. at H3258. 
414. See John Harris, Clinton Backs Crime VictimsJAmendment, WASH. POST, June 
26, 1996, at A1 (reporting that President Clinton supports a victims' rights amendment, 
although he has rejected other proposals to amend the Constitution); Editorial, Tinkering 
wit11 the Constitution, WASH. POST, June 26, 1996, at A20 (suggesting that the amendment 
had the backing of both parties' presidential candidates simply because of its "political 
irresistibility" during an election year). 
415. See Kyl's Victims' Rights Amendment Gets Senate Judiciary Hearing, Press 
Release, Apr. 16, 1997 (noting that Attorney General Janet Reno had testified in support 
of the Amendment, which would, among other things, allow victims to be present at 
judicial proceedings in their case and be told of the offender's release or escape). For a 
more critical view of proposal, see Stephen Chapman, Constitutional Clutter: The Wrongs 
of the Victims' Rights Amendment, CHI.  TRIB., Apr. 20, 1997, at A21. 
416. See U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. 
417. See ELY, supra note 295, at 99. 
418. See U.S. CONST. amends. XVII, XXIII. 
419. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII. 
420. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; see also amend. XIV. 
421. See U.S. CONST. amends. XX, XXV. 
422. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIT. There have been numerous proposals to impose 
congressional term limits through constitutional amendment. See John E. Yang, Term 
Lirnits Fail Again in the House, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1997, at Al. Recently, in the wake 
of abuses that occurred during the 1996 elections, another proposal that would provide 
procedural safeguards-campaign finance reform-has gained widespread momentum, 
more or less across party lines. See Stephen Green, Constitutional Amendment Sought for 
Campaign Reform, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 26, 1996, at A2. 
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viding a f'process of government, not a governing ideology";423 
otherwise, it would not survive through the ages. By ensuring 
adequate process and "a durable structure for the ongoing resolu- 
tion of policy disputes,"424 the Constitution protects representational, 
republican democracy. The guarantees of life, liberty, and happi- 
ness are assured "not by trying to define them for all time, but 
rather by attending to the government processes by which their 
dimensions would be specified over tirne."425 
In sum, instead of creating a new substantive right, an amend- 
ment that protects public participation and full and complete de- 
liberation and accountability in the legislative process, particularly 
with respect to issues that are subjected to extreme political and 
economic pressures, such as environmental protection, would be 
more consistent with the spirit and structure of the Constitution, 
Y 
2. A Process-Based Constitutional Amendment Prohibiting 
Substantive Legislation by Appropriation Would Be the Most 
Efective Solution 
The Constitution protects fundamental values through proce- 
dural protections that ensure that "in the making of substantive 
choices the decision process will be open to all on something 
approaching an equal basis, with the decisionmakers held to a duty 
to take into account the interests of all those their decisions af- 
f e ~ t . ' ' ~ ~ ~  However, the procedural protections of representative gov- 
ernment have broken down in recent decades. The nation's political 
system currently 
reflects an emphasis on expediency and a failure to nurture our 
capacity for self-determination. We have not paid adequate 
attention to the serious problems undermining the account- 
ability of government and the confidence citizens have in it . . . . 
[an order to redeem the promise of democratic government, we 
must make all these [governmental] institutions more account- 
able.427 
423. ELY, supra note 295, at 101. 
424. Id. at  90. Indeed, its very impetus was that the colonists were not being 
adequately represented in Parliament. See id. at 89. 
425. Id. at 89. 
426. Id. at 100. 
427. GORE, supra note 39, at  180-81. 
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The case for a process-oriented right to protect the environ- 
ment is particularly compelling under the representational demo- 
cratic framework of the United States. "The largest promise of the 
democratic idea is that, given the right to govern themselves, free 
men and women will prove to be the best stewards of their own 
destiny . . . . But now a new challenge-the threat to the global 
environment-may wrest control of our destiny away from 
It is generally recognized that due process rights-access to 
information, education, participation, recourse, and sanctions-are 
a necessary component of maintaining a decent and sustainable 
environment.429 Access to information is the bedrock upon which 
participatory rights are founded. Indeed, "'informed public opinion 
is the most potent of all restraints upon misgo~ernrnent.'"~~~ With 
regard to environmental issues: 
Unrestricted public access to adequate information is a condi- 
tion sine qua non to the participation by everyone in the 
protection and improvement of the environment. Without appro- 
priate data, the general public cannot answer the following very 
fundamental question: is the environment clean and balanced or 
not?431 
428. Id. at 276-77. The deprivation of choice and, consequently, self-destiny, 
impairs a fundamental interest: "[elach generation exercises power over its successors: and 
each, in so far as it modifies the environment bequeathed to it . . . limits the power of its 
predecessors." Sax, supra note 81, at 102 (citing C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 
36-37 (1947)). 'The impoverishment of the earth and its resources limits the choices 
available to future generations, and makes future human beings 'the patients o f .  . . [our] 
power."' Id. at 103 (citing LEWIS, supra). 
429. See Janusz Symonides, The Human Right to a Clean, Balanced, and Protected 
Environment, 20 INT'L J .  L. INFO. 24, 29-37 (1992). In the international forum, although 
substantive environmental rights have not been recognized, "regional and international 
human rights bodies are developing a practice whereby the procedural bases for enforcing 
the right to a satisfactory environment are becoming more firmly established." UNITED 
NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNSEL, SUB-COMMISSION O PREVENTION OF DIS- 
CRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 
SECOND PROGRESS REPORT PREPARED BY MRS. FATMA ZOHRA KSENTINI 37, $123, U.N. 
Doc. EICN.4ISub.2 (1993) (emphasis added). 
430. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (citing Grosjean v. American Press 
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)). 
431. Symonides, supra note 429, at 29. The consideration and exchange of environ- 
mental information is anticipated by a number of international agreements. See, e.g., 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, art. IX 
(2), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-10 (1987), 26 I.L.M. 1541, (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989); 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on-Envi- 
ronment and Development, Princ. 17, U.N. Doc. AIConf. lSI/PC/WG.III/Rev. 1 (1992) 
(declaring that "environrnenta1 impact assessments . . . shall be undertaken for proposed 
activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment"). 
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Information alone, however, is not enough. Individuals must 
be provided with "both the information to comprehend the enor- 
mity of the [environmental] challenge and adequate political and 
economic power to be true stewards of the places where they live 
and Such stewardship necessarily requires the availability 
of appropriate political tools, including the opportunity to partici- 
pate meaningfully through our elected repre~entatives.~~3 
In a broader sense, use of the appropriations power to establish 
public policy-environmental and otherwise-and to circumvent 
the long-term priorities of the public has undermined meaningful 
representation and seriously corrupted the political process, to the 
extent that it is no longer deserving of the citizenry's 
Accordingly, an amendment to protect participatory rights in rep- 
resentational government, which would prohibit the enactment or 
waiver of substantive legislation through the abbreviated budget 
p ro~ess ,4~~ warrants consideration as a possible solution.436 
This Article does not purport to define the proposed amend- 
ment in detail, and instead takes the position that a process- 
oriented amendment deserves further consideration. As a starting 
point, a constitutional provision could require all appropriations 
432. GORE, supra note 39, at 277. 
433. Senator Leahy noted that American citizens have the right to participate and 
express their interest in the management of public lands, and that the Senate should not 
accept a provision that denies this right. See 141 CONG. REC. S4876 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 
1995). 
434. ~alfunct ion in democracy occurs "when the process is undeserving of trust!' 
ELY, SUPM note 295, at 103. In fact, mistrust of state assemblies, where bribery and 
corruption were frequently the norm, resulted in the amendment or incorporation of 
provisions in many state constitutions that restrict the content of appropriations bills to 
non-substantive, budgetary matters. See Zielske, supra note 297, at 742 & n.7. 
435. State courts have struggled with the interpretation of anti-rider provisions; for 
example, the distinction between substantive and non-substantive measures has not been 
clearly defined. See Zielske, supra note 297, at 745-46 (detailing judicial interpretations 
of Pennsylvania provision that states that general appropriations bills "shall embrace 
nothing but appropriations for the executive, legislative and judicial departments of the 
Commonwealth, for the public debt and for public schools."). 
436. Without doubt, some will continue to argue that process alone is not enough 
to ensure environmental protection. Professor Sax has concluded that the implicit principle 
underlying the procedural mandate of NEPA-that federal programs would become less 
environmentally damaging when agencies are required to consider alternatives and publicly 
describe adverse environmental effects-has not been fulfilled. See Joseph L. Sax, Tlie 
(Unhappy) Truth about NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239 (1973). But see Hungerford, supra 
note 62, at 1433-34 (arguing that the issuance of the Northwest Forest Plan in response 
to the spotted owl injunctions provides evidence that NEPA has influenced environmental 
policy in far-reaching ways, by forcing the executive branch to rethink public lands 
management). 
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measures to be germane to the spending bill under consideration, 
consistent with existing law, and limited to the life of the appro- 
priations bill itself.437 In addition, an amendment should likely 
include a provision to allow for waiver, perhaps by a supermajority 
of both houses of Congress, in case of actual emergency.438 The 
experience of states that do have constitutional prohibitions on 
riders is a plausible place to look for guidance.439 
Fundamental constitutional change is justified when special 
interest factions have successfully and repeatedly manipulated the 
political structure to pursue their own narrow interests, as a small 
group of extractive resource users has done in recent years. It is 
justified when "ordinary irresponsibilities of normal politics . . . 
begin to offend in a special way,"440 as is the case when elected 
representatives routinely manipulate the legislative process to co- 
erce the executive branch to forego its veto authority, or to take 
action contrary to directives from the judiciary, thereby eroding 
constitutional checks and balances. It is justified when judicial 
review is severely curtailed by appropriations riders. The assault 
on the public interest and the environment has precipitated a con- 
stitutional crisis. A collective effort to renew and redefine the pub- 
lic good by fine-tuning the legislative process is in order. 
437. See Zielske, supra note 297, at 742-745 (discussing the Pennsylvania Consti- 
tution). 
438. See Devins, supra note 277, at 459. 
439. States have long been considered "laboratories of democracy," a conception 
particularly relevant in this area. See Briffault, supra note 314, at 1171; see also supra 
note 268 (providing a partial list of state constitutions that include limitations on riders). 
In interpreting their own constitutions, state courts have gained substantial experience with 
the difficulty of giving content to terms like "germaneness" and distinguishing between 
"substantive" and "non-substantive" measures. See ZieIske, supra note 297, at 745-46. 
440. Ackerman, supra note 339, at 1040. 
